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1. Introduction: From Prostheses to Processes 
 
This book aims to conceptualize figurations of disability in the work of contemporary 
U.S.-American writer William Gibson. By adopting a disability studies framework, I 
argue that Gibson’s narratives contain yet untapped potential to re-think non-
normative bodies and minds thereby offering a new perspective on the author who is 
known for coining “cyberspace.” Over the course of twelve novels, and more than 
twenty short stories,1 Gibson’s specific literary style and concrete thematic interests 
have varied. Yet, from his short story collection Burning Chrome (1986) to his latest 
and first graphic novel Archangel (2017), Gibson’s oeuvre has always been concerned 
with the question of the materiality and embeddedness of an embodied human being. 
This is not to deny the author’s explorations of new, imaginary, or re-issued 
technologies, and particularly the unanticipated possibilities of their “misusage” as 
manifested in his famous claim that, “the street finds its own uses for things” 
(“Burning Chrome” 215). The specification of “things” in this iconic sentence 
indicates “the stuff [that is clinically used] to counter senile amnesia” and usually 
eludes attention by scholars (“Burning Chrome” 215). This widely unrecognized 
reference to a failing physiological functionality of the body and its medical treatment 
lends particular import to the purpose of this thesis, which is to re-read Gibson as a 
writer of the extraordinary body.  
In Gibson’s pioneering cyberpunk fiction, readers experience everything from 
simulated sensory perception technologies in “Fragments of a Hologram Rose” 
(1977), reflective mirrorshades in “Johnny Mnemonic” (1981), a whirring myoelectric 
arm prostheses in “Burning Chrome” (1982), and a corrosive exoskeleton in “The 
Winter Market” (1985) to the more traditional science fiction tropes of time travel, 
parallel universes, human cloning, and military quantum transfer technologies (The 
Peripheral, Archangel). Notably, all of the radical, futuristic technologies of Gibson’s 
fiction decisively relate to the human body. By presenting figures that are damaged, 
deformed, and dysfunctional as well as sutured, restored, prosthetisized and 
technologically enhanced, Gibson interrogates the body’s abilities, challenges its 
appearances, and confronts readers’ preconceptions of the normal body. In this sense 
Gibson is a naturalist rather than a futurist, an anthropologist of the present rather than 
an archeologist of the future. The overt corporeal exceptionalities of Gibson’s 
characters elude normative classifications. Instead of ossifying the characters’ 
relations as “special” at best, “deviant” at worst, Gibson opens up innovative ways to 
conceptualize extraordinary bodies. 
While all three trilogies equally draw attention to the extraordinary body, they 
do so in different ways. There is a distinct development in the representation of the 
manner and effect of corporeal extension from the Sprawl to the Bigend trilogy. In the 
Sprawl trilogy, prosthetic repair and rehabilitation are depicted as a common cultural 
practice, whereas in the Bigend trilogy the medical cure of the characters’ 
“deficiencies” for purposes of normative alignment is no longer a desired measure. I 
argue that this transition is not primarily related to a shift in genre, which does exist 
and will be classified as from technoromanticism to new realism, but instead that it is 																																																								
1 Apart from the collected stories of Burning Chrome there are several uncollected (all commissioned) 
stories, among others “Tokyo Collage” (1988), “Tokyo Suite” (1988), “Hippy Hat Brain Parasite” 
(1983), “The Nazi Lawn Dwarf Murders” (unpublished), “Doing Television” (1990), slightly expanded 
and republished as “Darwin,” “Skinner’s Room” (1990), “Academy Leader” (1991),  “Cyber-Claus” 
(1991), “Where the Holograms Go” (1993), “Thirteen Views of a Cardboard City” (1996), “Dougal 
Discarnate” (2010).  
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motivated by a changing attitude toward the “broken” body that seeks restoration. The 
socio-historical negotiation of bodies suffering from individual incapacities or social 
disadvantages is located in the field of disability studies. My analysis goes hand in 
hand with the denaturalization of disability as a stable category of inherent individual 
deficits, and draws on Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s terminology regarding the 
“extraordinary” body, which she refers to as a “paradigm of what culture calls 
deviant” (Extraordinary Bodies 6).   
A main concern of this book is to understand the formal qualities of Gibson’s 
writing with regard to the forms and functions of the disabled figure, and to further 
demonstrate how this literary style and underlying ideology changes in parallel with 
the advancement of cultural conceptions of disability. I distinguish two major shifts 
over the course of the novels, one on the level of genre and the other on the 
conceptual level. I show how Gibson’s depiction of characters draws increasingly on 
a processual understanding of the human body, and decreasingly on traditional 
prosthetic technologies. This conceptual trajectory from prostheses to processes 
corresponds with the genre-specific shift in Gibson’s work that I classify as one from 
technoromanticism to new realism.  
Overall, I approach Gibson’s oeuvre chronologically. I will begin in this 
introduction with his cyberpunk short stories and conclude with his latest works, The 
Peripheral (2014) and Archangel (2017). The main focus of my analysis lies on 
Gibson’s three trilogies, which inform the structure of chapter 4. Chapter 4.1 centers 
on the Sprawl trilogy: Neuromancer (1984), Count Zero (1986), and Mona Lisa 
Overdrive (1988). Then, chapter 4.2 focuses on the Bridge trilogy: Virtual Light 
(1993), Idoru (1996), and All Tomorrow’s Parties (1999). Finally, chapter 4.3 
examines the Bigend trilogy: Pattern Recognition (2003), Spook Country (2007), and 
Zero History (2010). Within each of these chapters however I will not proceed strictly 
chronologically, but will discuss the construction of disability thematically across 
each set of novels with a focus on characterization techniques and representational 
strategies.  
Since a study of the construction of disability in Gibson’s novels demands an 
introduction into, and explication of, the ways in which “the human body” was 
culturally understood, categorized, and conceptualized in the time of Gibson’s 
writing, my analysis of the conceptual shift from prostheses to processes is 
methodologically met with a theoretical triad that feeds on the socio-historical 
developments of the concept of disability. To that end, chapter 2.1 begins with the 
historicizing of material bodies in medical history. Until the intervention of disability 
activism and disability studies in the 1960s and 1970s, a medical model dominated 
cultural understanding of disability. Developed in the 1970s, the social model 
provided an entirely new, constructivist notion of disability. Chapter 2.2 draws on 
criticism of the semiotic body as proposed by the social model of disability and 
supplements it with an intersectional approach. In chapter 2.3, I present an actor-
network theory approach to disability that is grounded in contemporary science and 
technology studies, and further allows a discussion of both semiotic and material 
entities, particularly in the sense of their interrelation.  
This book can be read in two ways. Read in its own chronology chapter 2 
presents the conceptual shift from prostheses to processes in the historical theorization 
of disability. This development is mirrored in Gibson’s trilogies, which correspond to 
the three decades that have been significant for the reconceptualization of disability. 
The literary shift from prostheses to processes in Gibson’s fiction is discussed in 
chapter 4. Readers who are more profoundly interested in the detailed resonances 
 11	
between disability history and the corresponding analysis of Gibson’s trilogies are 
invited to read the chapters 2.1 and 4.1, 2.2 and 4.2 as well as 2.3 and 4.3 
consecutively.  
In its totality, this book is indebted to Nickianne Moody’s “disability-informed 
criticism”. Inspired by Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm’s (1996) model of an 
ecologically informed criticism, Moody advocates a methodology for studying 
disability in literature that aims at understanding “both the cultural product and the 
culture that produced it” (30). In opposition to those traditions of literary criticism 
that analyze a subject matter (disability or other) either on the basis of the biography 
of the author alone or as an issue relevant only within the fiction of the story, 
Moody’s 
 
methodology requires the researcher to focus on the fictional disabled subject, 
their interrelations within the narrative and the context of disability in the 
fictional world. From this vantage point the structure of the text, its cultural 
significance, and the meaning of disability to the culture in which the narrative 
is produced and consumed, are the pivotal interests of the analysis (31). 
 
Therefore, disability-informed criticism urges the literary analysis of literary 
disability to link back to a culture’s socio-political realities, for instance, the medical-
industrial complex 2 , ablenationalism 3 , austerity 4 , and eugenic world building 
throughout various historical moments5. Moody continues,  
 
Such an approach has to draw on literature from the broader humanities and 
disability studies. It is concerned with the role, appearance, discursive 
treatment and resonant meaning of the characters in the narrative; and their 
dealings with, or the absence of, representations of a disabling environment; 
and power relations between able-bodied and disabled interests (31). 
 
As shown above, in its literary analysis this study draws on a theoretical triad of the 
medical, social, and actor-network theory approaches toward the disabled body and 
disabled literary figure. 
Burning Chrome provides a point of departure for this book. In this 
introduction, I illustrate how Gibson’s early short stories prefigure the language and 
style, tropes and characters, as well as underlying ideologies, of his novels. In these 
short stories, these elements already exist in embryonic form. Therefore, the analysis 
of a selection of stories does not only achieve the purpose of familiarizing the reader 
with Gibson’s fiction, but conceptually prepares the ensuing analyses of his trilogies. 
To this end, the prominent examples of “Johnny Mnemonic”, “Burning Chrome,” and 
“The Winter Market” are discussed as they explicitly showcase the prosthetically 
enhanced body. Stories from the collection that do not put the extraordinary body 
center stage nonetheless inconspicuously remark on it. For example, “New Rose 
Hotel” touches upon the ideological belief in corporeal wholeness, the medical 
practices of reconstruction, and the social practice of “passing” when a character 																																																								
2 See Jasbir K. Puar’s discussion in “Coda: The Cost of Getting Better” (2012). 
3 See David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder’s The Biopolitics of Disability: Neoliberalism, 
Ablenationalism, and Peripheral Embodiment (2015). 
4 See Dan Goodley, Rebecca Lawthom and Katherine Runswick-Cole “Dis/ability and Austerity: 
Beyond Work and Slow Death” (2014). 
5 See Garland-Thomson’s “Building a World with Disability in It” (2016).	
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mentions that “his left shoulder skewed at an angle no Paris tailor could conceal,” that 
“[s]omeone had run him over with a taxi in Berne, and nobody quite knew how to put 
him together again” (125). These subtle references to extraordinary corporeality 
pervade Gibson’s work, making the extraordinary body a staple ingredient to his 
literary repertoire. At the same time, the short stories serve as a foil to throw the 
conceptual and genre shifts of his work into relief.  
Moreover, this introduction contextualizes Gibson as a science fiction author, 
and provides an overview of his work’s reception in order to highlight the neglect of 
disability therein. Although, for instance, the notions of the posthuman and 
transhuman have attracted some attention over the years, the concept of disability 
remains a blind spot in Gibson scholarship. In this introduction I will, therefore, first 
explain the role of the normal and disabled figure in science fiction, cyberpunk, and 
post-cyberpunk literature before turning specifically to Gibson’s work. Chapter 3 in 
particular, discusses the attention, or the lack thereof, that has been given to Gibson’s 
depiction of the extraordinary body in the academic reception of his trilogies.  
  
 
THE DISABLED FIGURE IN SCIENCE FICTION 
 
For a long time, medical conceptualizations dominated literary depictions of the 
disabled human body. From folktales and classical myths to modern and postmodern 
fictions, the disabled body has been traditionally figured as a symbol of mental 
deficiency or moral corruption, as a consequence of Godly punishment or personal 
tragedy, as an occasion of freakish spectacle or grotesque manifestation, and as a 
condition to be overcome or rehabilitated in order to return to order, health, and 
normalcy. As a genre with arguably infinite possibilities in its creation of worlds, 
societies, and creatures, traditional science fiction resorts to surprisingly normative 
notions in the construction of all three.  
The heroes of classic science fiction stories by Jules Verne (1828-1905), H. G. 
Wells (1866-1946), Hugo Gernsback (1884-1967), Robert A. Heinlein (1917-1977), 
Arthur Clarke (1917-2008), Isaac Asimov (1920-1992), Ray Bradbury (1920-2012), 
and Harlan Ellison (1934), as well as those in contemporary work such as that of 
Andy Weir and Neil Gaiman, are often rational scientists and undaunted warriors of 
mostly good health and good morals. Sometimes they are on a mission to explore and 
missionize or colonize outer space, or they may be tasked with defending the world 
from alien forces and re-establishing law and order. What most of them have in 
common is a specific body type we re-encounter in film and television adaptations. 
Examples of this include: George Reeves in Adventures of Superman (1952-1958), 
Walter Pidgeon and Leslie Nielsen in Forbidden Planet (1956), Lee Majors in The Six 
Million Dollar Man (1973-78), Harrison Ford in Star Wars (1977), Sam J. Jones in 
Flash Gordon (1980), Michael J. Fox and Christopher LLoyed in Back to the Future 
(1985), Arnold Schwazenegger in Total Recall (1990), Tom Hanks, Kevin Bacon, and 
Ed Harris in Apollo 13 (1995), Tom Cruise in Minority Report (2002), War of The 
Worlds (2005), and Oblivion (2013), Matthew McConaughey in Interstellar (2014) 
and  Matt Damon in The Martian (2015). With respect to representations of 
protagonists in Hollywood action cinema, which subsumes the majority of science 
fiction films, Susanne Rieser and Susanne Lummerding write that these kinds of 
movies cherish “the fetishistic display of male hardbodies … The martyred (and later 
reborn) bodies of Arnold Schwarzenegger and company testify that action film … 
reaffirms the construction of male subjectivity by renouncing its social origin” (247).  
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Of course, right from the early days of science fiction literary, and later filmic, 
works emerged that explored various forms of embodiment situated along an entire 
spectrum of ability. To that end, stories actively interrogated, covertly featured, or 
were otherwise narrated by “Others.” Literary figures such as those in Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818), H. P. Lovecraft’s At the 
Mountains of Madness (1936), and Anne McCaffrey’s The Ship Who Sang (1969); or 
films such as the Planet of the Apes franchise, The Bionic Woman (1976-78) and 
Blade Runner (1982), further illustrate this point. However, besides the fact that any 
deviance from the white, male, heterosexual, able-bodied hero archetype is perceived 
as a “deviance” and compulsorily addressed in the narrative, the modes of 
representation vary significantly from that of their normal-bodied counterparts.  
 In terms of the depiction of disabled bodies explicitly, Kathryn Allen writes in 
Disability in Science Fiction: Representations of Technology as Cure (2013) that, 
 
[w]hile the settings and temporal framework of SF may differ dramatically 
from our own current reality, the way in which disability and people with 
disabilities are represented—as well as the technology that is used to contain 
or cure them—often directly reflects present-day biases and stereotypes (3).  
 
As a staple ingredient in science fiction (SF), “the disabled body stood in for a whole 
of host of socially constructed and marginalized otherness—sexual deviance, 
criminality, moral and intellectual deficiency, ethnic and racial difference” (7). 
Following the idea that science fiction addresses the politics and ideologies of the 
present, Allan provides a critique on the dominant ideology of the genre, which posits 
technology as “a solution to overcome the physical or mental limitations of the human 
body” thus a “perfect body” can be attained through medical intervention (1, 11, 9). 
Allan argues that while all bodies undergo constant change, it is the disabled body in 
particular that represents “a modifiable condition that offers opportunity for … 
enhancement” (7). Through an emphasis on curing or rehabilitating people with 
disabilities, the “unruly bodies” in science fiction (and by extension, cyberpunk) are 
like, “no other literary genre [in coming] close to articulating the anxieties and 
preoccupations of the present day” (2).  
  
 
THE DISABLED FIGURE IN CYBERPUNK 
 
Gibson’s unparalleled sensitivity to detail and innovative literary style guaranteed his 
immediate breakthrough as a young author in the early 1980s. Much to his disfavor, 
readers, critics, and scholars honored him as the founder of a new science fiction 
subgenre, deeming him “the father of cyberpunk”. Gibson together with Bruce 
Sterling, Pat Cadigan, Lewis Shiner, John Shirley, and Rudy Rucker formed a loosely 
associated group of writers who addressed familiar topics in a radically new literary 
style. In 1983 Sterling proclaims,  
 
a crying need to re-think, re-tool, and adapt to the modern era. SF has one 
critical advantage: it is still a pop industry that is close to its audience. It is not 
yet wheezing in the iron lung of English departments or begging for 
government Medicare through art grants. … SF has always preached the 
inevitability of change. Physician, heal thyself” (Cheap Truth n.pag. qtd. in 
Blake).  
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Sterling captures not only the antagonistic and revolutionary spirit of cyberpunk 
writers and works, but summons the figure of the “poet-physican” in his Romantic 
request for the cure of an ill-adapted literary tradition to the modern era.6 As a result, 
cyberpunk texts left many readers dumbfounded. As Victoria Blake holds  
 
[n]obody had ever read anything like what the cyberpunks were writing—
stories and novels that were the bastard child of science fiction, with a 
common-man perspective, a love of tech and drugs, and an affinity for street 
culture. That most cyberpunk was written by white males didn’t seems to 
ruffle any feathers (9-10). 
 
Therefore, as Kelly and Kessel observe, “[i]t is not surprising that the cyberpunk 
movement, so quick to sneer at other kinds of science fiction and to strike an attitude 
of hip self-importance, would be controversial” (vii). Criticism was directed at the 
cyberpunks’ preoccupation with surfaces instead of substances, and the recycling of 
classic science fiction works (vii). Kelly and Kessel go on to say, “as [the cyberpunk 
writers] continued to publish their innovative stories and novels, readers and—
eventually—writers and critics began to acknowledge that there might be something 
to cyberpunk” (vii-viii). Thematically, what unites these authors is, according to 
David Porush, the significance attributed to the question: “What aspect of humanity 
makes us human?” (“Out of Our Minds” 258). As Tatiani G. Rapatzikou’s discusses 
with regard to Gibson’s fiction in Gothic Motifs in the Fiction of William Gibson 
(2004), stylistically these authors evince a strong undercurrent of Romantic and 
Gothic elements in settings and narrative techniques, as well as characters’ attitudes 
towards the body and set-ups of the mind.  
In contrast to traditional science fiction, cyberpunk has a distinct inclination 
toward figures on the margin of society, and social outcasts of all sorts. Depictions of 
marginalized bodies often reveal scars, tattoos, addictions, and prostheses without 
glorifying the outlaw. These scarred, tattooed, addicted, and prostheticized cyberpunk 
bodies go against the grain of the “fetish bodies of white supremacism” not by 
reversing the power dynamics but by complicating the characters’ sense of self-
identity (Rieser and Lummerding 247). It is not only the figure of the “disaffected 
loner from outside the cultural mainstream” that validates these writers’ stories as 
“punk” literature (Kelly and Kessel xi). Kelly and Kessel contend that an excessive 
reliance on the outsider figure testifies to a disappointing lack in “extrapolative rigor” 
(xi). “No future could exist,” they explain, “in which there were only data thieves in 
trench coats and megalomaniacal middle managers. Someone had to be baking the 
bread and driving the trucks and assembling all those flat screens. Cyberspace needs 
electricians!” (xi). While over the years Gibson’s protagonists have evolved to more 
well-rounded characters and their worlds have incrementally expanded, the punk 
element preserves a “defiant attitude based in urban street culture,” and “an 
adversarial relationship to consensus reality” (Cavallaro, Cyberpunk and Cyberculture 
14, Kelly and Kessel xii).  
 The “cyber” element points to a particular brand of science fiction, which 
centers on cybernetics rather than rockets and robots. Thus, rather than outer space, 
cyberpunk characters explore a “paraspace,” or metaphorical space under the name of 
cyberspace, the matrix, or virtual reality (Bukatman 200). Conceptually, these 																																																								
6 These tropes will be introduced in more detail in chapter 2.1 of this book. 
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alternative spaces provide more than a setting for hacker adventures, they are also 
virtual channels of communication and interaction, and digital networks of 
interrelations and control. In “Burning Chrome,” Gibson describes cyberspace in 
distinctly visceral terms as “mankind’s extended electronic nervous system” (197). 
The matrix, on the other hand, is understood as “an abstract representation of the 
relationships between data systems (196). The protagonist explains how computer 
cowboys have bodies “[s]omewhere … very far away” and devotes his attention to the 
description of the matrix as a “3-D chessboard, infinite and perfectly transparent” 
(200, 195). Today we might feel a certain nostalgia for the “monochrome nonspace 
where the only stars are dense concentrations of information, and high above it all 
burn corporate galaxies and the cold spiral arms of military systems,” for a crude 
digital realm populated with “bright geometries” as the internet today is all surface 
(197). In Gibson’s cyberpunk fiction, hackers surf through “[t]owers and fields of 
[corporate data, which] ranged in the colorless nonspace of the simulation matrix, the 
electronic consensus-hallucination that facilitates the handling and exchange of 
massive quantities of data” (“Burning Chrome” 197). Gibson forges a new language 
and new mental images that not only revolutionize traditional science fiction, but also 
enrich cultural vocabulary in a way that facilitates the navigation of the human in 
increasingly complex relationships with technology, globalization, and 
corporatocracy.  
As Cavallaro decisively states, the body is pivotal in this negotiation of the 
modern era:  
 
in spite of several critics’ claim that technology has erased the body, this is not 
really the case. Technology has transformed the body (at times by empowering 
it, at others by attenuating it) but it has not taken it away. Technological 
transformations of the body are crucial tools through which contemporary 
cultures define themselves, their beliefs and their desires. Cyberpunk enhances 
the body through biotechnology and futuristic surgery but simultaneously 
exposes it to environmental threats, corporational greed and sexual 
exploitation (Cyberpunk and Cyberculture xviii).  
 
In this respect, Cavallaro observes the significant role of prostheses in prompting 
questions about the physical limits and technological extensions of the human body. 
He states, 
 
Prostheses enhance our bodies, but they also remind us of our failings, thus 
endowing us with a double identity: the better self and the failing self. 
Prostheses refine our capacities and alert us to our incapacities; they 
consolidate the edges of our bodies and simultaneously blur them. Indeed, by 
pointing to what is missing in and from the body, they question radically the 
body’s integrity. Prostheses are there to remind us that we have always already 
slipped from the planes of completeness and self-sufficiency. We can never be 
totally sure where our edges are, where we begin and where we end. 
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that prosthetic devices do not simply 
encompass artificial limbs and implants but also the various technologies with 
which increasing numbers of people daily interact—from the Internet to 
fitness-club machinery. Is the person hooked into a computer and navigating 
through cyberspace, or the person developing his/her body schema through 
exercise equipment built with the latest technology less or more a cyborg than 
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the person kept barely alive by machines in an intensive care unit, or the 
person connected by complex interfaces to a war craft? If all these people are 
cyborgs, do some retain a greater degree of humanness than others? If so, how 
is this humanness measured? Where does the human end and where does the 
technological begin? (50-1). 
 
While Cavallaro’s passage sounds like a critical disability studies scholars’ 
introduction to a discussion of the relation between cyberpunk and disability to a 
disability sensitive reader in 2019, an explicit thematization of the mechanisms of the 
construction of disability in cyberpunk literature does not follow. This disregard of 
disability in Gibson’s fiction exemplifies a “critical avoidance” disability studies 
scholars have observed across all media and genres (Bolt 287). As Ria Cheyne holds, 
“[t]his avoidance is typically attributed to a disabling society: the assumption is that 
most literary scholars, like the authors who produce and reproduce disabling imagery 
in their work, unconsciously reinforce wider social prejudices” (146). It is the main 
objective of this study of Gibson’s work to address the narrative strategies, literary 
tropes, and underlying ideologies involved in the figurations of human embodiment in 
relation to disability in Gibson’s cyberpunk fiction, as well as the incrementally 
expanding perspective on the body in his post-cyberpunk novels.  
 
 
LITERARY CRITICISM AND GIBSON’S CYBERPUNK FICTION  
 
Gibson, usually attributed with the epithet of “the author of Neuromancer,” had his 
finger on the pulse of society when he wrote his novel about the essential 
pervasiveness of new computer technologies, apocalyptic urban landscapes, and 
hacker culture all of which affected the condition of the body. Opposed to science 
fiction literature that tended toward clean, shiny, and high-tech settings, morally and 
physically flawless heroes, and the faultless machines of earlier decades, Gibson 
initiates a turning point in the genre. His dystopian technoculture scenarios shake 
cultural consciousness by undermining the binary oppositions between human beings 
and machines. Recognizing that “[w]e cannot think realistically any longer of the 
human species without a machine,” Bruce Mazlish associates the decades of 
cyberpunk with what he, in tribute to Freud, calls “the fourth discontinuity” (6). 
Initiated by the Copernican, the Darwinian, and the Freudian revolutions that 
dethroned the human from his position as master of the universe, the animal kingdom, 
and his own psyche, as well as the rise of modern technology spearheaded by the 
computer, it is clear that the boundaries between nature and artifice, the real and the 
virtual, the body and its mechanic extensions, have been eroded. In what way do 
machines relate to, or even constitute, that which they are commonly diametrically set 
up against? Although these questions are not at all restricted to negotiations of 
disability and prosthetics, it is exactly there that body and machine visibly interlock. 
Technological supplements, however, rather than bringing forth a new wholeness or 
unity, emphasize a fundamental fragmentation and diversification of embodied 
agency.  
In light of such an abundance of provocative concerns, stylistic elements, and 
potential paradigm shifts, Gary Westfahl wonders at “the surprising paucity of books” 
devoted to Gibson (5). Indeed, extensive scholarship on William Gibson is limited to: 
Lance Olsen’s William Gibson (1992), Tom Henthorne’s William Gibson: A Literary 
Companion (2011), Gerald Alva Miller’s Understanding William Gibson (2014), two 
 17	
books examining specific concerns Cavallaro’s Cyberpunk and Cyberculture (2000), 
Rapatzikou’s Gothic Motifs in the Fiction of William Gibson (2004), and Carl B. 
Yoke and Carol L. Robinson’s essay collection The Cultural Influences of William 
Gibson, the Father of Cyberpunk Science Fiction (2007). That being said, there are a 
numerous journal articles devoted to Gibson, however most concentrate specifically 
on Neuromancer. Due to its innovative literary style, Neuromancer has become 
something of a touchstone for academic literature on cyberpunk, virtual reality, and 
the posthuman condition. To this end, Gibson’s debut novel is still his most 
intensively reviewed work. Yet, the evolution of Gibson’s literary style occasioned a 
continuous discussion of genre classifications. I discuss the reception of each trilogy 
in more detail in chapter 3.  
I argue that discussions of the extraordinary body have been perfunctory 
because most criticism has reiterated views of the disabled figure as either broken and 
in need of repair, or empowered along posthuman and cyborg lines, thus neglecting 
institutionalized oppression and medicalized constraint. My study of Gibson’s work 
aims to address this critical gap. As Westfahl notes, Gibson “is most comfortable with 
characters who neither embrace nor reject innovations but, like Gibson himself, 
simply adjust to them while carrying on with everyday life” (6). This adjustment to 
technological innovations is performed first and foremost on the stage of the human 
body and thus negotiates a cognitive and emotional ambivalence towards the 
technologization of the body on a visceral level. My refashioning of Gibson as a 
writer of the extraordinary body is preceded by Cavallaro’s excellent study of 
cyberpunk, which is one of the few to recognize the body’s centrality to, and 
ambiguity in, Gibson’s work. Cavallaro states, 
 
On the one hand, the fusion of the biological and the technological signals the 
disappearance of the body, its reduction to lifeless meat. On the other, it opens 
up fresh opportunities for experiment, recombination and play … Though the 
physical dimension is often marginalized by digital technology, both the 
biological body and the body of the posturban megalopolis go on presenting 
eminently material traits, intensified by their lacerations and vulnerabilities. 
The bodies generated by cyberpunk are simultaneously mythological, as 
products of imagination and fantasy, technological, as products of science and 
ideology, and Gothic, as products of psychotic and fragmented environments, 
of physical and mental disarray, of deviance and transgression (xv). 
 
Instead of castigating previous receptions of Gibson’s work for overlooking the 
literary mechanisms of the (re-)production of disability by the criteria of an academic 
disability studies informed understanding of the body, it is my aim to resume the 
modest beginnings of discussion regarding Gibson’s fictional bodies. I will do this by 
reassessing the depictions of extraordinary embodiment with regard to medical, 
cultural, and sociological concepts of disability that are individually introduced in 
chapter 2 of this book.  
 My discussion peripherally borders on what N. Katherine Hayles popularized 
as “the posthuman.” Especially in publications such as Cary Wolfe’s What is 
Posthumanism? (2010), Patricia MacCormack’s Posthuman Ethics (2012) and Rosi 
Braidotti’s The Posthuman (2013), it is persistently the specter of disability that is 
evoked as the preeminent site for the negotiation of cultural and political 
transformations of human embodiment in the age of intelligent machines. In 
delineating representations of extraordinary bodies, beginning with Gibson’s 
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depiction of a prosthetic future in the Sprawl trilogy and moving on to the modalities 
of what might be called a processual present in the Bigend trilogy, this study traces a 
transformation in the conception of what it means to be technologically extended. 
Instead of reinforcing what Elaine L. Graham has termed the, “‘ontological hygiene’ 
separating human from non-human, nature from culture, organism from machine,” 
prosthetic embodiments in Gibson’s later fiction will thus be revealed to exhibit 
unexpected affirmative and emancipatory potential that goes far beyond the common 
science fiction motif of the technologically enhanced superhuman (35). 
 
 
Burning Chrome: Early Elements of Extraordinariness 
 
THE BODY IN PROSTHETICS 
 
The title of Gibson’s short story “Johnny Mnemonic” indexes the vital role of 
memory for the characterization of its protagonist. However, the narrative focuses not 
so much on Johnny’s ability to preserve or recall his past experiences, but rather 
showcases in a truly cyberpunk manner how a neural implant endows the character 
with the capacity to store additional mostly sensitive or criminal data. The central 
conflict of the story arises when Ralfi, one of Johnny’s customers, is unwilling to 
retrieve his data, and exploits the character for “data laundry.” Uncommon to the 
narrative situations of Gibson’s novels, his short fiction tends towards first person 
narration. Johnny recounts 
 
I had hundreds of megabytes stashed in my head on an idiot/savant basis, 
information I had no conscious access to. Ralfi had left it there. He hadn’t, 
however, came back for it. Only Ralfi could retrieve the data, with a code 
phrase of his own invention. I’m not cheap to begin with, but my overtime on 
storage is astronomical  (15).  
 
Throughout Johnny’s quest to get things straight with a Ralfi, the portrayal reduces 
him to his function as an external data storage unit, a “blind receptacle to be filled 
with other people’s knowledge” which can only be retrieved with a password the 
customer determines (32). To guarantee data security, Johnny is programmed to play 
it back in “synthetic languages” he himself does not understand. The stand-off 
between Johnny and Ralfi is interrupted by street fighter Molly Millions, who sees a 
job opportunity in offering her services as bodyguard to the highest bidder. It is 
Johnny who takes this chance to save his life. Molly, herself prosthetically enhanced 
by “surgical inlays” in both hands and eyes, joins Johnny on his mission (19). 
Eventually, she succeeds in removing the data out of his system by introducing him to 
a drug addicted ex-military dolphin who hacks Ralfi’s password and successfully 
initiates the playback. All Johnny remembers from the incident is that “it all faded to 
cool gray static and an endless tone poem in the artificial language. I sat and sang 
dead Ralfi’s stolen program for three hours” (27). Essentially, this character embodies 
functionality instead of personality—a depiction buttressed by an understanding of 
the body as a machine which can be broken and repaired, made from individual parts 
that can be replaced, added, or removed.  
 Echoing the misanthropic, brilliant, and disabled main character of Heinlein’s 
short story “Waldo” (1942), Gibson’s short story “Burning Chrome” features a 
protagonist named “Automatic Jack,” who is distinctly marked by a prostheticized 
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corporeality. Depending on the prioritization of function or appearance, Jack 
alternates between his automatic “waldo,” and arm prosthesis. Jack’s name signifies 
his identity, which in turn equals his function. Reduced to the functionality of his 
waldo to conduct precise micro repairs, Jack is indeed a “jack-of-all-trades,” and 
signifies the practicality of the body. Jack’s associate and computer cowboy Bobby on 
the other hand represents the mind of the duo. Jack introduces them as  
 
Bobby Quine and Automatic Jack. Bobby’s the thin, pale dude with the dark 
glasses, and Jack’s the meanlooking guy with the myoelectric arm. Bobby’s 
software and Jack’s hard; Bobby punches console and Jack runs down all the 
little things that can give you an edge (197). 
 
By foregrounding how the functional roles of the characters are inscribed in their 
bodies, the narrative dispenses with a profound depiction of their experience of 
embodiment. As Westfahl realizes with regard to the Sprawl trilogy, “none of 
Gibson’s characters spend any time pondering the implications of such innovations … 
they have ‘no imagination.’ Body modifications are accepted without comment” (68). 
 The prosthetic enhancement of ability or restoration of bodily function, albeit 
central, is but only one incentive for the body modifications portrayed in Gibson’s 
short fiction. Motivations range from the cosmetic heightening of beauty ideals to the 
intensification of physical pleasure, or the permanent enactment of fetishism. All of 
which do not target the approximation, but rather the deliberate deviance from, an 
assumed norm. Mocking the hyper-masculinity of “muscle-boys,” the protagonist of 
“Johnny Mnemonic” observes how a group of men “were flexing stock parts at one 
another and trying on thin, cold grins, some of them so lost under superstructures of 
muscle graft that their outlines weren’t really human” (15). Even more outlandish are 
the “Magnetic Dog Sisters,” who live out fetish fantasies through full-body change. 
Johnny notes: 
 
They were two meters tall and thin as greyhounds. One was black and the 
other white, but aside from that they were as nearly identical as cosmetic 
surgery could make them. They’d been lovers for years and were bad news in 
the tussle. I was never quite sure which one had originally been male (14-5).  
 
Such a mechanical vision of the body as having unlimited possibilities in prosthetic 
re-assemblage, implies the idea that like a machine, the body can be hacked or 
disabled. In his attempt to threaten Ralfi by force, Johnny is immobilized by a “neural 
disruptor”:  
 
I put everything I had into curling the index finger of my right hand, but I no 
longer seemed to be connected to it. I could feel the metal of the gun and the 
foam-padded tape. I’d wrapped around the stubby grip, but my hands were 
cool wax, distant and inert (17).  
 
Gibson illustrates here how once the electric circuitry of the body is interrupted, 
control is also disabled. 
Furthermore, Gibson’s descriptions are profoundly technical as manifested in 
neural disruptors, “[s]uperconducting quantum inference detectors” or “parabolic 
microphones and lasers” (23). With regard to the representation of the body, Gibson’s 
language thus relies on notions of the machine as much as it simultaneously works 
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within a medical register. Johnny describes how the “stored data are fed in through a 
modified series of microsurgical contraautism prostheses,” and refers to his condition 
as an “idiot-savant” mode (22). This terminology bears on a distinct history of 
medical classification schemes, particularly the eugenic typology of humans of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Moreover, this terminology characterizes 
Gibson’s Sprawl novels by undergirding the representation of extraordinary bodies.  
 
 
THE BODY IN CONTEXT 
 
In contrast to Johnny Mnemonic, who remains mainly unconcerned about body 
modifications, Automatic Jack reveals various instances of critical reflection upon the 
interpersonal reactions of others to his embodiment, as well as the potential 
drawbacks of technological enhancement. Ultimately, Jack realizes the success of 
surgical operations is not guaranteed. When Jack encounters his beloved Rikki in a 
café, next to her sits “a boy with Sendai eyes, half-healed suture fines radiating from 
his bruised sockets” (“Burning Chrome” 211). Herself aspiring the implantation of 
camera lenses and recording gear instead of her eyes, Rikki emulates media superstar 
Tally Isham, “the Girl with the Zeiss Ikon Eyes.” Jack, however, is deeply concerned 
and warns Rikki, that the boy’s “optic nerves may start to deteriorate inside six 
months. You know that, Rikki? Those Sendais are illegal in England, Denmark, lots 
of places. You can’t replace nerves” (211-2). In contrast to Jack’s arm prosthesis, the 
replacement of nerves appears impossible despite how advanced biotechnology might 
be. While characters do not reflect on their technologized identity, they consider the 
possibly negative outcomes of the hybridization of body and machine. Characteristic 
of cyberpunk depictions of biotechnology does not, as Cavallaro remarks, “make the 
body stronger and more durable. If anything, it shapes it on the model of the 
commodity doomed to planned obsolescence” (92). Johnny Mnemonic concludes at 
the end of story that “one day [he]’ll have a surgeon dig all the silicon out of [his] 
amygdalae, and [he]’ll live with [his] own memories and nobody else’s, the way other 
people do. But not for a while” (36). It took Gibson a decade of work before his 
characters began to make, keep, reflect on, and above all, fully appreciate their lived 
embodied memories. Most notably, we see this in the character of Keith Allen 
Blackwell of the Bridge trilogy. Unlike Johnny, Blackwell’s memories are personal 
and leave physical traces as reflections of his life story. There is another mirror image 
of Johnny Mnemonic in Gibson’s later fiction. As Tatsumi observes, “Gibson has 
been obsessed with the role of the courier who carries information around without 
knowing what it is; all Johnny does is not to know but carry” (116). The Bridge 
trilogy features Chevette Washington as another human carrier of information. This 
time, however, as an analog version in the form of a rebellious teenager girl bike 
messenger.  
 Moreover, “Burning Chrome” introduces the gaze as a means of interaction 
between characters.  
 
I was working late in the loft one night, shaving down a chip, my arm off and 
the little waldo jacked straight into the stump. Bobby came in with a girl I 
hadn’t seen before, and usually I feel a little funny if a stranger sees me 
working that way, with those leads clipped to the hard carbon studs that stick 
out of my stump. She came right over and looked at the magnified image on 
the screen, then saw the waldo moving under its vacuum-sealed dust cover. 
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She didn’t say anything, just watched. Right away I had a good feeling about 
her; it’s like that sometimes (“Burning Chrome” 201). 
 
The fact that Jack consciously evaluates the girl’s reaction, and more specifically the 
way she observes his arm prosthesis reveals two things. First, it is noteworthy that to 
him, his body is not problematic. At no point in the narrative is Jack concerned about, 
or bothered by, his prosthesis unless he is in the company of strangers. Discomfort 
does not arise from an alleged deficiency of the body itself but instead it is 
somebody’s stare that can cause uneasiness. While Jack is generally comfortable with 
Rikki, when she asks “[w]hat happened to your arm?” in public Jack gets 
uncomfortable (203). Feeling exposed, he answers brusquely that it was an accident. 
Only the reader is let in on the full extent of his discomfort by his narration: “I don’t 
remember how I changed the subject, but I did” (203). As it turns out, Rikki is 
attracted to Jack and shows no signs of fear of contact. Jack notes, 
 
[a]nybody else ever touched me there, they went on to the shoulder, the neck 
… But she didn’t do that. … And her hand went down the arm, black nails 
tracing a weld in the laminate, down to the black anodized elbow joint, out to 
the wrist, her hand soft-knuckled as a child’s, fingers spreading to lock over 
mine, her palm against the perforated Duralumin (204-5).  
 
Moreover, Jack shows a playful, even humorous, way of dealing with his arm 
prosthesis as he “snapped [his] Duralumin fingers for [Rikki]” or purposefully teases 
the Finn, a street dealer of all sorts of spare and stolen goods (202).   
 
I let my arm clunk down on the table and started the fingers drumming; the 
servos in the hand began whining like overworked mosquitoes. I knew that the 
Finn really hated the sound. ‘You looking to pawn that?’ he prodded the 
Duralumin wrist joint with the chewed shaft of a felt-tip pen. ‘Maybe get 
yourself something a little quieter?’ (199). 
 
 Unlike Johnny Mnemonic, Automatic Jack shows moments of individual 
reflection and social mediation with regards to his embodiment. This not only adds 
another layer of complexity to the narrative, but also reveals that despite the 
pervasiveness of body alterations, these physical differences are still consciously 
registered by characters, further implying another normative system outside the 
hacker subculture Gibson portrays. Jack’s uncomfortable reaction to another 
characters’ stare condensed in the statement “I thought he spent too long on my arm” 
shows the ways in which prostheses have not fully entered the invisible realm of the 
norm (212). Gibson’s characters are at times fascinated by bodily differences, and at 
other times troubled by bodily deviances. This ambivalence remains a vital 
characteristic throughout his work.  
 In addition, “Burning Chrome” problematizes the relation between body and 
prosthesis by questioning the extent to which the machine counts as an integral part of 
the body. Throughout the narrative which follows hacker duo Bobby and Jack on their 
quest to “burn Chrome,” that is to break into and rob the computer system of the 
known criminal Chrome, Jack refers to the prosthesis simply as his arm. He explains 
that the prosthesis is not only a consciously used tool for handyman work, but also a 
body part that is integrated into the circuitry of impulses and thus unconsciously his 
“arm convulsed, started clicking, fear translated to the myoelectrics through the 
 22 
carbon studs” (208) or on the contrary sometimes his “arm forgot to click” (210). This 
ambivalence also pervades interactions with Rikki. In one scene, Jack recounts how 
he “nodded, watching the arm swing up to take her hand; it didn’t seem to be part of 
me at all, but she held on to it like it was” (219). Inclined towards ocular implants 
herself, Rikki begets the unequivocal acceptance of his prosthetic body while it is 
Jack who appears doubtful about the integrity of his body. 
 When Jack points to the limitations that result from his missing organic arm, 
such as in rubbing “sleep from [his] eyes with [his] left hand, one thing [he] can’t do 
with [his] right,” these barriers are of a personal almost banal nature, and socio-
politically irrelevant (207). By contrast, a passage in “Johnny Mnemonic” points to 
the ways in which the rules and norms of subcultures inform the body and re-
configure the acceptance of deviations. Molly introduces Johnny to the community of 
Lo Teks, “Low technique, low technology” she clarifies (28). Embedded in an 
intricate network woven of strings, cables, and all sorts of clutter gathered from the 
Sprawl, the Lo Teks live way above the shanty towns of Nighttown. When Johnny 
meets his first Lo Tek he is astonished by the boy’s extraordinary body: 
  
In the narrow beam of her taped flash, he regarded us with his one eye and 
slowly extruded a thick length of grayish tongue, licking huge canines. I 
wondered how they wrote off tooth-bud transplants from Dobermans as low 
technology. Immunosuppressives don’t exactly grow on trees. ‘Moll.’ Dental 
augmentation impeded his speech. A string of saliva dangled from the twisted 
lower lip. ‘Heard ya comin’. Long time.’ He might have been fifteen, but the 
fangs and the bright mosaic of scars combined with the gaping socket to 
present a mask of total bestiality. It had taken time and a certain kind of 
creativity to assemble that face, and his posture told-me he enjoyed living 
behind it. He wore a pair of decaying jeans, black with grime and shiny along 
the creases. His chest and feet were bare. He did something with his mouth 
that approximated a grin. ‘Bein’ followed, you’ (28). 
 
The depiction of the Lo Tek displays how deviance from dominant cultural norms 
may become popular and desirable. Furthermore, this depiction examines how 
individual bodies align with subcultural sets of rules, be it in the form of the 
Doberman teeth or another implantation. Molly’s move to go to the Lo Teks is 
strategic. As it turns out, during the confrontation with Ralfi, the data stored in 
Johnny’s memory is stolen from the Japanese criminal organization Yakuza. Not 
wanting their data revealed, a Yakuza assassin follows them in order to eliminate 
Johnny. The Yakuza’s “nervous system’s jacked up… mostly grown in a vat in Chiba 
City,” and his weapon is a monomolecular wire from his prosthetic thumb (21). As 
Johnny recounts,  
 
they must have amputated part of his left thumb, somewhere behind the first 
joint, replacing it with a prosthetic tip, and cored the stump, fitting it with a 
spool and socket molded from one of the Ono-Sendai diamond analogs. Then 
they’d carefully wound the spool with three meters of monomolecular 
filament  (20). 
 
Molly lures the Yakuza assassin to the Lo Teks’ fighting arena, the so-called Killing 
Floor, for their final face-off. Gibson presents the Killing Floor with a meticulous 
precision regarding the exact materials and styles worked into the setting. 
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The Killing Floor was eight meters on a side. A giant had threaded steel cable 
back and forth through a junkyard and drawn it all taut. It creaked when it 
moved, and it moved constantly, swaying and bucking as the gathering Lo 
Teks arranged themselves on the shelf of plywood surrounding it. The wood 
was silver with age, polished with long use and deeply etched with initials, 
threats, declarations of passion. This was suspended from a separate set of 
cables, which last themselves in darkness beyond the raw white glare of the 
two ancient floods suspended above the Floor. A girl with teeth like Dog’s hit 
the Floor on all fours. Her breast were tattooed with indigo spirals. Then she 
was across the Floor, laughing, grappling with a boy who was drinking dark 
liquid from a liter flask. Lo Tek fashion ran to scars and tattoos. And teeth. 
The electricity they were tapping to light the Killing Floor seemed to be an 
exception to their overall aesthetic, made in the name of... ritual, sport, art? I 
didn’t know, but I could see that the Floor was something special. I had the 
look of having been assembled over generations (31-2). 
 
What later in Gibson’s career will be recognized as a passion for the description of 
settings and objects, is already discernible (if only in retrospect) in his depiction of the 
Killing Floor which appears more like another character rather than a mere 
background architecture. This interest has found expression in Gibson’s experimental 
short story “Thirteen views of a Cardboard City” (1996), which consists of thirteen 
poetic observations of a homeless shelter in the middle of a Tokyo subway station, 
thus renouncing narrative essentials such as plot, conflict, and protagonist. Moreover, 
as Gibson told Rapatzikou in an interview in 2004, “one of the things that frustrated 
me about science fiction was a poverty of sensory detail,” so that in his own writing 
he aspired after “a sort of hyper specificity” (“Interview with William Gibson” 
222). This interest in heterogeneous self-organizing settings is taken further in 
Gibson’s novels and comes particularly into effect in his fourth novel Virtual Light 
through the introduction of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. The Bridge, as 
much as the Floor, partakes actively in the respective story’s action. All sorts of actors 
become visible in the showdown between Molly and the Yakuza assassin: cables, 
plywood, the audiences’ cheers, the electronic beat, and the vibrations of the floor. 
Johnny’s indecisiveness regarding the purpose of the Floor – whether it was for ritual, 
sport, or art – is mirrored in the fight’s atmospheric blend of a boxing match and tribal 
fight: 
 
And then I noticed just how quiet the Lo Teks had become. He was there, at 
the edge of the light, taking in the Killing Floor and the gallery of silent Lo 
Teks with a tourist’s calm … Molly hit the Floor, moving. The Floor 
screamed. It was miked and amplified, with pickups riding the four fat coil 
springs at the corners and contact mikes taped at random to rusting machine 
fragments. Somewhere the Lo Teks had an amp and a synthesizer, and now I 
made out of shapes of speakers overhead, above the cruel white floods. A 
drumbeat began, electronic, like an amplified heart, steady as a metronome … 
She began to dance. She flexed her knees, white feet tensed on a flattened gas 
tank, and the Killing Floor began to heave in response. The sound it made was 
like a world ending, like the wires that hold heaven snapping and coiling 
across the sky. He rode with it, for a few heartbeats, and then he moved … He 
pulled the tip from his thumb with the grace of a man at ease with social 
 24 
gesture and flung it at her. Under the floods, the filament was refracting thread 
of rainbow. She threw herself flat and rolled, jackknifing up as the molecule 
whipped past, steel claws snapping into the light in what must have been an 
automatic rictus of defense. The drum pulse quickened, and she bounced with 
it, her dark hair wild around the blank silver lenses, her mouth thin, lips taut 
with concentration. The Killing Floor boomed and roared, and the Lo Teks 
were screaming their excitement ... And Molly seemed to let something go, 
something inside, and that was the real start of her mad-dog dance. She 
jumped, twisting, lunging sideways, landing with both feet on an alloy engine 
block wired directly to one of the coil springs (31-4).  
 
Unable to process the situation so quickly, Johnny is in culture shock watching Molly 
fight, the Lo Teks cheer, and the Floor vibrate.  
 
I cupped my hands over my ears and knelt in a vertigo of sound, thinking 
Floor and benches were on their way down, down to Nighttown, and I saw us 
tearing through the shanties, the wet wash, exploding on the tiles like rotten 
fruit. But the cables held, and the Killing Floor rose and fell like a crazy metal 
sea. And Molly danced on it. And at the end, just before he made his final cast 
with the filament, I saw in his face, an expression that didn’t seem to belong 
there. It wasn’t fear and it wasn’t anger. I think it was disbelief, stunned 
incomprehension mingled with pure aesthetic revulsion at what he was seeing, 
hearing - at what was happening to him. He retracted the whirling filament, the 
ghost disk shrinking to the size of a dinner plate as he whipped his arm above 
his head and brought it down, the thumbtip curving out for Molly like a live 
thing. The Floor carried her down, the molecule passing just above her head; 
the Floor whiplashed, lifting him into the path of the taut molecule. It should 
have passed harmlessly over his head and been withdrawn into its diamond 
hard socket. It took his hand off just behind the wrist. There was a gap in the 
Floor in front of him, and he went through it like a diver, with a strange 
deliberate grace, a defeated kamikaze on his way down to Nighttown. Partly, I 
think, he took that dive to buy himself a few seconds of the dignity of silence. 
She’d killed him with culture shock (34-5). 
 
What is striking about this fight between high and low technology is that it is not 
primarily the abilities or inabilities of the two prosthetically enhanced fighters that 
lead to their success or defeat. Molly lures her opponent to a specifically chosen 
setting, to a literally tightly knit community, and what ultimately defeats the Yakuza 
is not Molly’s fighting skills alone but also the heaving floor, the “deviant” creatures’ 
shouts, the roaring beat, and even the communal act of culture shock. As I argue in 
chapter 4.2 and 4.3, Gibson illustrates how abilities, and by implication disabilities, 
are dependent on the specific social and material constellations individuals are 
suspended in.  
 
 
THE BODY IN ARTICULATION 
 
Gibson’s short story “The Winter Market” is set in a near-future Vancouver. The 
central conflict of the story arises when Casey, editor of the “Autonomic Pilot,” 
 25	
encounters the disabled character Lise at a mutual friend’s (Rubin) party. More 
intensely than in “Burning Chrome”, Gibson explores the gaze: 
 
First time I saw her: She had the all-beer fridge open, light spilling out, and I 
caught the cheekbones and the determined set of that mouth, but I also caught 
the black glint of polycarbon at her wrist, and the bright slick sore the 
exoskeleton had rubbed there. Too drunk to process, to know what it was, but 
I did know it wasn’t party time. So I did what people usually did, to Lise, and 
clicked myself into a different movie. Went for the wine instead, on the 
counter beside the convection oven. Never looked back (143-4).  
 
This scene portrays a small moment of social exclusion on the grounds of disability. 
Casey detects Lise’s non-normative body and shuns her in revulsion. Characters who 
encounter Lise get into “social panic” and dodge her (144). Incited by Casey’s 
evasion, Lise seeks to confront him. He recounts, “she found me again. Came after 
me two hours later, weaving through the bodies and junk with that terrible grace 
programmed into the exoskeleton” (144). Casey’s perception of Lise is characterized 
by the association of disability with passivity, as well as a victim position. He even 
corrects himself in his observation of how she moves towards him: “Lise advanced 
was advanced, with that mocking grace straight at me now… The exoskeleton carried 
her across the dusty broadloom” (144). These statements clearly present the disabled 
body as entirely passive; it is only the machine that acts. In order to attain a deeper 
understanding of the story, the narrative perspective needs to be taken into account, as 
it is Casey and not Lise herself who bemoans immobility. 
 
She couldn’t move, not without that extra skeleton, and it was jacked straight 
into her brain, myoclectric interface. The fragile-looking polycarbon braces 
moved her arms and legs, but a more subtle system handled her thin hands, 
galvanic inlays. I thought of frog legs twitching in a high-school lab tape, then 
hated myself for it (145). 
 
The analogy of Lise having remotely operated frog legs posits her as an immobile test 
object, an inanimate doll, instead of an individual with subjectivity and agency and 
who is enabled or empowered by the exoskeleton. Medical notions of the body’s 
functionality, and cultural notions of technological remedy, inform Casey’s 
perception. When Lise appears in front of him at the party, he is rendered speechless 
by her confrontation.  
 
Looked into those eyes and it was like you could hear her synapses whining … 
‘Take me home,’ she said, and the words hit me like a whip. I think I shook 
my head. ‘Take me home.’ There were levels of pain there, and subtlety, and 
an amazing cruelty. And I knew then that I’d never been hated, ever, as deeply 
or thoroughly as this wasted little girl hated me now, hated me for the way I’d 
looked, then looked away, beside Rubin’s all-beer refrigerator (144). 
 
Against his will, and out of pity and shame, he does take her home. There, she 
discovers all his editing equipment and demands he records her dreams, which he 
does because “she claimed she was an artist, and because [he] knew that [they] were 
engaged, somehow, in total combat, and [he] was not going to lose” (147). The so-
called “dry dreams” are a  
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neural output from levels of consciousness that most people can only access in 
sleep. But artists, the kind I work with at the Autonomic Pilot, are able to 
break the surface tension, dive down deep, down and out, out into Jung’s sea, 
and bring back well, dreams (146).  
 
It probably took all of four seconds. And, course, she’d won. I took the trodes 
off and stared at the wall, eyes wet, the framed posters swimming. 
I couldn’t look at her. I heard her disconnect the optic lead. I heard the 
exoskeleton creak as it hoisted her up from the futon. Heard it tick demurely 
as it hauled her into the kitchen for a glass of water. Then I started to cry. 
(148-9) 
 
Casey has no script for how to process this experience. Bypassing the recipient’s 
preconceptions of her disabled embodiment and her art, Lise’s dreams directly target 
affect so that language fails to describe them: “[w]ords. Words cannot. Or, maybe, 
just barely, if I even knew how to begin to describe it, what came up out of her, what 
she did” (148). Casey emphasizes that Kings of Sleep enriches his “vocabulary of 
feelings” (148). In his reflection upon Lise’s artistic dreams, Casey draws on a 
dualistic notion of body and mind only to equate, in an ableist manner, the 
constrained condition of her body by the prosthesis to that of her art confined by her 
mind. In Casey’s view, Kings of Sleep was “locked up in her head the way her body 
was locked in that exoskeleton” (153). When played back to Casey’s supervisor, the 
latter is similarly affected and in realizing Lise’s talent in terms of its market value, he 
immediately signs her. As Casey dryly remarks, “so we can package it, sell it, watch 
how it moves in the market” (147). Many of Gibson’s following narratives encompass 
the criticism of commodification, and the Bigend trilogy in particular explores the 
strategies which turn art and fashion into market values.   
Nonetheless, Casey remains utterly ambivalent regarding Lise. Once he 
describes how “Lise was amazing. It was like she was born to the form, even though 
the technology that made that form possible hadn’t even existed when she was born” 
(154). Then again, he sounds disgusted by her: “I have just spent three weeks editing 
the dreams and nightmares of one very screwed up person” (161). It is the oscillation 
between attraction and revulsion that characterizes her abject nature. In order to 
mitigate this reaction towards Lise, Casey’s company hires stylists to change her hair 
and replace her clothing. By “hiding the polycarbon ribs” they hope her to “pass” 
(157). The sociological concept of “passing” is historically associated with race but 
has been extended to age, religion, class, gender, and disability in discourse. With 
regard to disability, “passing” describes the suppression of abnormal behavior or 
concealment of the social markers of impairment in order to be recognized as a 
member of a different identity group and in order to increase status, privilege, and 
acceptance (Brune and Wilson, Disability and Passing 2013). Lise’s agents also 
“brought in medics, who padded the polycarbon with foam and sealed the sores over 
with micropore dressings. They pumped her up with vitamins and tried to work on her 
diet” (“The Winter Market” 155). Nevertheless, Casey observes that “[p]ropped up in 
the exoskeleton, she was looking worse than she had that first night, at Rubin’s,” and 
the attempt to pass fails (156). While readers are not granted any explicit insight into 
Lise’s perspective, Casey observes how she keeps her jacket “zipped to the neck, 
always, even though it was too warm in the studio” (157). One can thus conclude that 
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she is uncomfortable with her body due to ableist looks, reactions, attitudes, and the 
overall stigma of her disability, rather than the prosthesis or sores themselves.  
 In their initial confrontation of lust and disgust, Casey intentionally attacks 
Lise when she repeatedly asks whether they are “going to make it.” Offended, he 
decides he “wasn’t going to take it” and recounts how he “cold-eyed her from 
somewhere down in the beer-numb core of my walking, talking, live-limbed, and 
entirely ordinary body and the words came out of me like spit: ‘Could you feel it, if I 
did?’” (146, emphasis added). To which Lise coldly responds that she sometimes 
likes to watch. As a non-disabled character, Casey appears on the one hand unsettled 
by her physical deviance, and on the other hand assumes deep misery on Lise’s side. 
This reveals the dominant non-disabled perspective that disabled people, in the words 
of Alison Hartnett “can never be happy as they are and must change in order to be 
accepted and valued” (22). Lise’s change occurs when she commits suicide and the 
narrative initially questions the notion of liberation through technology but ultimately 
subverts the notion. Oftentimes disabled figures in literature serve the purpose of 
reassuring the protagonist, as well as reader, of their normal embodiment. As chapter 
4.3 of this book shows, Gibson’s narratives do not grant such reassurance to either 
protagonists or readers. As I will show, Casey is just as much irritated with himself 
about his ordinary body and ordinary life. 
Ambiguity surrounds Lise’s suicide, as it remains unclear whether it was 
triggered by social exclusion, what part of her actually died, and what part the matrix 
conserves. Casey describes her as dead with regard to the body, yet immortal with 
regard to the mind. She “merged with the net” and Casey struggles with the question 
of whether such a disembodied state is still “her”—a question that surfaced in a 
conversation with Rubin about another artist who uploaded his mind (“The Winter 
Market” 140, 165).  “But it’s not him, is it? It’s just a program,” Casey wonders 
(153). And, Rubin can only remark, “[i]nteresting point. Hard to say” (152). As stated 
earlier, a negotiation of what aspect of the human constitutes their humanity is central, 
albeit not always overt, in Gibson’s work. From the beginning, this is a question that 
is directed toward the body and is incrementally translated in to the analog world 
throughout his novels.                
 The fundamental subversion of the idea that Lise’s digital merging is a 
liberating move, occurs as the protagonist realizes that the disabled body, just as any 
other, desires physical touch and pleasure. Spotting Lise in a bar and observing how 
she holds on to a boy’s hand, a “hand she couldn’t even feel,” Casey perceives her 
functional biological inability according to normative standards of the human body 
which restricts his ability to appreciate it as a social gesture of attraction, affection, 
and intimacy (164). According to Casey’s logic, the boy must be too drunk to realize 
the girl’s dysfunctional body but conscious enough to notice her expensive drinks and 
clothes. As far as Casey is concerned, the possibility of actual interest in or attraction 
to Lise, is inconceivable. However, as much as Casey attempts to uphold his vision of 
Lise as a deviant other, what makes him cringe in this scene is not so much the horror 
of her non-normative body or her pitiful attempt at social inclusion, but instead a 
frustration with clear boundaries of separation.  
 
And I know something now. I know that if I hadn’t happened in there, hadn’t 
seen them, I’d have been able to accept all that came later. Might even have 
found a way to rejoice on her behalf, or found a way to trust in whatever it is 
that she’s since become, or had built in her image, a program that pretends to 
be Lise to the extent that it believes it’s her. I could have believed what Rubin 
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believes, that she was so truly past it, our hi-tech Saint Joan burning for union 
with that hardwired godhead in Hollywood, that nothing mattered to her 
except the hour of her departure. That she threw away that poor sad body with 
a cry of release, free of the bonds of polycarbon and hated flesh. Well, maybe, 
after all, she did. Maybe it was that way. I’m sure that’s the way she expected 
it to be (164). 
 
Well cited among literary disability studies scholars, is the narrative strategy in which 
the disabled figure serves to elicit an epiphany in the non-disabled protagonist with 
regard to himself or the greater scheme of things (Mitchell and Snyder, Narrative 
Prosthesis 2014). Casey describes the moment when he “knew, once and for all, that 
no human motive is ever entirely pure. Even Lise, with that corrosive, crazy drive to 
stardom and cybernetic immortality, had weaknesses. Was human in a way I hated 
myself for admitting” (164). At this point, it is physical desire, as well as 
vulnerability, that constitutes humanity irrespective of fitting within normative 
notions of ability. Casey realizes that “it was true: She did like to watch. I think she 
saw me, as I left. I was practically running. If she did, I suppose she hated me worse 
than ever, for he horror and the pity in my face” (164-5). 
The figuration of Casey instantiates what Margrit Shildrick defines in her 
essay “The Disabled Body, Genealogy And Undecidability” (2005) as “normative 
anxiety” (757). Lise’s “Otherness” is so threatening to Casey because on the one hand 
it constantly underscores a devalued difference in able-bodiedness and gender while 
on the other hand, repeatedly allowing the recognition of alike-ness in vulnerability 
and desires for human contact, bonding, and physical touch. The recognition of 
commonality with the Other is coupled with revulsion and fascination, and the 
continuous oscillation between these reactions fundamentally unsettles the categories 
by which the human is defined. It dawns on Casey that “[w]hat we call disability is 
perhaps the essential characteristic of being human” (Garland-Thomson, “Integrating” 
21). However, “[g]iven the explicit privileging of wholeness, independence and 
integrity demanded of the able-bodied subject,” Shildrick elucidates, “the cultural 
imaginary is highly invested in fantasies of an invulnerable body” as exemplified 
earlier in the selection of classic science fiction novels and films (“Undecidability” 
757). Gibson on the other hand, presents a protagonist who recognizes “the other 
within the same” which fundamentally unsettles his sense of self-identity (757). 
Shildrick states that “[i]t is precisely that desire to deny or disavow vulnerability that 
generates anxiety in the individual psyche and cultural imaginary” (767). Casey 
embodies this “unbearable ambivalence of not being able to definitely settle on 
difference” (765). This represents a major concern of the genre because, as Sterling 
holds, “[c]yberpunk has little patience with borders” (Mirrorshades xiv).  
Despite the recognition of some inherent ambivalence in the depiction of 
Lise’s disabled body, most criticism reinforces an ableist reading rather than 
problematizing the narrative strategy or thematizing Casey’s role. For example, 
Westfahl notes, “[t]hroughout the story, Lise’s broken, crumbling body is always on 
the scene (though ostensibly marginalized by cybernetics) and screaming to be 
released from ‘the bonds of polycarbon,’ yet longing for the departure to be marked 
by bodily contact” (91). Westfahl reads “The Winter Market” as to “marginalize…the 
body’s materiality by turning it into a vehicle for simstim (simulated stimulation) 
dreams commercially edited into popular chillers and thrillers” (97). When Westfahl 
states that “unhappy Lise commits suicide,” he does not raise the question of how 
social factors might have contributed to her fatal decision (49). Besides the fact that 
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the trope of a disabled person’s death at the end of a narrative is all too commonly 
read along the lines of their release from physical pain, as well as burden and 
victimhood, I seek to re-address Gibson’s bodies as otherwise.7 I argue that the key to 
re-reading Gibson’s bodies is the narrative perspective, which in the case of “The 
Winter Market” is not Lise’s but Casey’s. It is a male, potentially white, but certainly 
able-bodied, gaze that reveals an ableist and potentially sexist bias that informs the 
perception of certain aspects of Lise’s character and not others. Thereby Gibson 
allows readers to reflect upon the nature of the perspectives and attitudes of his 
narrators rather than proposes a realistic portrayal of a “disability subjectivity”, unless 
of course, as it is in fact the case in many of his novels the protagonists’ own 
embodiment is extraordinary (Narrative Prosthesis).  
 “The Winter Market” provides not only a perspective on the disabled, but also 
a portrayal of the normal body and the normal subject position. In repeated contrast to 
Lise, as well as his friend and artist Rubin, Casey comes to realize his average nature. 
Rubin is introduced as “the master of junk” who himself “never calls the place a 
studio, never refers to himself as an artist” (141, 142). Instead, he describes his 
creative activity as “[m]essing around” (141). Rubin constructs robotic machines out 
of garbage and in that is modeled on American performance artist, inventor, and 
founder of the Survival Research Laboratories, Mark Pauline. As Kevin Kelly 
recounts in his chapter “Machines with an Attitude” from Out of Control: The New 
Biology of Machines, Social Systems And The Economic World (1994), “when Mark 
Pauline offers you his hand in greeting, you get to shake his toes. Years ago Pauline 
blew off his fingers messing around with homemade rockets” (29). Pauline is 
displaying in himself a form of extraordinary embodiment, which ultimately inspired 
another artist-character in Gibson’s later novel Mona Lisa Overdrive—Slick Henry. 
Rubin’s provocative work always contains more than a hint of irony. As Casey 
observes:  
 
I’ve seen Rubin program his constructions to identify and verbally abuse 
pedestrians wearing garments by a given season’s hot designer; others attend 
to more obscure missions, and a few seem constructed solely to deconstruct 
themselves with as much attendant noise as possible” (142).  
 
Rubin cannot explain how he comes to his kinetic sculptures, and “has nothing to say 
about gomi. It’s his medium, the air he breathes, something he’s swum in all his life” 
(143). This trope of the “genius artist” unable to elucidate the formation process of his 
own artifacts recurs frequently in Gibson’s work. It is a trope that follows a Kantian 
notion of genius, which holds that “[s]ince the beautiful does not have a concept, the 
genius’ originality also cannot fall under a concept that can be explained or taught. 
Consequently, the artist does not understand the process of creation or where the ideas 
that guide the work arise from” (Fry 549). Rubin pointedly explains why Casey, 
however, is not the artistic type: 
 
‘You know what your trouble is?’ he says when we’re under the bridge, 
headed up to Fourth. ‘You’re the kind who always reads the handbook. 
Anything people build, any kind of technology, it’s going to have some 
specific purpose. It’s for doing something that somebody already understands. 
But if it’s new technology, it’ll open areas nobody’s ever thought of before. 																																																								
7 See, for instance, Nicole Markotic’s Disability in Film and Literature (2016). 
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You read the manual, man, and you won’t play around with it, not the same 
way. And you get all funny when somebody else uses it to do something you 
never thought of. Like Lise’ (152). 
 
While Rubin and Lise have the ability to find their own uses for things, Casey lacks 
the creativity as well as the ability to defy intended purpose and accepted particular 
standards. This prompts Casey to recognize his “average” lifestyle and “normal” 
subject position.  
 
The burritos tasted like cardboard, but I decided I liked them because they 
were so aggressively normal … Sometimes it looks to me like nobody in 
particular lives there. Not that it’s that messy; I’m a good if somewhat robotic 
housekeeper, and even remember to dust the tops of framed posters and things, 
but I have these times when the place abruptly gives me a kind of low-grade 
chill, with its basic accumulation of basic consumer goods. I mean, it’s not 
like I want to fill it up with cats or houseplants or anything, but there are 
moments when I see that anyone could be living there, could own those things, 
and it all seems sort of interchangeable, my life and yours, my life and 
anybody’s … I think Rubin sees things that way, too, all the time, but for him 
it’s a source of strength. He lives in other people’s garbage, and everything he 
drags home must have been new and shiny once, must have meant something, 
however briefly, to someone. So he sweeps it all up into his crazy-looking 
truck and hauls it back to his place and lets it compost there until he thinks of 
something new to do with it. Once he was showing me a book of twentieth-
century art he liked, and there was a picture of an automated sculpture called 
Dead Birds Fly Again, a thing that whirled real dead birds around and around 
on a string, and he smiled and nodded, and I could see he felt the artist was a 
spiritual ancestor of some kind. But what could Rubin do with my framed 
posters and my Mexican futon from the Bay and my temperfoam bed from 
Ikea? (161-2) 
 
In opposition to Rubin’s and Lise’s extraordinary lives, Casey’s is normal in a way 
that makes him feel sadly interchangeable—a realization that causes disappointment 
and anger. In this respect, Moody notes in “Untapped Potential: The Representation 
of Disability/Special Ability in the Cyberpunk Workforce” that it “is the disabled 
characters who are often presented as having attitude whilst the general able-bodied 
population passively experience corporate oppression” (103). 
Besides asking by what literary means bodies come to signification, my 
analysis is driven by the issue of who gets to speak, and whose perspective is in focus. 
To this effect, I will repeatedly turn my attention to the narrative perspective in order 
to highlight that the ways in which difference is marked implies value judgments in 
the attitudes and biases of specific characters. It is not my argument that by deciding 
against positioning the narrator outside of the narrative universe (which is generally 
read to purport absolute authority over truth) Gibson avoids the impression of 
proposing objective notion of the body (leaving aside the fact that the authorial 
narrative situation in the same way relies on terminologies and metaphors that involve 
particular sets of values). Instead, I argue that by presenting the ways of seeing and 
thinking about bodies as embodied and thus subjective, Gibson encourages a 
reflection of the identities of both the narrator and the narrated, the starer and the 
stared at as well as the nature of their relationship. This is crucial insofar as these 
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implicit attitudes and biases can also be read as products of a wider socio-political 
context. When an inquiry of the formal narrative situation is omitted then the ideology 
on which characterizations are based and, by extension, the construction of disability 
may remain unquestioned, invisible, and thereby even more powerful. On the grounds 
that disability has usually been overlooked in discussions of Gibson’s work, it is 
precisely this obliviousness to the value-laden descriptions that makes them especially 
powerful in impacting our imagination. Therefore, my analysis focuses heavily on 
characterization and narrative perspective. 
The meaning of social conformity is even more provocatively explored in the 
short story “The Belonging Kind,” which Gibson co-wrote with John Shirley. 
Focused on Coretti, a divorced middle-aged linguistics professor who spends his 
evenings alone in bars drinking, “The Belonging Kind” is a straightforward outsider 
story. Coretti is an expert in communication but is unable to communicate with fellow 
human beings. However, one evening he gets into a conversation with a woman who 
amazes, as well as startles, him with her perfect fit in society. Notably, he is struck by 
her mode of behavior:  
 
Just the right amount of laugh. The part of Coretti that was dialectologist 
stirred uneasily; too perfect a shift in phrasing and inflection. An actress? A 
talented mimic? The word mimetic rose suddenly in his mind, but he pushed it 
aside to study her reflection in the mirror; the rows of bottles occluded her 
breasts like a gown of glass … She moves perfectly to the music and does not 
miss a beat in conversations—always, always fitting in perfectly (61-62, 64).  
 
In stark contrast to this mysterious female figure, Coretti feels constantly embarrassed 
by his own comments, his awkward phrasing, and his “totally unconvincing tough-
guy mode” (62). Upon her “too damn polite” “thank-you-for-the-drink” line, his 
voyeuristic impulse leads him to follow her to the street and make the striking 
discovery that from bar to bar she mutates and transforms her appearance. The 
character thus mirrors her social conformity in the materiality of her body, which 
changes in vocal pitch, laughter, posture as much as clothing:  
 
in the light of a streetlamp, like a stage lamp, she began to change … She 
stepped off the curb and it began. It began with tints in her hair … in three 
seconds she was white-blond. He was sure it was a trick of the light until her 
dress began to writhe, twisting across her body like a shrink-wrap plastic. … 
He looked back up at her and the dress was another dress, green satin, shifting 
with reflections. Her shoes had changed too. … Her hair had become short, 
spiky (62-3). 
 
In this way “The Belonging Kind” dramatizes the adaptation to social norms via the 
metaphor of body alterations that pertain to appearance, age, and class. At the end of 
the story Coretti realizes that he is also, or at least can be, one of “them” – one of the 
belonging kind. By giving up his former self and mimicking the physiognomy and 
physiology that is considered normal for each specific context, he succeeds in 
“sa[ying] it right” and becoming “a real human being” (75). Gibson and Shirley’s 
cyberpunk view on the normal body is truly terrifying. Indeed, the normal human 
being is the shape-shifting monster which evokes alienation in the reader. In 
individual contexts, the belonging kinds appear completely adequate while their 
overall lack of personality and ultimate heteronomy make it difficult for the reader to 
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identify with them while also provoking a rejection of absolute conformity to 
normative standards. In a similar sense, Casey’s lived conformity to normative 
standards, which includes an ingrained ableist bias, appears if not terrifying then at 
least undesirable. Read in this way, Gibson’s representation of the normal – i.e. male, 
middle-class, abled-bodied, heterosexual – body undercuts what Robert McRuer coins 
“compulsory ablebodiedness,” in Crip Theory. McRuer’s critique centers on the 
assumption “that we all agree: able-bodied identities, able-bodied perspectives are 
preferable and what we all, collectively, are aiming for” (9). Destabilizing the concept 
of the normal body, Gibson invites the reader to consider the disabled body as beyond 
the victim position without denying physical pain or unfulfilled desire as possible 
contingencies of embodiment (in general). Instead of featuring a “disabled hero” 
(Wendell) or “super cripple” (Barnes, Disabling Imagery), who successfully 
overcomes the limitations imposed by their disability, Gibson challenges the reader to 
tolerate the human body in its non-normativity, ambiguity, volatility, and 
interdependency because just as “[l]ife is never smooth” as the cyberpunks were 
acutely aware, neither is the body (Kelly and Kessel xii).  
In chapter 4.1, “The Body and Medicine: The Sprawl Trilogy,” I explore the 
representations of prostheticized bodies in Neuromancer, Count Zero, and Mona Lisa 
Overdrive to further demonstrate how these depictions rely on a bio-medical 
terminology that infuses bodies with bio-medical values of cure and wholeness, 
rehabilitation and functionality. Historicizing concepts of the normal and disabled 
body provides a foundation for my analysis of the literary depictions of virtual and 
embodied selves, whole and fragmented bodies, as well as organic and machine-
bodies, in Gibson’s cyberpunk trilogy. What chapter 2 will not do, however, is 
provide “a comprehensive history of the body.” This is not only because such an 
undertaking would pose a profoundly different question, but also because such 
treatises already exist. 8  Instead, I draw on the terminological foundation for 
debunking deviant, non-normative, and disabled bodies of their natural or neutral 
character and interrogate their status as “bodies in repair.” A main concern of this 
chapter is therefore to decouple the bodily form from its meaning by exploring the 
figurative forms and narrative functions which construct extraordinary bodies in the 
Sprawl trilogy. I argue against reading the active sculpting of the physiological 
apparatus of the body, as well as its projection into cyberspace, as practices of an 
annihilation of the material body or an aversion of its flesh. Instead, I point to an 
ambivalent relationship between the body and technology to highlight instances of 
fascination with, and pleasure in, the visceral body. Bringing both Gibson’s fiction 
and its criticism into a productive conversation with disability scholarship, the chapter 
closes with the classification of the Sprawl novels as technoromantic fiction.  
In chapter 4.2, “The Body and Society: The Bridge Trilogy,” I concentrate on 
the intricate relationship between extraordinary bodies and their meanings in social 
environments. To this end, I discuss the ways in which Virtual Light, Idoru, and All 
Tomorrow’s Parties partly rely on, reinforce, and defy ableist ideologies. Moreover, 
this chapter introduces the social model of disability as taking bio-medical 
conceptualizations of the body as the object of epistemological investigation. Through 																																																								
8 Michel Feher, Fragments for a History of the Human Body (1989), Daniel Garrison, A 
Cultural History of the Human Body (2010), Aldersey-Williams, Hugh, Anatomies: A Cultural History 
of the Human Body (2013), or specifically focusing on disability: Henri-Jacques Stiker, A History of 
Disability (1999), Elsbeth Bösl, Anne Klein, Anne Waldschmidt, Disability History (2010). C. F. 
Goodey, A History of Intelligence and ‘Intellectual Disability’ (2011). 
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this investigation, I examine the politics and ideologies that certain medical registers, 
biological classifications, sociological paradigms, legal frameworks and cultural 
artifacts imply, and the ways in which each partakes in the formation of ableist or 
eugenic structures and social barriers. Furthermore, chapter 4.2 links the issues of 
social participation, oppression, and the marginalization of people with that of 
disabilities. By understanding how Gibson shifts away from virtual networks and 
towards social and material interrelations in the Bridge trilogy, the social dimensions 
of oppressive norms of ability come into view vis-à-vis tacit communication 
practices, such as attitudes and gazes. In order to grasp the meaning of complex 
characters, such as the female Mexican disabled figure in Idoru, it becomes crucial to 
consider disability as multiaxial in order to distinguish the impact of variously 
interlinked subject positions. Therefore, I will supplement the social model approach 
with the theory of intersectionality. Moreover, my analysis diverges from the notion 
of abilities and disabilities as residing in an individual body’s constitution and instead 
focuses on the ways in which abilities and disabilities depend upon a social and 
material context that cannot simply be understood by a nature/culture dualism. 
In chapter 4.3, “The Body and Actor-Networks: The Bigend Trilogy,” I 
examine Gibson’s third trilogy, which approaches the disabled body from yet another 
angle. Rather than prosthetic devices or ableist social structures, Pattern Recognition, 
Spook Country, and Zero History depict the interrelations of the extraordinary body 
with human and non-human actors. In this way, these novels are queering dualisms 
between subjects and objects, active and passive, and living and inert matter in terms 
of agency. The ways in which the human body is made and unmade, articulated and 
accommodated, through processes of interrelation with all kinds of heterogeneous 
entities comes to fore. Moreover, in Pattern Recognition and Zero History the trope of 
the female disabled genius artist is re-fashioned through a character whose art deeply 
affects the people in the novels. I argue that these narrative situations differ drastically 
from his earlier work because these later narratives embody the perspective of the 
extraordinary figure.  
In order to conceptualize the ways in which bodies interrelate with humans 
and non-humans, material and immaterial entities, and conceive of this formative 
process as the articulation of bodies, I draw on science and technology studies to 
address disability by way of actor-network theory. Actor-network theory reduces 
differences and hierarchies for the purpose of allowing all characters, all factors, or 
simply all actors that make a difference come into view. In reaching great proximity 
to the processes of the body, Gibson develops what I call a new realist style of the 
body.   
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2. The Extraordinary Body in Theory 
 
2.1 The Body and Medicine 
 
2.1.1 The Normal Body 
 
Before we can fully understand the disabled body, we need first to turn to its invisible, 
seemingly neutral, and natural Other: the normal, medial, average body. As disability 
studies scholar Lennard Davis says, the locus of the problem, “is not the person with 
disabilities; the problem is the way that normalcy is constructed to create the 
‘problem’ of the disabled person” (“Constructing Normalcy” 3). By drawing on 
Davis’ and Jürgen Link’s approaches to normalcy, I begin this chapter by 
historicizing the concept of “the norm” in relation to the human body. Next, I will 
discuss the role that literature, particularly the novel, plays in the construction of 
normal and disabled bodies. This background will lay the foundation for the analysis 
of William Gibson’s extraordinary figurations in the Sprawl trilogy. 
Historically, it is possible to accurately pinpoint when the term “the norm” 
entered the English language. In Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness and the 
Body (1995) and “Constructing Normalcy: The Bell Curve, the Novel, and the 
Invention of the Disabled Body in the Nineteenth Century” (2006), Davis explains 
how the initial linguistic manifestations of “the norm” in the sense of “constituting, 
conforming to, not deviating or different from, the common type or standard, regular, 
usual” can be traced to a period between 1840-1860 (“Constructing Normalcy” 3). 
This includes related terminology such as: normal, normalcy, normality, normativity 
and so on. This conceptual and linguistic moment of emergence shows that the notion 
of the norm is less a universal and ahistorical condition of human nature, than it is a 
developing feature of a particular society. “The norm” first appears in demographics 
and medical disciplines. For instance, “the application of numbers to illustrate the 
natural history of health and disease” was central to medical statistics in 1829 (Porter 
24). Soon the methods of data collection, averaging, and probability calculations 
became common practice in scientific, political, and economic sense making. There 
have been multiple drivers of this term’s occurrences and mechanisms of its 
dissemination. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century saw significant social 
developments in the form of industrialization, modern mass production, modern data 
collection, and statistics. Because leading members of British statistical societies were 
industrialists or had close ties to industry, concepts regarding statistics, industry and 
the body became inextricably linked. Once the idea of “the norm” further migrated to 
conversations of everyday life, the ideological consequences for private and public 
life became innumerable.9 																																																								
9 While not founded on the notion of the norm, there was, of course a thorough conceptualization of 
health and disease prior to the eighteenth century. The Socratic notion of health and disease can be 
roughly summarized in the distinction of an inner space delineated through a defense against the outer 
space (Wallen 2016). Martin Wallen points out that much of the Socratic notion is a tautological 
definition, since health is understood as the absence of disease while disease is defined as the opposite 
of well-being. Health and disease, understood in an absolute polarity, are regarded as ideal standards 
that need to be maintained while being constantly threatened from the outside. Health is a singular, 
static, orderly condition that importantly mirrors the moral quality of ethical integrity. This is in 
contrast to the plurality of diseases, which entail ethical chaos, bodily and moral instability, and the 
dissolution of integrity and identity. These Socratic notions fueled later conceptualizations of health, 
disease, and disability in Western culture.  
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 In Versuch über den Normalismus. Wie Normalität produziert wird [An 
Approach to Normalism. How Normalcy is Produced; my translation] (2006), German 
literary scholar Jürgen Link presents an extensive study of normalcy. By means of a 
careful discourse analysis, Link systematically unfolds the semantic field of “the 
normal” and traces it back to the eighteenth century. Moreover, Link carefully 
describes the advent and structures of dissemination for the concept of “the normal”. 
Link arrives at the conclusion that “the normal” is not an isolated idea, but an 
extensive and complex discursive field. In everyday conversations “the normal” 
manifests in the form of stereotypes, truisms, idioms, and laymen’s terms. Most 
notably, Link explains how the idea of the norm has travelled between discourses. 
Specialized discourses – such as medicine, psychology, sociology and their respective 
practices – are constituted by scientific knowledge for a specialized audience, acute 
attention to terminological differentiations, and a foundation in data and statistics. 
These specialized discourses each describe and produce a certain reality, or a sectoral 
normality. These medical, psychological, and sociological normalities are translated 
into common cultural notions of normality through what Link calls “interdiscourses”. 
Eventually, these notions become ordinary and naturalized. “The normal” is accepted 
as “fact” and becomes the benchmark for assessing the lives of modern occidental 
subjects. Together, all three types of discourses form an interactive network, a broad 
cultural phenomenon Link refers to as “normalistic complex.”10 
 Clarification of the German term Normalität is required for English speaking 
readers to fully understand Link’s explanation of the normalistic complex because the 
English language contains both “normality” and “normalcy.” Link uses the former to 
refer to psychological states of individuals and the latter to index collective social or 
political conditions. Both normalcy and normality, according to Link, are historically 
specific achievements of modern Western societies, which never before existed, and 
even today, in numerous societies and cultures do not exist. However, Link is not 
always consistent in following this distinction, a distinction that Davis does not even 
make. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term “normality,” which emerged in 
1839 and the term “normalcy,” which appeared slightly later in 1857 and is mainly 
used in North America. Although its frequency in use is very low, the OED also 
suggests a third variation deemed “normalness”. In my analysis, I will adopt the term 
normalcy, since it is the broadest and most common of the three variations. I use this 
term in a sense of a collective socio-political normalcy that encompasses, among 
other things, individual normalities.  
 Discursive concepts, academic models, and everyday practices instigate a 
process of “making normal” in society. The production and reproduction of normalcy 
is commonly referred to as “normalization.” According to Link, it is within everyday 
conversations, i.e. the elementary discourse that people ask themselves whether 
something is normal or not and as a significant consequence adjust their behavior 
accordingly. (Versuch 20) Drawing on a collection of public statements in 
newspapers, interviews, and speeches, Link makes the observation that historical 
moments of crisis are oftentimes not met with the insistence on democracy or justice 
but rather a promise of normalcy.11 As I show in the course of this chapter, such 																																																								
10 As a whole this discursive field is also referred to as “normalism” by Link.  
11 Link exemplifies: “President Bush Jr. said in his speech to the Nation on 20 September 2001: ‘It is 
my hope that in the months and years ahead life will return almost to normal.’ As several observers 
remarked, he hereby nearly quoted his predecessor, Warren G. Harding, who ran and won the first 
presidential campaign after World War I with the slogan ‘Back to Normalcy’. And here is the central 
message of President Obama’s Wall Street Speech to the Nation on 14 September 2009, exactly one 
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promise of the return to normalcy is also a common strategy in depictions of people 
with disabilities. That is, disability is often conceived as a moment of crisis calling for 
repair and the return to a state of normalcy.  
 Link’s central argument, that normalcy is an emergent cultural phenomenon of 
modern Western societies rather than an anthropological constant, demands first of all 
categorical differentiation of some of the derivatives of “normal.” In order to specify 
his subject matter, Link resorts to the Foucaultian principle of inequations. The first 
two of Link’s six inequations12 will be of prime interest to this book. First, there is the 
central difference between “the normal” and “the normative”. Normativity is an 
abstract category for the entire field of “norms.” Drawing on interpretations from the 
disciplines of ethnology, anthropology and sociology, Link concludes that all human 
societies possess and have possessed norms in the sense of explicit or implicit, ethical, 
juridical or legal rules that prescribe a specific action to materially or formally 
determined groups of people. Norms, therefore, always preexist action and their 
nature is binary; they are either met, or not. Their function as regulative principles is 
reinforced through sanctions.  
Data-processing and statistics have a fundamentally constituting role in the 
production of normalcy. As Davis says, “there is probably no area of contemporary 
life in which some idea of a norm, mean or average has not been calculated” 
(“Constructing Normalcy” 3). Surely most cultures develop certain kinds of daily 
routines but it is only those “everydays” which, 
 
are data-processed [that] are entirely new emergences: through them, we adapt 
ourselves to the average speeds of massive traffic flows; we respect critical 
values or not; we work according to normal workdays in normal working 
relationships or, when we are unemployed, we live with the help of 
unemployment insurance, which is calculated on the basis of mathematical 
statistics, etc.; we attempt to adjust our weight (i.e., our ‘figure’) according to 
data like ‘normal’ and ‘ideal’ weight; and, even when we get divorced or plan 
a late first birth, we also orient ourselves (at least sub-dominantly) to the 
relevant statistical curve-landscape (Link, “Crisis between ʻDenormalizationʼ 
and the ʻNew Normal’” 9). 
 
The second inequation cautions against confusing individual normalities with 
everydayness or everyday life. Normality presumes statistical dispositifs and is 
defined in relation to averages and other statistical sizes in the strongest sense. 
Therefore, normality (as much as normalcy) can only be found in data-processing 
societies or, “cultures that continuously, routinely, comprehensively, and 
institutionally make themselves statistically transparent” (“Crisis between 
ʻDenormalizationʼ and the ʻNew Normal’” 8). This means that normality, in contrast 
to normativity, is essentially post-existent to action. The normal is thus established 
only retrospectively through its positioning on the concretely empirical statistical 
distribution curve. In this sense, normality (and by extension normalcy) is not an 
ahistorical, pan-chronological concept like “everydayness,” which is historically all-
encompassing, and affects all ages and cultures.  																																																																																																																																																														
year after the Lehman crash: ‘We are beginning to return to normalcy. But normalcy cannot lead to 
complacency … History cannot be allowed to repeat itself’” (“Crisis between ʻDenormalizationʼ and 
the ʻNew Normal’” 7, emphasis added). 
12 Link, furthermore, inequates Normalität with ‘bio-homeostasis,’ ‘cybernetics and technocracy,’ 
‘aesthetic banality,’ ‘constructed social reality’ (Versuch 33-40).	
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Before the concept of the norm entered Western culture and developed into a 
measuring stick for the individual calibration of physical and psychological traits 
ranking from below-average to above-average, frames of reference were significantly 
different. Davis demonstrates how the notion of the “ideal body” preceded the idea of 
the “normal body.” For example, in the seventeenth century the ideal body, “as 
exemplified in the tradition of nude Venuses” was understood as a “myopoetic body 
that is linked to that of the gods” (“Constructing Normalcy” 4). Furthermore, “when 
ideal human bodies occur, they do so in mythology,” not in reality (4).  Davis argues 
that the central point here, “is that in a culture with an ideal form of the body, all 
members of the population are below the ideal … There is in such societies no 
demand that populations have bodies that conform to the ideal” (4). The crucial 
difference to contemporary conceptions, then, lies in the consequence that the ideal 
body cannot, by definition, be attained by humans. 
Among key figures in the establishment of an achievable “normal body” in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was the Belgian astronomer, 
mathematician, and statistician Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874). 13 Quetelet collected 
and analyzed data associated with incidents of crime and homicide, but also marriage. 
He devised improvements in census taking, and developed methods for simultaneous 
observations of astronomical, meteorological, and geodetic phenomena from scattered 
points throughout Europe. Quetelet’s prominence, however, rests on his application of 
statistics and probability theory to social phenomena. Both methods were common in 
astronomy in accounting for measurement errors around means. Quetelet was the first 
to attempt to describe and explain the complexity of social phenomena by means of 
data collection and statistical methods of analysis. Not only did Quetelet believe there 
were calculable statistical laws underlying social phenomena, but that in the 
mathematical assessment of humankind psychological and moral characteristics could 
be measured in the same way as physical characteristics. Correspondingly, he referred 
to his project as “social physics.” In Sur l’homme et le développement de ses facultés, 
ou essai de physique sociale (1835; A Treatise on Man and the Development of His 
Faculties), Quetelet drafts the concept of the calculable l’homme moyen, or the 
“average man” by means of the normal distribution. Average, here, comprises both 
physical and moral characteristics. This statistically calculable “average man” was 
propagated as the ideal version of man. In Quetelet’s eugenicist view, “deviations 
more or less great from the mean have constituted [for artists] ugliness in body as well 
as vice in morals and a state of sickness with regard to the constitution (qtd. Porter 
102). Davis sees in Quetelet’s work a “scientific justification for moderation and 
middle-class ideology,” and observes that “[t]he average man, the body of the man in 
the middle, becomes the exemplar of the middle way of life” (5). Carrying socially 
valued characteristics, l’homme moyen becomes an aspirational concept. In this way 
Quetelet’s analysis becomes ideological. It moves from description (normal) to 
prescription (normative). A remnant from Quetelet’s reflections, the body-mass-index 
(BMI) measurement is still commonly used in medical diagnostics. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
13 For a more detailed discussion of Quetelet’s work, see	Donnelly, Kevin, Adolphe Quetelet, social 
physics and the average men of science: 1796-1874, (2015); Gamper, Michael, “Emergenz des 
Mittelmäßigen: Cousin, Quetelet, Tocqueville und der literarische Realismus” (2007); Beirne, Piers, 
“Adolphe Quetelet and the Origins of Positivist Criminology” (1987). 
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EUGENICS 
 
As a consequence of the establishment and pervasiveness of norms, the movement of 
eugenics gained momentum during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
As Davis observes, “[t]he rather amazing fact is that almost all the early statisticians 
had one thing in common: they were eugenicists” (“Constructing Normalcy” 6). The 
reason statistics is bound up with eugenics is because the core tenet of statistics is that 
a population can be normed. In the wake of this central insight, Davis states that the 
norm divides the population into standard and nonstandard, normal and deviant 
subpopulations (6). Key figures in the eugenicist movement, such as Sir Francis 
Galton (1822–1911), Karl Pearson (1857-1936), and Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher (1890-
1962), worked on figuring out the statistical measure of humans in hopes of 
improving humans and diminishing deviations from the norm. In this way, eugenics 
as a scientific discipline and practice aims to norm the nonstandard.  
It was Sir Francis Galton, a cousin to Charles Darwin (1809-1882), who 
coined the term “eugenics” in Inquiries into the Human Faculty and its Development 
(1883). Eugenics was, “the science of human improvement by better breeding” 
(Davenport 3). Galton engaged himself in the ways human traits can be inherited. 
This preoccupation led him to invent the method of fingerprinting in order to 
systematically identify and register those individuals carrying deviant features. These 
aims were not considered forms of criminalization at the time, but instead as 
procedures in service of national fitness. In Galton’s pursuit of a progressive 
improvement of the human race, the individual body became the object of scrutiny 
and the reproductive rights of those identified with undesirable traits were questioned. 
In this way the Darwinian theory of evolution took hold of applied biology, and 
reinforced the idea that “defectives” were to be eliminated from the human race. In 
their objective to understand and eradicate social problems, professionals from 
disciplines such as medicine, psychology, and statistics targeted those classes of 
people they considered responsible for the so-called “feebleminded”14. It was widely 
believed that “feeblemindedness” was “one of the root causes of crime, pauperism, 
dependency, alcoholism, prostitution, and other social ills” (Elks 76).15  
“Feebleminded” was considered a clinical term in the United States at the turn 
of the twentieth century and was later differentiated into the terms “mental 
deficiency,” “mental retardation,” “intellectual disabilities,” and “developmental 
disabilities.” Since it was believed that the major cause for feeblemindedness resided 
in the body, its diagnosis required an examination of hereditary status or cases of 
inbreeding, and disease.16 The only way society as a whole could be spared from 
degeneration, eugenicists thought, was through controlling who was allowed to 
																																																								
14 I use the term here as it was used at the time. 
15 See the work of Henry Goddard, psychologist and leading eugenicist, who advanced this thinking 
with publications, such as Feeblemindedness: Its Causes and Consequences (1914). Another 
Eugenicists who believed it was possible to classify individuals visually by learning to recognize what 
they believed to be observable characteristics of idiocy and imbecility was physician Martin Barr who 
developed a visual classification scheme (1904), which he perfected with Earle Francis Maloney as 
Types of Mental Defectives (1920).	
16 For more information see David J. Smith’s Minds Made Feeble: The Myth and Legacy of the 
Kallikaks (1988); Saran Ghatak’s “Goddard, Henry H.: Feeblemindedness and Delinquency” (2010); 
Alison C. Carey’s “Beyond the Medical Model: A Reconsideration of ‘Feeblemindedness,’ 
Citizenship, and Eugenic Relations” (2003); or Joseph Jastak’s “A Rigorous Criterion 
of Feeblemindedness” (1949).  
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breed.17 The strategies of control were diverse. Strategies reached from regulations 
concerning the marriage of “undesirables” and strict immigration laws, to forced 
confinement in institutions and euthanasia.18 By 1914 eugenics was a fully recognized 
science, taught at universities, promoted by associations (e.g. American Breeder’s 
Association or Race Betterment Foundation), represented at state fairs, and accepted 
by the public. For example, state fairs held competitions “where families would be 
examined and trophies given to the ‘fittest families’ in order to promote positive 
eugenics” (Elks 76). Theories of degeneracy, genetic inheritance, and intellectual 
disability promoted the idea that a person’s physical features, the shape of their body, 
their facial appearance, and expressions revealed basic information about their 
character, mental abilities and morale. Photography was one of eugenicists’ most 
effective weapon in their crusade. As a diagnostic tool, photographs buttressed 
classification systems and provided “empirical proof” of the link between material 
bodies and mental deficiencies. In other words, the emergence of a new technology 
paradigmatically changed methods of conceptualizing the human body. 
In this context, the work of Italian criminal anthropologist and eugenic 
phrenologist Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909) stands out. Lombroso’s theories of the 
“born criminal” included an analysis of “bodily indicators” or, an enumeration of 
bodily features indicating a criminal disposition or mind. Clinical photography served 
a clear purpose; subjects were depicted as specimen, as examples of types of mental 
defectives, or carriers of particular disease or condition. Photographs made it possible 
and easy to grasp visually what was considered a mental defect that would otherwise 
be invisible. There has been extensive academic work19 on the technological and 
representational strategies applied in clinical photography and its part in the 
construction of disability. These strategies may include: the use of measurements or a 
‘helping hand’ in the picture, the juxtaposition of extremes in a single shot, the 
depiction of single shots of brains, before and after photographs, the singling out of 
particular body parts, or showcasing syndromes such as “mongolism” and 
“cretinism.” The latter were considered genetic throwbacks to “inferior races,” and 
called for genetic-control policies and classificatory systems in order to decide who 
should be institutionalized or sterilized. These photographs clearly depicted which 
characteristics were socially valued and which were not (e.g. dependency vs. 
independency). 
Galton’s work contributed significantly to statistics in that he initiated the 
substitution of the concept of averaging with the idea of ranking. Thus, physical and 
psychological traits, like weight or intelligence, were thought of in ranked order. One 
direct result of Galton’s work is the Intelligence Quotient (IQ) and scholastic 
intelligence tests.20 In other words, Galton redefined the concept of the “ideal” once 
more. Galton’s work argues that the ideal body is achievable. Instead of being 
average, the ideal body is the perfect combination of the physical and psychological 
traits ranked best. Davis summarizes this development as follows,  
 																																																								
17 See Stefan Kühl’s For the Betterment of the Race: The Rise and Fall of the International Movement 
for Eugenics and Racial Hygiene (2015). 
18 See Rebecca M. Kluchin’s “Social Engineering in the United States: Eugenics and Euthanasis” 
(2006); Gerald Vincent O’Brien’s “Protecting the Social Body” (1999). 
19 See Sander Gilman’s Seeing the Insane (1982); David Green’s “Veins of Resemblance: Photography 
and Eugenics” (1984); Elizabeth Stephens and Peter Cryle’s “Eugenics and the Normal Body” (2017); 
Anne Maxwell’s Picture Imperfect: Photography and Eugenics, 1870–1940 (2010).  
20 For the historical consequences of the implementation of the intelligence quotient and intelligence 
testing for non-Americans in the U.S. American context see Chapter 2.1 of this thesis. 
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First, the application of the idea of a norm to the human body creates the idea 
of deviance or a ‘deviant’ body. Second, the idea of a norm pushes the normal 
variation of the body through a stricter template guiding the way the body 
‘should’ be. Third, the revision of the ‘normal curve of distribution’ into 
quartiles, ranked in order, and so on, creates a new kind of ‘ideal.’ This 
statistical ideal is unlike the classical ideal which contains no imperative to be 
ideal. The new ideal of ranked order is powered by the imperative of the norm, 
and then is supplemented by the notion of progress, human perfectibility, and 
the elimination of deviance, to create a dominating hegemonic vision of what 
the human body should be (“Constructing Normalcy” 8). 
 
In the aftermath of Galton’s changes to the normal distribution, people possessing 
allegedly undesirable traits of any kind were grouped together: criminals, the poor, 
and people with disabilities. Disability was conflated with depravity and the 
undifferentiated classes of defectives, undesirables, and unfit were created. 21 During 
the eugenic era and beyond, “the unfit” were considered the disease of the nation and 
a threat to the project of perfecting autonomous subjects, and of producing bodies rich 
in capacity. The consequences of this redefinition for people with disabilities are 
multifarious: conceptual (in rise of notions like ‘feeblemindness’ or ‘pauperism’), 
material (in the disregard in public transportation schemes, or architectural designs), 
political (in the practiced institutionalization and sterilization), and legal (in the 
exclusion from the educational or voting system).  
In his criticism of the eugenics era, Martin Elks discounts the scientific 
practices and inherent ideology almost too easily: 
 
The inappropriate and inaccurate use of photographs by eugenicists as 
scientific proof is obvious when one reviews the thousands of pictures used as 
illustrations in eugenics texts. Some assertions about the photographs are just 
plain absurd … The belief in the validity of photography in general and of this 
specific photograph led the viewer to see in the photograph the condition 
identified in the caption (92). 
 
Moreover, Elks emphasizes that “[t]he ‘objectivity’ of clinical photographs was an 
illusion” and explains how through the new medium of photography, “eugenicists 
created an imaginary disease, feeblemindedness.” (98) He continues, “[t]heir textbook 
and journal illustrations are better described … as rhetoric rather than science. 
Nevertheless, the belief in the truth of photographs helped to elevate eugenics to 
scientific social policy (98). 
 Today, eugenics is no longer considered a valid science22 and disability rights 
activism has gradually succeeded in developing inclusive legal and political 
frameworks. One notable landmark in civil rights legislation is the United States 
Disabilities Act of 1990. As Garland-Thomson summarizes in Extraordinary Bodies, 
the Act, 
 																																																								
21 For further reading see Marsha Saxton, “Disability Rights and Selective Abortion” (2006); or Irmo 
Marini and Danielle D. Fox “The History of Treatment Towards Persons with Disabilities in America” 
(2018). 
22 And yet there are active supporters of the eugenic movement as could be recently seen in the 
revelation of a secretly hosted eugenics conference at the University College London (Rawlinson and 
Adams).		
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acknowledges that disability depends upon perception and subjective 
judgment rather than on objective bodily states. Essential but implicit to this 
definition is that both ‘impairment’ and ‘limit’ depend on comparing 
individual bodies with unstated but determining norms, a hypothetical set of 
guidelines for corporeal form und function arising from cultural expectations 
about how human being should look and act. Although these expectations are 
partly founded on physiological facts about typical humans—such as having 
two legs with which to walk upright or having some capacity for sight or 
speech—their sociopolitical meanings and consequences are entirely culturally 
determined (6-7). 
 
And yet, ramifications from the eugenic era still subliminally pervade modern 
Western societies.  
In their latest publication The Biopolitics of Disability, Mitchell and Snyder 
focus on the question of what consequences the shift from a liberal to a neoliberal 
system entails for the disabled body. Mitchell and Snyder argue, it is a “shift from 
fetishizations of full capacity to fetishizations of minor, yet prolific incapacitations” 
(41). Mitchell and Snyder observe, “a turning point in the social management of 
disabled people from eugenic exclusionist practices to neoliberal inclusionist 
approaches” as a shift that comes with the drawback that disability is increasingly 
turned into a business model (41). Furthermore, they contend “[d]isability turns out to 
provide a key way of documenting the shift from production (Fordist) to consumption 
(post-Fordist) end of capitalism’s perpetual historical renewal process intended to 
justify its founding inequalities and wealth disparities” (41). The status of the body in 
Western political systems is understood as overall unfavorable. In neoliberal 
biopolitics, all bodies are referenced as deficient and “in need of product 
supplementations to treat the in-built inferiority within” (39-40). The neoliberal gaze 
subdivides the body into individual insufficiencies, ailments, and shortcomings all in 
need of chemical, surgical or rehabilitative interventions. Mitchell and Snyder explain 
that, 
 
The historical shift from liberalism’s carceral restraints on deviant bodies to 
neoliberalism’s referencing of deficiencies across all bodies provides a key 
transition in historically distinct approaches to body management. Whereas 
liberalism recognized some bodies as normatively capacitated for a 
competitive labor market and other bodies as nonproductive due to their 
incapacitation (their defining, in-built impairment effects), neoliberalism tends 
to produce all bodies as languishing through excessive exposure to toxic 
environments in order to exploit new treatment markets (40).  
 
Incapacitated bodies are now increasingly understood as normal. At the same time 
these individual incapacities drive the desire for perfection as well as the healthcare 
economy.23 Mitchell and Snyder explicate:  
 
Under neoliberalism the body is targeted as inherently lacking, and the 
pharmaceutical and medical industries promise not to remove but mask social 
symptoms as individualized adjustments to states of a universally beleaguered 
embodiment. Nowhere in this marketing scheme is there a direct address of 																																																								
23 See also Puar’s notion of the “economics of debility” (149). 
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the toxic environments, workplaces, or oppressive living arrangements as the 
appropriate objects of critique or suspect sources of bodily debility. This loss 
of the exploitation of environments as causal agents brings full circle a shift in 
emphasis from the early eugenics period that identified urbanity as the origins 
of modern maladjustment and ‘pastoral cure’ (removal to rural institutions to 
reestablish one’s connection with nature for the rejuvenation of ailing spirits) 
as the appropriate intervention (40). 
 
Similarly, Judy Segal negotiates “the economic causes and effects of the notion that 
the body is the possession of a consumer who is able to purchase ‘repairs’ for it” 
(122). Related criticism has been voiced from within and without disability studies.24 
According to Segal’s study on the rhetoric of medicine, the idea of the “healthy 
consumer” derives from the dominant metaphor of “medicine is a business.” Segal 
explains that, “[a]lthough the business metaphor is not derived from biomedicine per 
se, it is sponsored by the biomedical model. That is, a positivist medical model, 
focusing on the delivery of quantifiable units of care, ideally with observable and 
measurable effects, is easily mapped onto the discursive realm of economics” (124). 
 
 
2.1.2 The Medical Model of Disability 
 
The production of “the normal” is mutually dependent on the production of its 
conceptual Others: the deviant, the abnormal, or the disabled. In particular, the 
modern medical discourse of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries gave 
rise to a bio-medical model of disability25 that determined, until the 1960s, what 
human bodies and minds could or could not do. The medical approach to disability 
follows several principles. First and foremost, the medical approach targets the 
individual body, and the body’s examination is based on a comparison to a normative 
concept of the human body reminiscent of the Vitruvian Man as found in charts, 
tables, diagrams, and textbooks. Fundamentally deficit-oriented, the medical model 
determines physiologic and physiognomic deviances, maladies, and insufficiencies 
aiming for rehabilitation and restitution.26  
In this context, the diagnostic act plays a significant role. As Segal declares, 
we “crave,” and “fetishize” diagnoses, and sometimes we “desire the diagnosis even 
more than the relief from symptoms” (116). Monitoring devices and diagnostic apps27 
have entered our everyday lives, and their power resides in a belief in standard values. 
The crucial aspect of diagnosis lies in its narrative quality. A diagnosis tells a linear 
story of progression and betterment. Moreover, a diagnosis carries the power to 
establish hope for recovery and a return to normalcy. Valued as truth, diagnosis 
becomes an important factor in deciding the future development and progression of 
																																																								
24 See, for instance, Chapter One of Davis’ Bending Over Backwards (2002) or Ivan Illich’s beginning 
to Medical Nemesis (1976).  
25 See Mike Bury’s “Illness Narratives: Fact or Fiction?” (2001). 
26 See Annette Gough’s “Body/Mine: A Chaos Narrative of Cyborg Subjectivities and Liminal 
Experiences” (2005). 
27 The market for health and fitness apps is expanding so massively that from 2014-2016 the usage of 
such apps “grew by over 330%” (Kesiraju par.1). Advertised to track one’s health and fitness, apps 
monitor one’s diet, weight, BMI, body fat, lean body mass and step count. 
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health conditions.28 The reduction of impairment and restoration of all functions to the 
body is fulfilled through the use of prostheses, ortheses,29 or muscular exercises. 
These technologies are meant to bring the disabled body (back) in line with the model 
of the able-bodied. Traditional rehabilitative practices follow and perpetuate a linear 
narrative of restoration and healing, which according to Pamela Fisher and Dan 
Goodley “can obstruct the development of positive discourses around disability” (78). 
Normalization does not only bear on the (re-)acquisition of ordinary capacities and 
normal bodily functions, but also on the restoration of an average visual appearance. 
According to this logic, it is not enough to move or get about by whatever means 
necessary but rather it is unequivocally preferable to walk on two legs. Disability 
studies scholars have criticized the enforcement of a strong alignment with functional 
and aesthetic norms its overarching and yet narrow normalizing authority over what is 
considered an acceptable body.30  
 To show that this understanding of the human body has a distinctive history, 
and therefore, agenda and ideology, disability studies scholars refer to this medical 
approach as “the medical model of disability.” This choice in terminology intends to 
historicize, criticize, and denaturalize the medical approach to disability, and classify 
it as a corollary of a modern belief in science. Substantial disability scholarship has 
focused on “the historical formation of the social identity ‘disabled,’ presenting it as a 
way of organizing physical, mental and emotional variations into a large and diverse 
group of people who may have no more in common than the stigmatized designation 
of abnormality.” (Garland-Thomson and Stoddard-Holmes 74)  
In contrast, sparked by the activism of the disability rights movement in the 
1960s, the academic negotiation of disability developed their own theories and a new 
vocabulary of disability consolidated under the header of “the social model of 
disability.” 31 In opposition to the medical model, this new critical framework defined 
“disability not as a physical defect inherent in bodies—just as gender is not simply a 
matter of genitals nor race a matter of skin pigmentation—but rather as a way of 
interpreting human differences” (73). Within the social model, “disability becomes a 
representational system more than a medical problem, a social construction rather 
than a personal misfortune or a bodily flaw, and a subject appropriate for wide-
ranging intellectual inquiry instead of a specialized field within medicine, 
rehabilitation or social work.” (73) The social model offers a new perspective on 
disability by addressing abnormality, deviance, and the disabled body in historical 
terms while problematizing mechanisms of social construction and modes of cultural 
representation. Thus, this approach shifts the responsibility for accommodating 
disabilities from the individual to the society.  
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
28 See Goodley and Claire Tregaskis. “Storying Disability and Impairment: Retrospective Accounts of 
Disabled Family Life” (2006). 
29  In contrast to prostheses substitutive function, ortheses support structural and functional 
characteristics of the muscular and skeletal system externally.  
30 See Fisher and Goodley’s “The linear medical model of disability: mothers of disabled babies resist 
with counter-narratives” (2007). 
31 For a detailed analysis of the British and American social model of disability see chapter 2.2 of this 
book.	
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2.1.3 Medical Romanticism 
 
In the following I will show how literary traditions, particularly those of Romanticism 
grounded depictions of disability in the medical notions of disease, dysfunction, and 
disorder through visions of a grotesque body. Furthermore, when the Romantics’ 
quest for cures were coupled with computer technologies two centuries later, the 
overcoming of the body’s maladies appeared within reach. 
Tracing the paradigmatic changes in Western conceptualization of the human 
body, I have so far treated medicine and literature as separate spheres, or in C. P. 
Snow’s (1905-1980) coinage, as “two cultures.” However, it is particularly the period 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Romantic era, that teems with 
cross-fertilizations between medical and literary discourses. “The romantic 
imperative,” Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) declares, “demands the mixing of all 
genres.” (KFSA 16: 134, no. 586, my translation) One of the main objectives of the 
Romantic Movement, which arose in Germany around the 1790s and subsequently 
spread to the U.K. and U.S., was bringing together different ways of knowledge 
production. The disciplinary boundaries between philosophy, art, poetry, and science 
were meant to become permeable in support of developing a new way of knowing 
about human life, art, and nature. Dedicated to the Romantic imperative, not only did 
authors such as Schlegel, Goethe (1749-1832) and Novalis (1772-1801)32 identify 
with the ideal of the poet-philosopher-scientist but so did their Anglophone 
counterparts including: Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), William Wordsworth 
(1770-1850), John Keats (1795-1821), and Thomas Beddoes (1803-1849).  
As an artistic and intellectual movement, Romanticism shaped visual arts, 
music, literature as well as the natural sciences. At that time, one point of 
intersection33 between literature and medicine was, for instance, the medium of the 
periodical press. In Literature and Medicine in the Nineteenth Century Periodical 
Press (2017), Megan Coyer assesses the ways in which “the Romantic periodical 
press cultivated innovative ideologies, discourses, and literary forms that both 
reflected and shaped medical culture in the nineteenth century” (1). While such 
interdisciplinary, or even transdisciplinary, approaches appear progressive from a 
contemporary point of view, some ideas remain fairly traditional. One such traditional 
idea is the conceptual understanding of health and disease. Martin Wallen shows that, 
“[t]he division into categories of heath and disease reveals the reliance of romantic 
discourses on the Socratic tradition that first makes the startlingly fundamental 
identification of health with life, order, and truth, disease with death, disorder and 
falsehood” (6). 34  The Romantics considered themselves the corrective to a 
misdirected, or sick, age. Again and again in the writings of the poet-philosopher-
physicians, “we find the call for a restoration of health and expulsion of disease; and 
as consistently, health appears as a single standard of unity, while disease constitutes 
the multiple and obscure attacks” (Wallen 6). Wallen further emphasizes that, “[a]ll of 
a culture’s values come into effect in setting the limits between health and disease,” 
so that “[t]he categories of health and disease direct the valuations of all these other 
oppositions” whether they be binaries such as: organic and mechanic, nature and 																																																								
32 Together with Christian Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling 
(1775-1854), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1970-1831) they were referred to as the Jena romantics.   
33 Only recently have the Romantics been reevaluated with an explicit focus on disability. Michael 
Bradshaw’s volume of collected essays, Disabling Romanticism (2016) aims to revisit Romantic 
“ideologies that support able-bodied and able-minded privilege” (1). 
34 See footnote nine of this book.  
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artifice, or imagination and reason (5). “To the Romantics,” Wallen states, “this one 
division instigates all the others” (5). Nonetheless, there was still a small and loosely 
associated group of individuals to whom these oppositions did not hold.  
 
 
2.1.4 Mechanical Romantics and Technoromanticism 
 
In The Romantic Machine (2012), John Tresch discusses how a group of what he calls 
“mechanical romantics” put the division between the organic and the mechanical 
specifically under revision to arrive at the conclusion that science and technology are, 
instead of a dichotomy between human and nature, actually an integral part “in the 
creation of a ‘second nature’ ” (4). Tresch elaborates,  
 
There was a shift in the image of the machine from an idea of balanced, 
inhuman clockwork to a ‘romantic machine’ exemplified by the steam engine 
and other technologies of conversion and transmutation. Concepts of 
mechanism and organism merged in several ways: mechanical processes were 
seen as the instruments of organic teleology; human technical innovations 
expressed nature’s development; devices and machines fused with human 
actions, intentions, and perceptions. More broadly, a new concept of nature 
emerged, with the recognition that nature not only has a history but is subject 
to alteration by human technology (5). 
 
Therefore, the mechanical romantics envisioned technology as a driver for their “re-
imagining of the system of government, the distribution of the fruits of labor, and the 
proper relationship between humans and the earth” (3). According to Richard Coyne, 
in the twenty-first century this new world order the Romantics envisioned is 
accomplished through information (12). Rather than the “mechanical,” Coyne speaks 
of the “technological” romanticism in his monograph Technoromanticism: Digital 
Narrative, Holism, and the Romance of the Real (1999). After an age of separation, 
fragmentation, and individuation, contemporary individuals form virtual 
communities, live artificial lives in virtual reality, and interact with artificial 
intelligences irrespective of their geographical location. In the information age, Coyne 
observes a return35 of modern Western societies to the organizational state of the 
tribe. Coyne argues that the pattern of formation online is similar to how 
“conventional communities come into being but without depending on spatial 
proximity” (2). In his discussion, Coyne strongly relies on media theorist Marshall 
McLuhan, who stated in 1964 that the “current translation of our entire lives into to 
spiritual form of information” may “make of the entire globe, and of the human 
family, a single consciousness” (61). Technology provides the means for a long 
sought unity because: 
 
For the technoromantic, [the yearning] is for such a degree of absorption into 
technology that not only the body but technology is transcended. The 
electronic matrix is something greater than the contingencies of individual 
components, their physicality and their failings. We become one with each 
other and with our machines. (Coyne 67) 																																																								
35 Media theorist McLuhan describes the evolution from preliterate, tribal culture to literate, data 
processing culture as one from unity to individuation and multiplicity (1964). 
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Similarly, Douglas Rushkoff conceives the transcendence of the body in terms of 
human evolution and the progression of a species when he states, “[a]s computer 
programmers and psychedelic warriors together realize that ‘all is one,’ a common 
belief emerges that the evolution of humanity has been a willful progression toward 
the construction of the next dimensional home for consciousness” (Cyberia 16). 
Technology is understood to facilitate unification by means of the rejection of the 
material world. This logic of a digital utopia undergirded by rhetoric of progress 
found its way into literary narratives, which depict how the mind immerses in an 
electronic data stream. Coyne takes Gibson’s Neuromancer as a prime example to 
illustrate how “[c]yberspace narratives are informed by the romantic (Gothic) fiction” 
(63).36 Putting technology at the forefront of the interrogation of the human and their 
relationship to nature and culture characterizes William Gibson’s technoromantic 
fiction. And yet, rather than simply discarding the body and abandoning the material 
world, Gibson’s narratives problematize unitary concepts of immersion or definitive 
answers to the feud between software and hardware. 
 
 
2.1.5 The Norm and the Novel 
 
Literature, and narrative structures in general, have been considered central to the 
project of constructing the normal and the disabled body. Jürgen Link argues that as a 
cultural practice literature is “above all functional for subjectivation—that is, the 
production and reproduction of subjectivities” (15). The experience of the prescriptive 
quality of the normalistic curve-landscape motivates the individual to organize their 
life with regard to the limits of normality. The assuring normal middle zone is 
bracketed by risky transitional zones of those limits, followed by marginal zones of 
abnormality. Link points to an ambivalence that has been described in depth by 
disability studies scholars.37 Link writes, “[t]he fear of denormalization establishes the 
average with an overwhelming power of attraction and the margins of abnormality 
with the power of repulsion” (15). And yet, Link observes that the margins are 
strangely attractive. That is, aesthetic abnormality appears to be more interesting than 
the ordinary, the average, and the normal. Link further argues that since there is no 
mathematical criterion for the precise limits of normality, these limits must be 
grounded symbolically. This is where the formative role of narratives comes in. The 
normalistic curve-landscape of statistical data is coded into collective symbols such as 
metaphors, synecdoches, partes pro toto, allegories, analogies, and the ubiquituous 
images of a culture (12). According to Link, the production of narratives is a central 
result of “the interplay between the normalistic curve-landscape and its coding by 
collective symbolism” (12). He declares that, “normalism is the overall 
interdiscursive frame for subjectivation both in the psychological and sociological 
dimension” (16). Narratives use normalistic curve-landscapes as the very basic 
underlying narrative and symbolic frame and psychology. Therefore, narratives 
cannot but be normalistic.  																																																								
36 In a similar spirit, Rapatzikou wrote extensively on this topic in Gothic Motifs in the Fiction of 
William Gibson (2004). 
37 For insightful analyses of the relation between disability and ambivalence see Garland-Thomson’s 
Freakery (1996); Elizabeth Grosz’s “Intolerable Ambiguity: Freaks as/at the Limits” (1996); 
Shildrick’s “The Disabled Body, Genealogy and Undecidability” (2005). 
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Likewise, Davis asserts that “the novel as a form promotes and symbolically 
produces normative structures” (“Constructing Normalcy” 11). Furthermore “[i]f we 
accept that novels are a social practice that arose as part of the project of middle-class 
hegemony, then we can see that the plot and character development of novels tend to 
pull toward the normative” (11). It is not so much an author’s conscious choice but 
instead “the very structures on which the novel rests [that] tend to be normative, 
ideologically emphasizing the universal quality of the central character whose 
normativity encourages us to identify with him or her” (11). In other words, the 
normalistic narrative structures symbolically buttress the normal body, repeatedly 
linking the normal with qualities such as healthy, virtuous, good, and desirable to 
consolidate this assertion of value. At the same time, more often then not literary 
works present figures like sacrificial victims or villains as physically abnormal. For 
example, these character-types are often represented as scarred, deformed, or 
mutilated. Attentive to the topic of disability, Davis observes that “almost any literary 
work will have some reference to the abnormal, to disability, and so on. [He] would 
explain this phenomenon as a result of the hegemony of normalcy. This normalcy 
must constantly be enforced in public venues” (12). Moreover, novels offer 
sometimes implicitly and other times explicitly, “a kind of surveying of the terrain of 
the body, an attention to difference—physical, mental, and national” (15). What could 
be called a “eugenic gaze” is however a mere “recapitulation of the novelistic gaze” 
that sees meaning in normal and deviant features (14). The basic features of the 
novelistic form are fundamentally normalistic because “from the typicality of the 
central character, to the normalizing devices of plot to bring deviant characters back 
into the norms of society, to the normalizing coda of endings, the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century novel promulgates and disburses notions of normalcy and by 
extension makes of physical differences ideological differences” (15). The novel, 
therefore, ideologically consolidates the power of the bourgeoisie. Davis argues that 
in order to develop awareness for disability issues, literary works and narratives in 
general need “to reverse the hegemony of the normal and to institute alternative ways 
of thinking about the abnormal” (15). Operating within the interdiscourse, the novel 
translates and integrates ideas from specialized medical discourses as can be seen in 
examples of canonical literary works such as: William Faulkner’s The Sound and the 
Fury (1929), John Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men (1937), Herman Melville’s Moby 
Dick (1956), and Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird (1960) as well as contemporary 
novels such as: Michelle Hodkin’s The Unbecoming of Mara Dyer (2011), Jojo 
Moyes’ Me Before You (2012), R. J. Palacio’s Wonder (2012), John Green’s The 
Fault in Our Stars (2012), and Anthony Doerr’s All the Light We Cannot See 
(2014).38 
An investigation of the “elementary discourse,” in Link’s sense, gives an 
indication of how the specialized discourse of medicine informs actual everyday lives 
with respect to disability. Fisher and Goodley examine biographical accounts of how 
parents, and particularly mothers, of disabled children make sense of and speak about 
																																																								
38  For more examples and their analysis see Miles Beauchamp, Wendy Chung, and Alijandra 
Mogilner’s Disabled Literature: A Critical Examination of the Portrayal of Individuals with 
Disabilities in Selected Works of Modern and Contemporary American Literature (2015); Alice Hall’s 
Disability and Modern Fiction: Faulkner, Morrison, Coetzee and the Nobel Prize for Literature 
(2012); Literature and Disability (2015); Kathryn Allan’s Disability in Science Fiction: 
Representations of Technology and Cure (2013); or Maren Linett’s Bodies of Modernism: Physical 
Disability in Transatlantic Modernist Literature (2017).  
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disability. What the two scholars find striking is how strongly these life narratives39 
are structured along the principle of linearity. In “Linear Medical Model of 
Disability,” Fisher and Goodley make the observation that, “[t]he linear life narrative 
constitutes a dominant trope within Western culture” and can be traced to the 
Enlightenment period of the late eighteenth century with its “modernist worldview 
and its belief in progress and science” (66, 70).40 Fisher and Goodley argue that, “both 
Enlightenment thinking and modernist traditions promoted the view that history could 
be regarded in terms of cumulative, linear progression, achieved through the 
application of reason, and the exercise of science and of ‘expert’ knowledge” (66). 
Such “all-explaining” approaches to the body are “rarely adequate to account for the 
complexities of human conditions” (66, 70). Still today, we realize the repercussions 
of the modernist push towards individualism and progress in manifestations of, for 
instance, the promising linear betterment inherent in diagnoses. At this point, I extend 
Fisher’s and Goodley’s criticism to argue that given the novel’s potential to mediate 
between discourses, the fundamental linearity of its form as well as the novel’s rise 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, contributed to the ways in which we 
think, talk, and write about the body. 
 
 
EXTRAORDINARY BODIES OF DISABLED FIGURES 
 
While literature, like other forms of art, has always featured both normal and disabled 
figures, the latter’s frequency of occurrence, attributed roles, modes of representation, 
ascribed values, and narrative purpose differ widely from their normal counterparts. 
Figures such as “the monster,” “the cripple,” or “the freak” have become iconic and 
integral to the artistic repertoire of narrative and representation.41 As signifiers of evil, 
or personifications of debased morals, these set figures function as the prototypical 
villains.42 Garland-Thomson observes, that “[d]isabled literary characters usually 
remain on the margins of fiction as uncomplicated figures or exotic aliens whose 
bodily configurations operate as spectacles, eliciting responses from other characters 
or producing rhetorical effects that depend on disability’s cultural resonance. Indeed, 
main characters almost never have physical disabilities” (Extraordinary Bodies 9). 																																																								
39 Exemplifying the importance of life narratives for people with disabilities G. Thomas Couser states 
in Signifying Bodies: Disability in Contemporary Life Writing (2009): “To members of marginalized 
groups, autobiography may be the most accessible of literary genres. It requires less in the way of 
literary expertise and experience than more exalted genres, like action or drama; it seems to require 
only that one have a life—or at least, one considered worth narrating—and sufficient narrative skill to 
tell one’s own story. Most literary scholars would agree that autobiography has served historically as a 
sort of threshold genre for marginalized populations; within the American literary tradition, witness the 
importance of autobiography to African Americans, Native Americans, and women, for example. 
Presumably, it might serve disabled people this way as well” (31). For a general introduction to life 
writing see Sidonie Smith, “Life Narrative: Definitions and Distinctions” (2002). 
40 For more information on linearity in relation to disability and medicine see David Coulby and 
Crispin Jones’s “Post-modernity, Education and European Identities” (1996); Curt Dudley-Marling’s  
“The Social Construction of Learning Disabilities” (2004); or Douglas Ezzy’s “Illness Narrative: Time, 
Hope and HIV” (2000). 
41 The journals Disability Studies Quarterly and Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies have 
specialized in the scholarly analysis of the medial representations as well as theoretical 
conceptualization of disability. 
42 Recent examples of physically or psychically marked villains may include figures from Split (2016) 
or Wonder Woman (2017). For a discussion of ‘disability vilification’ see Mark Weber, Disability 
Harassment (2007) or Marilyn Dahl “The Role of the Media in Promoting Images of Disability- 
Disability as Metaphor: The Evil Crip” (1993).  
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Representations therefore establish, reiterate, and substantiate the conjunction 
between a particular symbolic meaning and a particular body type. The disabled 
figure serves as “a repository for social anxieties about such troubling concerns as 
vulnerability, control, and identity” (6). Furthermore, it is in narratives that disability, 
or “the paradigm of what culture calls deviant,” and its related insecurities regarding 
the human body become manageable (6). “Because these characters operate as 
embodiments of an unnamed, profound peril,” Garland-Thomson writes, “the 
narrative resolution is almost always to contain that threat by killing or 
disempowering the disabled character. The logic that governs this cultural narrative, 
then, is that eliminating the anomaly neutralizes the danger” (36). Garland-Thomson 
further argues that showcasing corporeal otherness has a decisive function in 
American literature. The disabled figure is “as essential to the cultural project of 
American self-making as the varied throng of gendered, racial, ethnic, and sexual 
figures of otherness that support the privileged norm” (5) Like Davis and Link 
explain, “the normal” needs to be continuously reinforced in cultural practices and 
discourses of everyday life. “Invested with meanings that far outstrip their biological 
bases,” Garland-Thomson continues, “figures such as the cripple, the quadroon, the 
queer, the outsider, the whore are taxonomical, ideological products marked by 
socially determined stigmata, defined through representations, and excluded from 
social power and status” (8). Understood as politicized constructions, these figures 
both corroborate with and mirror oppressive governmental structures and exclusive 
power relations on all levels.  
There is, of course, a wide spectrum within the representation of corporeal 
Otherness that ranges from simplistic and formulaic, to complex and ambiguous 
figurations. One could argue that there exists a tradition of celebrating extraordinary 
bodies in cultural artifacts, which portray physical or psychic Otherness not as the 
signifiers of dysfunction or threat, but instead as an asset or a cause for admiration 
and fascination. The pathological case example of the “idiot-savant” is illustrative of 
how disability sometimes borders on genius or super-ability and has been taken up by 
popular literary works, such as Winston Groom’s Forrest Gump (1986) and Jonathan 
Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close (2005).43 
From a socio-political perspective, these allegedly “positive” or empowering 
representations can be similarly damaging for people with disabilities. Whether 
characters are depicted as totally blind, profoundly deaf, never leaving the wheelchair 
or, on the contrary, as super-abled, and having “overcome” their disability, both 
literary strategies widen the gap between reality and representation. Representation is 
crucial in shaping perception and constituting cultural identities and categories, 
especially if audiences have had little direct knowledge or few real-life encounters 
with disability. Literary disability studies scholars have criticized disabled figures 
which flatten or misrepresent the actual experience of disability because traits or 
conditions are often singled-out and depicted as static attributes that overshadow all 
other personality traits. The dynamic and interrelated character of disability is often 
missing. Garland-Thomson stresses that what is generally understood as a 
homogenous group does not share more characteristics but rather shares an 
“experience of stigmatization…A blind person, an epileptic, a paraplegic, a deaf 
person, and an amputee, for example, have no shared cultural heritage, traditional 
activities, or common physical experience” (15). It is primarily their social status that 																																																								
43 For more details on cultural depictions of autism see Stuart Murray’s Representation Autism: 
Culture, Narrative, Fascination (2008). 
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creates commonality. Mostly, representations lack in political awareness but feature 
disabled figures merely as “conventional elements of the sentimental, romantic, 
Gothic, or grotesque traditions” (10).  
Manifesting as a facet of the Romantic movement, the grotesque provided a 
subversive aesthetic and gave rise to fantastically distorted and ugly figures that 
became more pronounced during the eighteenth century—an era distinguished by 
rationalism and neoclassicism. As a historical mode of art, the grotesque has travelled 
from the original denotation of paintings found on the walls of the grottoes—the 
cellars of Roman ruins—to architecture, theatre, and literature.44 While “defenders of 
orthodoxy and keepers of catholic ideals of art” understood the grotto style as an 
“ideological threat” and “an assault on the orthodox standards of taste” leading critics 
such as Friedrich Schlegel, Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Victor Hugo conceived of it 
as an argent reaction to “an age sick with moral and political repression” (Burwick 
92). Among the major tropes of the grotesque are hybridity and the distortion or 
transgression of boundaries. These tropes can be psychological or physical, as in the 
fusion of fantastical motifs of the human form with that of animals, plants, and 
machines. The mode of depiction is fantastical rather than realistic, laying somewhere 
between horror and comedy, the Gothic and the Satire. Burwick describes grotesque 
aesthetics as operating “through an alternation of attraction and repulsion. The 
attraction is tainted with the lurid, the exotic, the forbidden; the repulsion is motivated 
more by a discomfort in disorder than outright revulsion” (94). Burwick paraphrases 
Victor Hugo affirmation that, “[t]o show man as he is,” namely a complex and 
muddled creature of body and soul, good and evil, beauty and beast, “art necessarily 
becomes grotesque” (Burwick 98) As paradoxical as it may seem, artists considered 
the grotesque body as the appropriate tool in investigating and comprehending the 
human body. Burwick also states that, “[a]s a recurrent theme in the Romantic 
grotesque, the psychodrama of sin and guilt is typically narrated as the compelling 
enchantment with which the demonic seductress captivates her prey” (97). 
In relation to his work on the normal and the deviant body, Davis writes that, 
“as a visual form [the grotesque] was inversely related to the concept of the ideal and 
its corollary that all bodies are in some sense disabled” (“Constructing Normalcy” 4). 
In pre-industrial, and pre-statistical times, the hybrid, deformed, and disordered being 
the grotesque portrayed evoked attraction and discomfort (i.e. freak shows) but were 
not considered deviant in a sense of Quetelet or Galton. Rather, “the use of the 
grotesque had a life-affirming transgressive quality in its inversion of the political 
hierarchy” (4).45 The grotesque, “permeated culture and signified common humanity, 
whereas the disabled body, a later concept, was formulated as by definition excluded 
from culture, society, the norm” (4). From the early nineteenth century onwards, and 
especially in light of the ramifications of World War I, the category of the grotesque 
body was increasingly understood through notions of deformity, disorder, and 
deviance. Here, the concept of the grotesque begins to shift considerably towards the 
idea of disability. Garland-Thomson sees another twist in this connection between the 
grotesque style and disability:  
 
When the interpretative framework of the grotesque’s visual fantasies and 
extravagances is translated into the predominantly realistic conventions of 																																																								
44 For extensive criticism see Friedrich Schlegel, Gespräch über die Poesie (1800) or Mikhail Bakhtin, 
Rebelais and His World (1968). 
45 Here, Davis references Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics of Transgression (1987) and 
more generally the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. 
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literary representation and criticism, the grotesque becomes equated with 
physically disabled characters. Therefore, using the grotesque as an analytical 
strategy invites both critics and readers to view representations of disability 
through an aesthetic rather than a political framework. Aestheticizing 
disability as the grotesque tends to preclude analysis of how those 
representations support or challenge the sociopolitical relations that make 
disability a form of cultural otherness (Extraordinary Bodies 111-112). 
 
While the disabled figure and its extraordinary form have been the topic of numerous 
artistic analyses, disability studies scholars bring the sociopolitical implications of art 
to the fore. An analysis of extraordinary bodies, be they coded through disability or 
superability, “furthers our collective understanding of the complex processes by 
which all forms of corporeal diversity acquire the cultural meanings undergirding a 
hierarchy of bodily traits that determines the distribution of privilege, status, and 
power” (6)  
In order to gain a critical distance to, and simultaneously trouble the notion of 
the normal, Garland-Thomson proposes the normate as a neologistic conceptual 
strategy that throws “the veiled subject position of cultural self” into sharp relief (8). 
She writes, “[i]f one attempts to define the normate position by peeling away all the 
marked traits within the social order at this historical moment, what emerges is a very 
narrowly defined profile that describes only a minority of actual people” (8). 
Erving Goffman refers to the fact that there is “only one complete unblushing 
male in America” and that is a “young, married, white, urban, northern, heterosexual, 
Protestant father of college education, fully employed, of good complexion, weight 
and height, and a recent record in sports” (qtd. Garland-Thomson 32).46 By taking the 
statistical approach to the normal subject position seriously, almost in a reductio ad 
absurdum fashion, the normate problematizes the figure of the American self by 
revealing its unmarked and sheltered position in the neutral space of normalcy and the 
mechanisms of its production.  
Since the terms “abnormal” and “deviant” carry strong medical overtones and 
historically loaded value judgments, their usage in my thesis is limited to the purpose 
of critical reflection, and in an effort to avoid the tacit continuation of the hegemony 
of normalcy. In the following, I will instead draw from Garland-Thomson’s notion of 
the “extraordinary” body—a conveniently vague term that primarily refers to the 
perceived differences (not statistically measured, medically assessed, and socially 
devalued deviances) between bodies. It is also a term that allows a fresh perspective 
on a topic that runs too often on purely medical rails. 
  
																																																								
46 Garland-Thomson specifically refers to Goffmann, his Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled 
Identity (128). Goffman published Stigma (1963) in the same year as Californian sociologist Howard 
Saul Becker’s Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (1963), which is foundational for 
labeling theory. Becker refined a general theory of deviance by analyzing the occurrence of the 
devalued statuses of certain individuals and groups. In stating that “The deviant is one to whom that 
label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label” (9), Becker 
moves towards a social model of conceptualizing deviance. Deviance, Becker underscores, “is not a 
quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others” (9). 
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2.2 The Body and Society 
 
2.2.1 The Social Model of Disability 
 
Until the 1970s, Western societies approached to disability primarily through 
medicine and biology—sciences that are dedicated to measuring, statistically 
assessing, categorizing, and normalizing the human body. In the 1960s and 1970s in 
North America and the United Kingdom, several civil rights movements47 came into 
being. Amongst the many fractions to formulate political claims against 
discrimination and exclusion were people with disabilities. Contrary to the previous 
negotiations of disability that were based on statistical data, eugenicist rhetoric, and 
medical rubrics, these activists based their demands on their personal experience of 
disability in their daily lives and pointed to the structural dimension of social 
inequalities. Disability activists in the United States as well as the United Kingdom. 
began to publically criticize social barriers and challenge “the historical oppression 
and exclusion of disabled people” (Shakespeare, “The Social Model of Disability” 
197). United in their rejection of the predominance of the “over-medicalized and 
individualist accounts of disability,” the disability rights movement provided the 
initial spark for what was later formalized under the term “the social model of 
disability” by academics (197). The social model of disability became a counter 
project to the well-established medical model of disability. Rather than 
conceptualizing disability as the deficit of an individual, a condition in need of repair, 
therapy, or rehabilitation as done under the medical (individual) model of disability, 
the social model examines the individual’s socially-engineered environment. This 
revolutionary shift in focus granted this model the denotation “the big idea” (Hasler 
1993). The key tenet of the social model is the fundamental distinction between 
individual biological characteristics (impairment) and its social reality (disability). 
Paramount to this model is the notion of disability as “a position of exclusion defined 
in relation to the balance of power between people” (Winance, “Rethinking 
Disability” 101). In its strongest, most revolutionary version, this model calls for an 
overall reformation of the state. In this way, the social model is more than a rights-
based approach48. While the latter uses an existing legal framework, the former 
champions the reformation of the political and legal system, the re-organization of 
society. “Indeed,” Mark Priestley elucidates, “it is precisely in revealing why legal 
safeguards alone cannot produce sufficient conditions for disabled people’s full 
participation and equality that social model analyses are so useful” (23). Out of the 
nine disability studies paradigms that David Pfeiffer identifies, the medical model and 
the social model became the two most prominent, and yet controversial, approaches to 
disability. Each model provides its own set of rules and has its own vocabulary. The 
social model of disability exists in different variations ranging from radical or 
“strong” (Shakespeare) to mild or “vague” (Finkelstein). In the following, I will focus 
on the most prominent U.K. and U.S. versions of the social model, the former usually 
understood as more radical. 
In the U.K., it was disabled-led activist groups, such as the Liberation 
Network of People with Disabilities, and the Union of the Physically Impaired 																																																								
47 To name a few groups and movements: Gay Liberation Front and Gay Activist Alliance early 1970s 
in the US, African-American Civil Rights Movement, Black Power Movement, Black Panther 
Movement, Chicano Movement, American Indian Movement, and first-wave feminism.  
48 Mark Priestley identifies this approach as more common in the E.U. and U.S. than U.K. (2005). 
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Against Segregation (UPIAS) that fought against social exclusion, stigmatization, and 
marginalization. They claimed that it was not the people with disabilities who were in 
need of change but social policies, laws, and attitudes. Shakespeare explains, “[t]he 
aim of UPIAS was to replace segregated facilities with opportunities for people with 
impairments to participate fully in society, to live independently, to undertake 
productive work and to have full control over their own lives” (“The Social Model of 
Disability” 197). In working towards the collective goal of liberation,  
 
[t]heir strategy … included … developing connections with other disabled 
people and creating an inclusive disability community for mutual support; 
exploring social conditioning and positive self-awareness; the abolition of all 
segregation; seeking control over media representation; working out a just 
economic policy; encouraging the formation of groups of people with 
disabilities (198).  
 
The Liberation Network of People with Disabilities argues in 1981 that, “[w]hile the 
basis of social divisions in society was economic, these divisions were sustained by 
psychological beliefs in inherent superiority or inferiority” (qtd. in Shakespeare, “The 
Social Model of Disability” 198). The historical evolution of such beliefs is presented 
in chapter 2.1. It is this “asymmetry between the positions of disabled and able-bodied 
people” that the “proponents of the social model make visible and denounce” 
(Winance, “Rethinking Disability” 101). Myriam Winance explains that this 
asymmetry originates in a “process of oppression by the latter of the former ([a] 
process of domination)” that forecloses same life opportunities (101).  
The British social model, as the more specific and resolute model, builds upon 
a number of dichotomies. First, there is a fundamental distinction between disability 
and impairment. “Disability” is structural, public, and pointing to social exclusion 
while “impairment” can be described as individual, private, and pointing to physical 
limitation. From these opposed ontologies follows the opposition of the social model 
and the medical model. Moreover, according to the social model disabled people are 
by definition an oppressed group. Defining disability as social oppression legitimizes 
the call for human rights (rather than pity or charity) and the call for action against 
disabling institutions, policies, power relations that underpin societies. In this vein, 
“social model thinking mandates barrier removal, anti-discrimination legislation, 
independent living, and other responses to social oppression (Shakespeare, “The 
Social Model of Disability” 199). Developed for these purposes, the social model is 
much more a “practical tool” than “a theory, an idea or concept” (Oliver 30). 
According to Mike Oliver, the social model is a powerful instrument to demonstrate 
that the problems disabled people face results from social oppression, not from an 
individually deficient physique. Thus, this tool has been politically powerful in 
building a social movement for disabled people due to its simple, memorable, and 
effective political slogans. Such unification has had a significant psychological effect 
in that it has fostered the self-esteem of disabled people and helped build a positive 
sense of collective identity and change perception of disabled people at large (30). All 
in all, this approach has helped to relocate the problem of disability and moral 
responsibility and move discourse from that of the individual to that of the social 
barriers and attitudes that disable them. A shift that allowed people with disabilities to 
“feel anger and pride,” as Shakespeare states, “[r]ather than … self-pity” (“The Social 
Model of Disability” 200). Such a shift empowered people with disabilities to 
organize and combine forces in the fight for equal citizenship. 
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The American social model differs from the British in that it is less strict 
regarding terminology and less radical regarding action. Unlike the British model’s 
focus on social oppression, the American approach defines disability through a 
“minority-group approach.” The minority group status requires civil rights protection, 
rather than calling for revolution. Moreover, Colin Barnes explains that, 
 
most American and Canadian accounts are impairment specific in that they 
limit their discussions to ‘people with physical disabilities’ or the body; 
‘disability’ is both biological condition and a social construct, and the terms 
‘disabled people’ and ‘people with disabilities’ are used interchangeably 
(“New or Not So New” 578). 
 
 When evaluating “ideas on the basis of their conformity to social model orthodoxy” 
as it has often been done within the disability studies discourse, the absence of a 
strong dualism has led to a certain discontent with the American version among 
scholars (Shakespeare and Watson 8).  
 
 
AN OUTDATED RHETORIC? 
 
Whereas the social model of disability has been effective for purposes of political 
activism in the past, its simplicity has become its fatal flaw. The reality of disability is 
so much more complex than what the social model covers, that by now it has 
“outlived its usefulness” and even “creates more problems than it solves” Shakespeare 
and Watson write in 2002 (9,10). 49 In the following, I will outline some of the social 
model’s principal weaknesses.  
Due to its stark focus on disability in terms of social oppression and 
exclusionary practices, the social model has been accused of neglecting the individual 
experience of impairment. Due to its outright rejection of medical approaches, the 
social model risks playing down the possibly problematic nature of impairment. Yet, 
“[e]xperientially, impairment is salient to many” (Shakespeare and Watson 11). 
Similarly, Liz Crow criticizes the failure of this approach to encompass the personal 
experience of pain and limitations (5). Furthermore, Simon Williams states that the 
“endorsement of disability solely as social oppression is really only an option, and an 
erroneous one at that, for those spared the ravages of chronic illness” (812). In reality, 
Shakespeare and Watson clarify, the “majority of disabled people do not have stable, 
congenital impairments” (14). Jenny Morris, Sally French, and Carol Thomas, all in 
their own ways consider alternatives to the strong social model and embrace a 
discussion of the effects of impairment.  Moreover, Shakespeare and Watson say, “it 
is clear that different impairments impinge in different ways” opening the debate for 
open-ended differentiation (12). A discussion of impairment requires the 
consideration of numerous factors: the degree of visibility, the ways it affects 
appearance and/or functioning, whether it is congenital or not, changes in condition 
from static to episodic to degenerative, etcetera. All of these aspects have different 
implications for health and individual capacity, for self-identity and for eliciting 
different responses from the broader cultural and social milieu. In short, “[a]ll these 																																																								
49 Both authors used to be advocates but changed their perspective, along the lines that Bailey and Hall 
formulate: “It is perfectly possible that what is politically progressive and opens up discursive 
opportunities in the 1970s and 1980s can become a form of closure – and have repressive value – by 
the time it is installed as the dominant genre” (15) 
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differences have salient impacts at both the individual and psychological level, and 
the social and structural level” (12). 
That said, the crude distinction between impairment and disability makes 
sense only on paper. Not only does it naturalize and reproduce biological deficiency 
as inherent and given but “[i]n practice, social and individual aspects are almost 
inextricable in the complexity of the lived experience of disability” (“The Social 
Model of Disability” 201). Impairment is “not a pre-social or pre-cultural biological 
substrate” (Thomas 124). But rather, “[i]n practice, it is the interaction of individual 
bodies and social environments which produces disability” (“The Social Model of 
Disability” 201). Thus, in 2002 Shakespeare and Watson argue that instead of 
regarding impairment and disability as dichotomous it is more adequate to consider 
them as “different places on a continuum” or “different aspects of a single 
experience” (24). A taboo within the strong social model, medical treatment within 
this moderate, reconciling approach can be critically reconsidered. Needless to say, 
Shakespeare and Watson’s line of argumentation is far from a “cure at all cost” logic 
but argues that a universal rejection or complete dismissal of medical intervention 
presents “an equivalent error” (13). Their observation that “there is no reason why 
appropriate action on impairment … cannot co-exist with action to remove disabling 
environments and practices” is as much to the point as the conclusion that “[p]eople 
are disabled both by social barriers and by their bodies” (15). Social change thus 
necessitates action at a political as much as a psychological level, and a legal as much 
as an interpersonal level.   
Apart from the logical circularity,50 the question of ascription,51 and the 
utopian goal,52 there are more drawbacks of the social model as an academic account 
of disability. Winance bemoans that despite the fact that “the social model challenges 
the process of normalization as this process is implemented in the individual model, 
notably in rehabilitation practices, and in its operational mode,” it forfeits to 
“challenge the normative ideal targeted by this process,” namely the “autonomous 
subject”  (Winance “Rethinking Disability” 101). Here, Winance points to a lack of 
conceptual/theoretical depth that in a similar way led Shakespeare to conclude that for 
research purposes, the social model of disability is “unhelpful in understanding the 
complex interplay of individual and environmental factors in the lives of disabled 
people” (202). Rather, Shakespeare states, “[m]ore sophisticated and complex 
approaches are needed” (203).  
With their notion of a materialist ontology of embodiment, Shakespeare and 
Watson point to an alternative conceptualization of disability and more adequate 
approach to disability politics (10). The centerpiece to their notion of embodied 
ontology is the elimination of the qualitative differences between disabled people and 
non-disabled people because “everyone has limitations,” “everyone is vulnerable,” 
and in essence, “everyone is impaired” (27, 29). This bodes a fundamental and drastic 
change in the architecture of the social model approach.53 Impairment that is not only 																																																								
50 Shakespeare criticizes that the social model assumes what it needs to prove, namely that disabled 
people are oppressed. In this case, a “circularity enters into disability research: it is logically impossible 
for a qualitative researcher to find disabled people who are not oppressed.” (“The Social Model of 
Disability” 200). 
51 Shakespeare and Watson emphasize that it is not self-evident who the disabled subject is, not always 
clear when disability is used as a label ascribed from the outside and when it manifests a self-
identification (25). 
52 Finkelstein illustrates how difficult it is to operationalize a barrier-free utopia (1981). 
53 This conceptual shift paves the way for the theoretical inclusion of Latour’s actor-network theory, 
which is discussed in chapter 2.3 of this book.	
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through the inevitable experience of functional loss through aging, or accident, or 
genetics, but impairment as in, “frail, limited, vulnerable, mortal” (28). Importantly, 
Shakespeare and Watson note that while we are all impaired, according to their new 
approach, “we are not all oppressed on the basis of this impairment and illness” and 
so the claim for social change remains (28). Unlike the broad and programmatic 
statements made by UPIAS, Shakespeare and Watson differentiate more thoroughly. 
For instance, UPIAS’ take on impairment is unambiguously negative stating that, 
“[d]isability is something imposed on top of our impairments, by the way we are 
unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society” (Shakespeare 
198). Disability is portrayed as an additional burden to an already problematic, 
because impaired, existence. Moreover, the additive logic used by UPIAS is deemed 
simplistic and thus inadequate by current discourse. There have been other voices 
suggesting alternative ontologies of disability over the years. Allan Sutherland (1981) 
attacked “the whole concept of physical normality,” arguing all along that 
disablement/impairment “is the normal condition of humanity” (18). Aaron 
Antonovsky (1979) emphasized that illness is the human condition and Sebastiano 
Timpanaro (1975) stressed the fragility and vulnerability of embodiment in his work. 
In acknowledgement of the complexity of the lived experience of disability 
being “so variable, so contingent, so situated,” sitting “at the intersection of biology 
and society and of agency and structure” it can “only be understood in specific socio-
historical contexts” (Shakespeare and Watson 19, 15-16). Shakespeare and Watson 
formulate a demand to include all the dimensions of disability in its negotiation: 
bodily, psychological, cultural, and political. But they do not stop there. Because the 
strong social model of disability operates one-dimensionally considering disability-
related inequalities only, it has been regarded unable to grasp the multi-dimensional 
reality of people occupying more than one subject position simultaneously. What this 
means is that social model perspectives have not proved very effective in reconciling 
the axes of race, class, and gender within or alongside disability (Morris 1991, 
Vernon 1996). With this in mind I will provide a discussion to the concept of 
intersectionality in the following sections. This broadened theoretical framework will 
provide the backdrop for my analysis of Gibson’s Bridge trilogy.  
 
 
2.2.2 Intersectionality 
 
Beyond its origin in African-American feminist legal and social studies and its 
ensuing proliferation in socio-legal contexts, intersectionality has now become a 
widespread concept throughout the Humanities. It was first proposed by African-
American lawyer Kimberle Crenshaw in the late 1980s as a heuristic term to reveal 
the drawbacks of single identity politics, to examine the dynamics of difference and 
sameness, and to fight interlocking systems of oppression and privilege.54 More 
specifically, Crenshaw’s work aims to make visible the social disadvantages arising 
from being both black and female in North America. It aims to expose the logic by 
which, “Black females are both too similar to Black men and white women to 
represent themselves and too different to represent either Blacks or women as a 
whole” (Cho et al. 790). 55  Thus, Black female narratives were rendered 																																																								
54 Anthias references the Combahee River Collective and bell hooks to clarify that the formulation of 
intersectionality has been driven by black feminist politics (5). 
55 See also Devon W. Carbado’s “Colorblind Intersectionality” (2013). 
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unrecognizable and this social group suffers from, what Crenshaw calls 
“intersectional invisibility” (2000, n.pag.). In more general terms the question is how 
“some differences coalesce to create a more abject form of oppression (e.g. being 
poor, black, and disabled)” and some others “support both privilege/invisibility within 
the same oppressed community (e.g. being black, wealthy, and gay)” (Erevelles and 
Minear 129). Such negotiation draws attention to “the legal system’s complicity with 
the foundational violence of slavery, genocide, and heteropatriarchy” (Spade 1031). 
The recognition of interlocking of identity categories and its consequences on “all 
aspects of human life” granted Crenshaw as well as her ally Patricia Hill Collins a 
pioneer status in the field of disability studies (Anderson and Hill Collins, xii). In its 
opposition to dominant regimes of knowledge and power relations, intersectionality 
found common ground with fields such as critical race studies, gender studies, and 
women’s studies. As Belkhir and Barnett state, “[t]his new integrative race, gender, 
and class (rgc) paradigm and the research it spawned reshaped fields, subfields, 
pedagogical and curricular discussions across the disciplinary and interdisciplinary 
spectrum” (158). 
However, the ways in which intersectionality has been implemented in 
academic fields varies. “Intersectionality” has been considered a buzzword, claimed a 
theory, used as a tool, regarded as a perspective, and fought for as a field. All these 
negotiations of its status, though, boil down to a question of methodology. The 
historical centrality of Black-American women and Black feminism has caused some 
“reservations about intersectionality’s usefulness as an analytic tool in addressing 
other marginalized communities and other manifestations of social power” (Cho et. al. 
788). Angela Harris espouses intersectionality as a “nuance theory” which Erevelles 
counters by arguing that, “[d]isability, like race, offers not just a ‘nuance’ to any 
analysis of difference” (Erevelles and Minear 128). The trouble with race, class, and 
gender is not simply “magnified” by disability but the latter is a structural category in 
its own right. In their “Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, 
Applications, and Praxis” (2017) article, Cho, Crenshaw and McCall advocate the 
implementation of intersectionality as a field called, “interdisciplinary studies.” They 
argue that “the widening scope of intersectional scholarship and praxis has not only 
clarified intersectionality’s capacities; it has also amplified its generative focus as an 
analytical tool to capture and engage contextual dynamics of power” (Cho et al. 788).  
Race, class and gender—the big three—constitute the most powerful 
organizing principles of cultural ideology in the American and European zones, if not 
worldwide (Belkhir and Barnett 2001). Traditionally based on binary differentiations 
(female/male, white/non-white) and hierarchies (upper, middle or lower class) which 
include site-specific and time-specific allocation of value, identity categories 
buttressed systemic inequality, exclusionary practices, and the oppression of those 
classified as inferior. The majority of research on race relations, social class, and 
gender identity developed in almost complete isolation from one other until the early 
1980s. Despite its usefulness for specialized (academic as well as non-academic) 
questions or policies, one-dimensional and strictly disciplinary knowledge production 
does not come without pitfalls. Single-axis scholarship has been accused of 
producing, as well as “relying on a static and singular notion of being or of identity” 
which is simultaneously expected to explain all of the other life experiences of the 
individual or the group—an expectation that is bound to fail (Pastrana 75). On the 
other hand, there is the danger of an endless enumeration of differences that increases 
the complexity of the analysis infinitely, and yet appears reductive due to the reliance 
on set categories (see McCall’s anticategorical complexity). In this regard, Yuval-
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Davis questions whether it is even possible to attend to all the possible social 
categories intersecting at any given time and whether some differences acquire greater 
prominence than others in specific contexts (see Women, Race, and Class, 1983). 
Similarly, Anthias signposts specificity in reminding scholars to keep in mind what 
differences matter, when, where and how, and warning against a mere, “‘listing’ of 
differences (often reduced to identities) that intersect and the impossibility of 
attending analytically to this plurality” (5-6).  
Further criticism turns on the original trinity as being invocative of the 
researcher, rather than reality. As Dhamoon notes, “the privilege assigned to this 
trinity is not intrinsic to the study of categories but indicative of the choices 
researchers have made … in specific historical context” (5). Cho et al. observe how 
“[i]ntersectionality has travelled into spaces and discourses that are themselves 
constituted by power relations that are far from transparent,” and thus urge scholars to 
reflect on their own subject positions and the structural relations that are dynamically 
constituted by the very forces being interrogated (789). Instead of suggesting a return 
to the belief in an objective external observer, Cho et al. demands a second-order 
analysis, and the recognition of the observer as an actor and their inclusion into the 
analysis. Belkhir and Barnett argue that “[r]ace, class, and gender are different but 
related systems of inequality, which indicates that they are not only sources of 
oppression but also of power” (171). They continue:  
 
This conflated relationship to power and oppression according to each of these 
dimensions—race, gender, and class—specifies that we all have responsibility 
in eliminating inequality because very few of us are either all-powerful or all-
oppressed. Eliminating oppression entails recognizing the sites of our own 
power (171).  
 
In spite of this diverse criticism, intersectionality is still regarded as the “most 
appropriate analytical intervention” (Erevelles and Minear 129). Moreover, to mediate 
multiple differences and an “important corrective to essentialising identity constructs” 
(Anthias 3). As is often the case with the dissemination of new terms though, 
methodology lags behind popularity. In this regard, McCall unabashedly states that, 
“there has been little discussion of how to study intersectionality” (1771). There have 
been several theoretical propositions for this problem.   
In her work, Anthias suggests the explicit distinction of three different levels56 
of intersectional analysis or as she calls it, ‘levels of abstraction.’ The most abstract 
first level covers social ontologies, followed by social categories, and lastly concrete 
social relations. This thesis is interested in the translation processes between social 
categories and concrete social relations through the medium of literature, rather 
concentrating on any of these three levels of abstraction as such. By means of an 
analysis of Gibson’s novels, I show how literary narratives rely on categories in their 
representation of characters and explore how literary figurations carry the potential to 
reinforce as well as undermine categories. In this way, literary narratives participate 
in both the construction of the category of disability, which has seen massive re-
fashioning over last four decades as well as the perception of disability on the level of 
social interaction. 																																																								
56 Winker and Degele (2011) also raise the issue of levels and argue for an intersectionality approach 
which focuses on “interactions between inequality-creating social structures (i.e. of power relations), 
symbolic representations and identity constructions that are context-specific, topic-oriented and 
inextricably linked to social praxis” (54).  
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In Anthias’ approach, social categories are seen as categories of discursive 
practice in the making of boundaries and hierarchies. She states, “[t]he social 
categories of gender, ethnicity, ‘race’ and class construct particular criteria by which 
people are ordered into the categories but the categorising of people should not be 
elided with particular population categories/groupings as they relate to social life” (7). 
While all of these categories have different historical and ontological bases, they all 
involve boundary-making and hierarchy-making processes (7). Unfortunately, 
Anthias does not provide any further discussion of what these ontological bases might 
be. Categories exist, Anthias stresses, “within spatial and temporal contexts and are 
emergent rather than given and unchangeable, located in the operations of power. 
Such a view refuses the idea of categories as fixed elements of the social landscape 
but not categories themselves” (8). They do not operate as stand-alone categories in 
the realm of the social. With an emphasis on the fact that there is no deterministic 
relationship between social categories and the concrete social groups and their actual 
relations, Anthias explicates that, 
 
categorisations, however salient, cannot be immediately translatable in terms 
of the concrete relations that people find themselves in. These are not out- 
comes only of the salience of these categorisations, but of their intersections 
and of their embeddedness within a complex array of social relations, located 
within different arenas of social life and within temporal and spatial contexts. 
(8) 
 
Anthias makes the case for a clear distinction between category and social relation, 
whereas both are in their own ways outcomes of processes of production, neither is 
simply given. She states, 
 
[c]oncrete relations of hierarchy exist as outcomes of the operation of power, 
underpinned by social categories that naturalise, collectivise and essentialise 
social relations, and through the workings of processes of inferiorisation 
(stigma, disgust, devaluation, disrespect), exploitation (commodification of 
persons and deriving interest and benefit from the exercise of power over them 
as an extension of the Marxist term) and unequal resource allocation (entailing 
multiple forms of inequality of access and inequality of outcome). (10) 
 
However, while categories can be “involved in a range of group-making and group-
breaking processes,” Anthias does not explicitly mention the reverse process in which 
specific social relations and concrete actions can lead to changes in social categories 
be it, for instance, through activism or non-typical representations (9).  
McCall’s contribution to the methodology of intersectionality primarily 
addresses the modalities of analytical categories. While her explications of categorical 
complexity are much needed, they are not ends in themselves. McCall’s real concern 
pertains to the stance researchers take toward categories, because different approaches 
produce different kinds of knowledge when it comes to examining the complexity of 
intersectionality in social life. On the whole, McCall presents three types of 
approaches. Originating in Women’s studies, the anticategorical approach to 
complexity regards social life as “too irreducibly complex—overflowing with 
multiple and fluid determinations of both subjects and structures—to make fixed 
categories anything but simplifying social fictions that produce inequalities in the 
process of producing differences” (1773). As a result of discontent with the simplicity 
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of analytical categories, scholars following the anticategorical approach reject 
categories altogether. Advocates of the intracategorical approach, on the other hand, 
do not believe social categories to be expendable but instead acknowledge them as 
necessary components of analysis. Intracategorical analyses target the complex 
relationships of inequality within a certain category and are, therefore, interested in 
the diversity and complexity of the lived experience within a social group.57 While the 
anticategorical approach and the intracategorical approach compare in their 
interrogation of boundary-making and boundary-defining processes, this is not the 
primary objective of the latter. While the intracategorical approach maintains a 
critical stance, it still accepts social categories. McCall underscores that, the point is 
not to deny the importance—both material and discursive—of categories but to focus 
on the process by which they are produced, experienced, reproduced, and resisted in 
everyday life” (1783). After all, it was the spirit of the intracategorical approach that 
inaugurated the study of intersectionality. Scholars use qualitative methods to 
intensively study single groups, or “cases.” Such sociological case studies are 
expected “to reveal diversity, variation, and heterogeneity where quantitative 
researchers see singularity, sameness, and homogeneity” (1782). This approach 
focuses on diversity and difference within a social group—diversity and difference 
that the respective social category glosses over. This is why the distinction between 
category and concrete social relationships is an important one; it undermines any 
deterministic notion that might arise. McCall says, 
 
Although broad racial, national, class, and gender structures of inequality have 
an impact and must be discussed, they do not determine the complex texture of 
day-to-day life for individual members of the social group under study, no 
matter how detailed the level of disaggregation (1782). 
 
In order to interrogate and ultimately explicate the intersectional configurations of 
inequality between different social groups within and across analytical categories, the 
third approach—referred to as intercategorical, categorical (McCall) or constitutive 
(Yuval-Davis)—resorts to provisionally adopt and strategically use analytical 
categories. McCall argues, that “[i]f structural relationships are the focus of analysis, 
rather than the underlying assumption or context of the analysis, categorization is 
inevitable” (1786). While categories serve as “anchor” points they are by no means 
understood as static (Glenn 14). Scholars working in this vein are concerned “with the 
nature of the relationships among social groups and, importantly, how they are 
changing, rather than with the definition or representation of such groups per se” 
(1775). Similarly, Yuval-Davis is concerned with the real-life experience of women of 
color at the intersection of multiple social categories, which includes an interrogation of, 
“the structural conditions within which these social categories are constructed by, and 
intermeshed with each other in specific historical contexts” (Erevelles and Minear 131). 
Yuval-Davis explains: 
 
The point of intersectional analysis is not to find ‘several identities under one’ … 
This would reinscribe the fragmented, additive model of oppression and 
essentialize specific social identities. Instead the point is to analyse the differential 
ways by which social divisions are concretely enmeshed and constructed by each 
other and how they relate to political and subjective constructions of identities 																																																								
57 See also Bonnie T. Dill’s “Work at the Intersections of Race, Gender, Ethnicity, and Other 
Dimensions of Difference in Higher Education” (2002). 
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(205). 
 
Whatever the status of categories, all three approaches have in common a heightened 
sensitivity to history. Anthias, in particular, emphasizes that social divisions appear 
differently when considered as historical processes (diachronic) and historical 
outcomes (synchronic) (12). In order to understand racist practices and outcomes, it is 
not enough to look at race and racialization alone but one must also consider their co-
dependency with other categories over time and in different contexts (juridical, 
sociological, medical and so on). In order to understand the complexity of lived 
experience, the analysis needs to consider all the relevant “[i]nflections for specific 
people in specific places and times within the arenas of organisation, representation, 
intersubjectivity and experience” (11). As has become clear, “intersections” do not 
denote specific (geographical) places but rather the processes of inflection, cross-
classification and mutual construction of subject positions. Therefore, rather than 
merely adding disability to nuance an intersectional analysis, I will foreground the 
historical contexts and structural conditions within which the identity categories of 
race and disability intersect. 
 
 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND DISABILITY:  
AN UNCERTAIN LIASION 
 
How does disability relate to the well-established triad of race, class and gender 
(RCG)? Owing to the increased popularity of intersectional perspectives in research, 
disability has surfaced as a structural category in subject formation in ever-new 
discourses. This has led to the recognition of disability as “constitutive of most social 
differences, particularly race” (Erevelles and Minear 133). With regard to Chicana/o 
history in the U.S., Molina writes, 
 
How health officials came to view and treat Mexicans was directly tied to 
these officials’ assumptions about and experiences with Asian residents in Los 
Angeles. Indeed, from 1869 until 1920, the city health department used only 
two racial categories: Chinese and the rest of the population. ‘Mexican’ was a 
category constructed from what it was not: not white, not Chinese, not 
Japanese (“Chicana/o History through a Relational Lens” 528). 
 
This passage illustrates how the construction of “Mexican” as a racial category took 
place within a medical discourse by way of consideration of other ethnic groups, and 
races at a certain point in time in Los Angeles—the same discipline that defined 
disability for centuries.  
Rather than “intersectional,” Molina categorizes her work as “relational.” But, 
in effect, both approaches are geared towards a similar goal: the exploration of “how 
the racial constructions of various groups affect one another” (525). Her negotiations 
of the concrete social relations involved in racialization are cross-classified with 
disability, gender, nation, ethnicity, and class, where those categories factor in. 
Molina explains,  
 
By relational, I do not mean comparative. A comparative treatment of race 
compares and contrasts groups, treating them as independent of one another. It 
also can leave the construction of racial categories themselves unexamined, 
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thereby, even if unintentionally, reifying them. A relational treatment of race 
recognizes that the construction of race is a mutually constitutive process and 
demonstrates how race is socially constructed, hence fighting against 
essentialist notions (522). 
 
In her work, Molina sometimes draws on her own intersectional experience to 
describe individual instances of the interlocking and interference of identity 
categories. “Being from a working-class neighbourhood,” she recounts childhood 
memory, “produced a kind of solidarity that cut across the color line” (521). 
Given the relevance of disability in the intersectional discourse, debates are 
still on-going whether it is to be regarded as a discrete category alongside RCG, or as 
a subcategory, or whether the category itself should not be disability but rather 
“body.” Nonetheless, having such discussions in the first place proves there has been 
progress since, for a long time, instead of building an alliance between RCG and 
disability, “CRT [critical race theory] scholars (like other radical scholars) have 
mistakenly conceived of disability as a biological category, as an immutable and 
pathological abnormality” derived from medical rubrics and diagnostic categories 
(Erevelles and Minear 132). Similarly, before critical race theory, race was considered 
a biological and natural category.  
This book does not provide a sociological case study. There is no data set of 
interviewed individuals from particular social groups. Nor is this a purely 
philosophical negotiation of categorical definitions. Instead, the literary depiction of a 
disabled female Mexican is central to my analysis of Gibson’s Bridge trilogy. For that 
matter, the historical relation between race and disability will be examined. Since 
specificity and historical sensitivity are of particular import to such intersectional 
approach, the following section is dedicated to a historical overview of the mutual 
construction of these categories and its consequences for the concrete social groups.   
 
 
THE MAKING OF THE DISABLED MEXICAN 
 
Following Ian F. Haney-Lopez’s assertion that, “[b]iological race is an illusion” but 
social race is not, I will present some of the mechanisms in the social construction of 
“Mexican” as a race category and its entanglement with disability in that process 
(172). “Every few years,” Molina observes, “the debate over whether race is a social 
construction or a biological reality is rekindled” (“Medicalizing the Mexican” 22). 
During the last few decades, discussions of race have seen a keen interest in 
discursive practices so much so that “important ways in which race is written (and 
continuously rewritten) on the body are sometimes overlooked” (23). Molina argues 
that race (and disability) are first identified as forms of non-normative embodiment, 
and then mobilized to exclude these particular groups from the body politic and the 
right of social membership. Similar to Garland-Thomson’s notion of the normate in 
disability studies, Molina invokes the modal subject in Latina/o studies. Molina 
explains, 
 
[i]n the United States, the modal subject is neither raced nor disabled. 
Historically, race has provided a shorthand way to refer to difference, be it 
physical, cultural, or political, and thus also has been central in defining the 
modal subject (e.g. enfranchised/disenfranchised; citizen/alien, slave 
owner/slave). Likewise, the modal subject historically has been assumed to be 
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independent and, by extension, able-bodied as well (“Medicalizing the 
Mexican” 23). 
 
A major drive in the process of racialization was immigration. When the U.S. 
sought a major infusion of labor for the expansion of railroad lines, construction of 
federally funded irrigation, and agricultural fieldwork, this led to a significant 
migration to the southern states from the Americas at the end of the nineteenth 
century and beginning of the twentieth century. It was particularly the “arrival of 
more than 200,000 Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles, San Bernardino, and Orange 
Counties between 1910 and 1930” that has become a prominent example of “a large-
scale transnational migration that disrupted the institutional apparatus of the nation-
state at the local level” (Torres-Rouff 99). Unprepared for the influx of Mexican 
workers and their families, local communities, schools, and lawmakers were 
challenged in their organization of society. Montejano describes the Mexican-
American relationship of the late nineteenth century as “inconsistent and 
contradictory” and yet the emergence of a “race situation” was already evident—a 
situation “where ethnic or national prejudice” lay the foundation of later practices of 
separation and control (Montejano 82). The contradictory nature of the situation 
derived from the disparate attitudes, for instance, of the advocates and opponents of 
immigration held. For example, large-scale employers who were in need of workers 
supported immigration in order to increase the productivity of their business. Since 
most of the Mexican workers were low-skilled, companies had a “vested interest in 
the continued importation of Mexican labor” as it meant low wages (Molina, 
“Medicalizing the Mexican” 27).  
At the same time, the endorsement of immigration relied on the argument that 
Mexicans were uniquely able-bodied, uniquely suited for physically demanding labor, 
and better able to do agricultural work due to their subordinate and docile nature. 
Molina explains that, “because immigrants were considered advantageous only to the 
extent they filled critical gaps in the labor market, physical fitness was central to 
gauging a groups’s desirability” (24). Anti-immigrationists, on the other hand, 
claimed Mexicans were generally “unfit.” Physical fitness became the battleground 
for advocates and opponents of immigration, and both used arguments based on 
corporeal attributes in order to construct Mexicans as desirable or undesirable. Molina 
states that, “[a]lthough Mexicans were not categorized as disabled, they were 
constructed as non-normative, and discourses that emphasized the body constituted a 
main vehicle for achieving this construction” (24). The notion of non-normative 
embodiment was a vital instrument in the construction of “the image of the 
undesirable immigrant” (24). “At the time,” Molina specifies that, “health officials 
took the position that Mexicans contracted tuberculosis after they arrived in the 
United States” (27).58 She goes on to say that, “[d]isease outbreaks legitimized the 
increased fortification of the border and stigmatized Mexicans as disease carriers. 
Still, the link between disease and race was not yet as all-encompassing as it would 
become after the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act” (28). It was after the passage 
of the 1924 Immigration Act that attitudes began to change and Mexicans’ biological 
makeup entered the discussion of the body and health: 
 																																																								
58 Molina reveals an insightfully gendered approach to racialized health problems when she explains 
how health officials marked in particular “Mexican women as the source of health problems and, in so 
doing, helped male Mexican laborers escape further stigma” (“Medicalizing the Mexican” 26). 	
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With the cessation of the flow of southern and eastern European immigrants, 
brownness came to signify the most important new threat to the racial 
hegemony of white native-born Americans. To ensure that Mexicans would be 
included in quota-based immigration legislation, it was imperative to depict 
them as dangerous. Anti-immigrationists began promoting an image of the 
racially inferior and diseased Mexican. Medicalized nativism proved central to 
this effort. Biologically based negative representations intensified during the 
mid- to late twenties and served as a key justification for the deportation of 
Mexicans during the Depression (29). 
 
The argument of Californian public health officials shifted from the idea of the 
contraction of diseases in the U.S., to that of an importation into the U.S. by 
Mexicans—a reinterpretation that produced dramatic effects. Moreover, the argument 
was grounded in biology and medicine thus propagating an image of the Mexican as 
inherently diseased, less able-bodied, and irresponsible, further extending the 
attributed inferiority from the body to that of morale. Molina elaborates, “Mexicans 
go from typically receiving fairly casual medical scrutiny … to being the objects of 
intense, negative assessment and then exclusion” (33). The racialized knowledge 
produced by health officials is crucial in so far as medical and public health standards 
came to be used “as a gauge with which to determine the deleterious effects of 
immigration” by lawmakers as well as eugenicists (31). The dramatic redefinition of 
“the Mexican” is thus grounded in the materiality of the body—a historical process, 
which reveals “the general principles of anti-immigration bias within political and 
medical discourses” (33). A twist that conveniently masked systemic inequalities for 
those in power.  
Another locus where the link between race and non-normative embodiment is 
reinforced was in schools. Despite the fact that California state law classified 
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans as white, and only permitted school districts to 
segregate Asian and American-Indian children, by 1928 “segregation had become 
standard practice and Mexican schools had become commonplace” (Torres-Rouff 93). 
Rather than legal enforcement, Torres-Rouff states that is was “parents, teachers, 
school board members, and school administrators, working in a variety of 
independent local contexts, engineered the transition from integrated to segregated 
schools for Mexican and black American students” (94). Once in place, these 
segregated schools contributed majorly to the construction of “Mexican” as a race 
category instead of merely a national identifier. Torres-Rouff explains how “white 
parents and administrators not only achieved racial separation, but also effectively 
reserved the best teachers, best facilities, and majority of available funds for white 
students at white schools” which left Mexican schools with underqualified teachers, 
and substandard facilities as well as specialized curricula – a school policy that meant 
to create “a docile and obedient workforce” (101, 108). Under these circumstances, it 
was not surprising that when during the 1920s and 1930s “intelligence testing became 
increasingly important to the education community” Mexican and Mexican-American 
children yielded particularly low results (122). Since “neither the scientists 
conducting the tests nor others using the results to support future research recognized 
the obvious bias,” the introduction of I.Q. testing in schools had severe and extensive 
consequences (127). 
On the basis of I.Q. test results, the inferiority of Mexicans was established as 
“a biological ‘truth’” (122). The naïve belief in the quantitative assessment of 
“Mexican and Mexican American schoolchildren’s inherent mental capacities” 
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resulted in the classification of the subjects as “‘feeble minded,’ providing scientific 
evidence that the average Mexican child was, in the parlance of these psychologists 
‘retarded’” according to the applied metric (122, 123). In this way, “Mexican 
students’ shortcomings … were presented as biological rather than cultural, 
permanent and heritable rather than malleable” (123). These scientific procedures 
consolidated the notion of “Mexican” as an inferior race was a fact. “Race making, or 
racialization,” as Torres-Rouff explains it, “is the product of political, social, and 
economic projects designed to divide and differentiate groups in a community on the 
presumed basis of inherent and inheritable biological difference” (95). What is more, 
this process worked two ways. Not only did “southern California’s Mexican schools 
serve … as active sites for the redefinition of “Mexican” as a biological racial 
category,” but at the same time “they served as tools for centering white children as 
mentally ‘normal’” (129). The interpretation of the data gained shows a striking and 
strategic negligence of the social inequalities found between the groups tested. Those 
who voiced concern regarding the testing methods and interpretation, pointing to 
social factors like poverty, bilingualism, a segregated educational system, and socio-
economic discrimination, arguing that “low I.Q. scores of Mexican-American 
students had to be understood in the context of the children’s environment” remained 
largely unheard at the time (Wollenberg 322). 
These increasingly common racist attitudes gradually informed legislation. 
This development made it possible for people like Carpenter to argue that, “Mexican 
children suffered from low moral and ethical character” and “the Mexican population 
is a fundamentally weaker race than the white race” which can be seen in “the 
Mexican temperament, the high percentage of juvenile arrests among the Mexicans, 
and the nature of offenses committed” (Torres-Rouff 126). Or similarly, State School 
Superintendent Andrew J. Moulder warned that, any attempt “to force African, 
Chinese and Diggers into one school … must result in the ruin of the schools. The 
great mass of our citizens will not associate in terms of equality with these inferior 
races; nor will they consent that their children should do so” (qtd. Wollenberg 318). 
Grace Stanely argued during this time that, “the Mexican is a menace to the health 
and morals of the rest of the community” (qtd. Wollenberg 319). These commonplace 
beliefs perpetuated a fundamentally eugenic logic. 
Against this backdrop, the legal case of Méndez v. Westminster (1947) 
became a milestone in the Mexican-American civil rights movement. The Méndez 
family filed a suit against the exclusion of their children from the school of their 
district. According to the school district superintendent, segregation was imperative 
because Mexican children did not have the “mental ability of the white children” and  
they had “lice, impetigo, [and] generally dirty hands, face, neck and ears” (Méndez v. 
Westminster 20). The Méndez family framed their argument as follows: “[a]ll 
petitioners are taxpayers of good moral habits, not suffering from disability, infectious 
disease, and are qualified to be admitted to the use of the schools and facilities, within 
their respective districts and systems”  (Westminster v. Méndez 2). 
Against this socio-political background they needed to dissociate from the 
categories that structured the common image of a Mexican in the forties, and 
emphasize their normal status as modal subjects. This self-representation as explicitly 
“not suffering from disability” is an attempt to disentangle the identity categories of 
race and disability, and obtain full acceptance as citizens and thus civil rights. When 
in February 1946, the judge decided that segregation “fosters antagonisms in the 
children and suggests inferiority among them where none exists” and their objection 
was allowed it bode a huge success for the civil rights movement (Wollenberg 326). 
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However, despite the success of the Méndez v. Westminster case, racialization and 
segregation have continued to shape American society. According to Wollenberg, 
“[s]tate-wide, more Mexican and Mexican-American children probably attended 
segregated schools in 1973 than did in 1947, Mendez v. Westminster notwithstanding” 
(330). 
Today, the processes described above are classified under the term scientific 
racism. According to Juliet Hooker, scientific racism denotes “racial theories with the 
credence and backing of science that posited the innate and permanent inferiority of 
nonwhites” (6). In her recent publication Theorizing Race in the Americas (2017), she 
elucidates how during the 19th century the,  
  
dominant Western ideas about race shifted from the (relatively) short-term 
explanations of human difference based on climate and environment that 
dominated Enlightenment thought, to full-fledged scientific theories of race as 
heredity and fixed notions of biological racial inferiority and ‘natural’ racial 
hierarchy (6).  
 
Hooker presents three principle strands of racist science. First, “the ascendance of 
scientific racism began with the emergence of the American school of ethnology in 
the 1840s and 1850s, which ‘affirmed … that the races of mankind had been 
separately created as distinct and unequal species’” (7). Thus, “explanations for racial 
difference shifted from external factors, such as climate and geography, to permanent 
inherited characteristics” (7). The ethnographical-biological approach argues that, 
“separate climate zones [were] destined for habitation by different racial groups, and 
that racial mixing led to degeneration” (7). Secondly, during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, “radically deterministic theories of history” emerged “that 
purported to establish the superiority of Aryans or Anglo-Saxons” (7). The historical 
school “argued that race was the central factor in historical development, that Aryans 
and Anglo-Saxons had reached the most advanced level of civilization” (7). In this 
line of thought, non-white inferiority was established as a predetermined historical 
fact. Finally, social Darwinism “argued that different races exhibited different levels 
of aptitude, including the ability to survive and become dominant, and as a result 
some were destined to rule over others” (8). It is not surprising how these racist 
mindsets within science spawned a height in the eugenics movement at the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. Particularly in the decades prior to 
World War II, eugenics directly informed official state policy, such as the 
Immigration Act of 1924 or Virginia Racial Integrity Act 1924. Hooker states, 
“[e]ugenicists such as Madison Grant combined the racial determinism of the 
historical school with new notions of racial hygiene to argue for racial purity, racial 
segregation, bans on nonwhite immigration and reductions in the flow of Southern 
European immigrants” (10). Grant particularly “advocated for the separation and 
eventual removal (via sterilization) of undesirables, defectives, and inferior race 
types. Grant’s ideas were influential on public policy in the United States” (10).  
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2.3 The Body and Actor-Networks 
 
2.3.1 Actor-Network Theory and the Articulation of the Body 
 
In this third chapter, I present how disability studies scholars negotiate the ways in 
which medical theory and practice produces the concept of disability by putting 
paramount emphasis on disciplinary, discursive, and linguistic factors. This developed 
into what in chapter 2.2 is presented as the social model of disability—an approach 
that in turn has been criticized for treating immaterial bodies. This chapter works 
towards an imbrication of these approaches with regard to the role of prostheses, the 
individual, and social forces. While prior approaches favor either one of these actors 
and work from within disciplinary boundaries—medicine, biology, and sociology—
these approaches are bound to identify some actors but not others which partake in 
disability. This final chapter centers on a cross-disciplinary actor-network theory 
infused method that allows me to address and account for the relationships between a 
high quantity and diverse quality of actors, instead of the actors in and of themselves. 
Thus, Actor-network theory provides the methodology and terminology that allows 
for a consideration of the individual as much as the society, language as much as 
materiality, and practices as much as things side-by-side59. 
 Actor-network theory (ANT), as developed by Bruno Latour, John Law and 
Michel Callon, is a methodology that specializes in the study of associations and has 
been recently taken up in discussions of disability by Mitchell and Snyder, and 
sociologists Myriam Winance, and Ingunn Moser. Originating in Latour, Law, and 
Callon’s individual as well as collaborative work on the sociology of science and 
technology, ANT has spread across a number of disciplines. As the figurehead of 
ANT, Latour is known for his criticism of the scientific method as an objective 
instrument to experimentally reveal facts in Laboratory Life (1979) and The 
Pasteurization of France (1988). Latour also addresses modernism, postmodern and 
antimodernism in We Have Never Been Modern (1993). Lastly, in Reassembling the 
Social (2005), sociological methodology that takes “the Social” as a cause or given, 
Latour argues the Social needs to be regarded as an effect of operations the current 
sociological method is oblivions to. As a pronounced scholar of science and 
technology, Latour might appear an unlikely candidate to engage with in both a 
literary analysis and a discussion of disability. However, Latour’s explicit occupation 
with the acquisition of embodiment in his essay, “How to Talk About the Body?” 
(2004), reveals that actor-network theory provides the terminology and methodology 
to examine the body on the basis of its interrelations.  
More prominent than Latour’s propositions on the production of the body, 
though, are his repeated references to literature. Some of the cornerstones of his 
work60 are, in his own words, “best accessible through the joint inventions of 
literature and science” (“Powers of the Facsimile” 14). In this sense Latour suggests 
“scientifiction”61 as a unifying expression for his interest in literature and science – a 
suggestion that is made in apparent unawareness of the original coinage of this term 
by writer Hugo Gernsback in 1929.62 The evolution of Gernsback’s “scientifiction” 
into the contemporary notion of science fiction and his enormous work as not only a 																																																								
59 See Harrasser’s notion of parahumanism in chapter 4.1 of this study. 
60 Here, the reference is to “matters of concern.”  
61 See Latour’s Aramis, or the Love of Technology ix. 
62 See Roger Luckhurst’s “Scientifiction” 4. 
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writer, but also an editor and publisher granted Gernsback the title “The Father of 
Science Fiction” by some critics 63 . This thesis focuses on the writer who 
revolutionized Gernsback’s traditional science fiction genre and was therefore 
referred to as “the father of cyberpunk.” 
How we theorize the body, Latour insists, fundamentally depends on our 
definition of science (“How to Talk About the Body?” 224). In hinging the discussion 
of the body on the specific modalities of science, Latour shifts from an essentialist 
question of “what is the body” to an epistemological question of “how do we talk 
about it.” Moreover, he ties the question of the body into his overarching critique of 
the history of science, scientific methodology, and the role of the scientist. It is the 
flagrant discrepancy between modernist fictions of laboratory life and the actual 
procedures of experimentation, between how we imagine facts are discovered and 
how they actually come into existence, that Latour makes the centerpiece of his 
academic work. An understanding of laboratories as completely sterile and well-
organized sites hosting scientists who are wholly uninvolved and who function as 
external observers of natural phenomena, mere conductors of laboratory practices 
which are in themselves neutral, logical, coherent, and devoid of social or political 
leverage is what over the course of almost four decades Latour has put under revision. 
As Latour describes it in Laboratory Life (1979), the laboratory is a messy place, 
saturated with the social and the political, and while he refashions the view on 
scientific practices, he also strongly challenges the underlying understanding of 
science.  
Latour presents a critique of the old Lockean empiricism that traces back to 
the period of early modern philosophy and modern science. It is the clear-cut 
distinction of primary and secondary qualities that carves the way for opposing 
notions of an objective reality that is “out-there” and a subjective experience that is 
“in-there.” A scientific method that first establishes the subject-object dichotomy and 
problematizes the mind-body dualism in order to then work towards the reconciliation 
or the overcoming of these dichotomies is, according to Latour, “not a useful 
approach” (“How to Talk about the Body” 209). Empiricists took “facts” as the “most 
primitive, solid, incontrovertible, undisputable material” and thus chose facts as the 
building blocks of their scientific method (Reassembling 112).  But “[h]ow could a 
fact”, Latour asks, “be that solid if it is also fabricated?” (112). Fabricated, that is, 
through a particular metric system, specific instruments, deliberate experiments, and 
so on.  Matters of fact, Latour argues, “are a poor proxy of experience and of 
experimentation and … a confusing bundle of polemics, of epistemology, of 
modernist politics that can in no way claim to represent what is requested by a realist 
attitude” (“Steam” 245).  
Latour suggests removing the artificial boundary between natural and social so 
that non-human entities can appear in new, unexpected ways. For instance, the much 
varied and uncertain nature that geologists attribute to rocks finds a too limited and 
stripped-down representation in empiricist accounts. 64  On the contrary to these 
empiricist negotiations, Latour observes how “[e]verywhere, the empirical 
multiplicity of former ‘natural’ agencies overflows the narrow boundary of matters of 
fact” (Reassembling 111).65 From this perspective, empiricism in its traditional form 
(a science built on facts, interested in essences, and formulating statements) fails to 
serve as an adequate framework to render experience. This inadequacy, however, is 																																																								
63 See Mark Richard Siegel’s Hugo Gernsback, Father of Modern Science Fiction (1988). 
64 Here, Latour refers back to Hacking’s chapter on rocks in The Social Construction of What? (1999). 
65 Latour’s examples are rocks, steel, genes, and computers. 
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not countered by “moving away from material experience, for instance to the ‘rich 
human subjectivity’, but closer to the much variegated lives materials have to offer” 
(111-112). Hence, Latour’s method suggests moving closer to where and looking 
closer at how agencies are made to express themselves.  
A key characteristic of ANT is the removal of the subject-object dichotomy 
and the implicit duality between humans and non-humans that grants agency and 
power to the subject, leaving the object passive and inert. Such presuppositions 
prevent, by default, the ability to recognize how some non-human objects enable or 
mediate action and is therefore countered by an ontological leveling, also referred to 
as the principle of generalized symmetry.66 Latour emphasizes that the actor in ANT, 
 
is a semiotic definition—an actant—, that is, something that acts or to which 
activity is granted by others. It implies no special motivation of human 
individual actors, nor of humans in general. An actant can literally be anything 
provided it is granted to be the source of an action (“On Actor-Network 
Theory” 373).67   
 
The actor-network that emerges when tracing actors is not a “technical network in the 
engineer’s sense” whereas it may be “one of the possible final and stabilized state[s] 
of an actor-network” (2). Instead, “the work, and the movement, and the flow, and the 
changes … should be stressed” as these are what constitutes the network of 
associations (Reassembling 143). In brief, ANT provides a material-semiotic method 
to describe formation processes, innovations, and the complexities of the 
sociotechnological world. In brief, ANT provides a material-semiotic method to 
describe formation processes, innovations, and the complexities of the 
sociotechnological world by employing the same analytical and descriptive 
framework when faced with a human, a thought, a feeling, a text, or a machine.  
The centerpiece of Latour’s new empiricism, sometimes referred to as second 
empiricism, is not “matters of fact” then but “matters of concern.” Matters of concern 
are, “highly uncertain and loudly disputed,” but “real, objective, atypical and, above 
all, interesting agencies” (Reassembling 114). Here, knowledge is gained exactly from 
competing propositions, shifting frames of reference, and the recalcitrance of human 
and non-human actors to established facts. Latour borrows this line of thought from 
William James’ and Isabelle Stengers’ work on Alfred North Whitehead, which has 
never been simply concerned with “matters of fact.” This new empiricism, 
accordingly, constitutes a new realist style that is committed to constructivism in that 
it accounts for the practices, conventions, beliefs, instruments, and competing 
viewpoints involved in the process of scientific fabrication of what is considered 
knowledge. It does not hold supremacy over what is true and what is not, and thus 
differs significantly from the first empiricism in terms of “its science, its politics, its 
esthetics, its morality” (Reassembling 115).68   
On the basis of such a modified understanding of science, Latour approaches 
the body through its ability to be affected, its sensitivity to the environment, its 
relational character, and by decisively not pinpointing any essence of the body. “[T]o 																																																								
66 See the work of Michel Callon (1986).	
67 While Latour intends to provide a clarification regarding the difference between “actor” and “actant” 
in “On Actor-Network Theory,” he is inconsistent in their usage and tends to use them synonymously 
on the course of his publications. This book therefore stands by the “actor” throughout.	
68 As an example see Latour’s analysis of French scientist Louis Pasteur in The Pasteurization of 
France (1988). 
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have a body,” Latour states with reference to Vinciane Despret, and William James, 
“is to learn to be affected” (“How to Talk About the Body” 205). This translates into 
the interrelated processes of “being moved” and becoming increasingly sensitive to 
the actors that put one into motion. This foundational statement entails several 
implications. First, a body is always acquired. Making an example out of the perfume 
industry, namely the ability to discriminate increasingly subtle differences of 
chemical composites through the use of odor kits, Latour explicates how through 
specific training one acquires an organ (meaning sensory capacities) and by extension 
a body (207) Secondly, this acquisition takes place progressively. Refining one’s 
sensitivity to the world is a step-by-step and open-ended enterprise that involves 
things in a crucial manner. “Before the sessions, odors rained on the pupils without 
making them act, without making them speak, without rendering them attentive, 
without arousing them in precise ways” but after training the olfactory capacities the 
odor kit cannot but be conceived as “part and parcel of what it is to have a body” 
(207). Implicit in this line of argumentation is Latour’s criticism of subject/object-
based models for “discounting all the extrasomatic resources ever invented that allow 
us to be affected by others in different ways” (225). Latour argues that such an 
approach allows him to, “give back to the body all the material impedimenta that 
make it sensitive to differences” (206, emphasis added). In this way, things are 
theorized as “coextensive” with the body. Finally, Latour explains that, “body parts 
are progressively acquired at the same time as ‘world counter-parts’ are being 
registered in a new way” (207). The interaction between the body and the world is 
thus a mutually sensitizing, or constitutive process—a growing discriminative 
capacity brings about an increasingly richer (or richly differentiated) world.  
Latour calls this type of learning, or process of differentiation “articulation.” 
The odor kit accordingly, “‘articulates’ pupils’ perceptions” because it informs/shapes 
the differentiations pupils will be able to make (210). Following this logic, an 
undifferentiated sensorium is identified as inarticulate. In that case, different odors 
elicited the same behavior. In contrast to conceptualizations of the body as naturally 
given, Latour emphasizes that the logic underpinning “articulation” makes it possible 
to, “take on board the artificial and material components allowing one to 
progressively have a body (210). In addition, there is no end to articulation. 
Articulation provides ever more “propositions” defying the conventional true/false 
dichotomy inherent to “statements.” “For articulated propositions,” Latour explains, 
“such a query is totally irrelevant and slightly quaint since the more artificiality, the 
more sensorium, the more bodies, the more affections, the more realities will be 
registered … Reality and artificiality are synonyms, not antonyms” (213). 69 
Moreover, articulation, “does not expect accounts to converge into one single version 
that will close the discussion” (211). 
With regard to another of Latour’s seemingly improvised formulations, 
namely that of being “moved” or “put into action,” it can be said that these 
formulations’ value for my discussion of the literary representation of extraordinary 																																																								
69 Latour further clarifies: “if I, an untutored nose, need the odor kit to become sensitive to contrast, 
chemists need their analytical instruments to render themselves sensitive to differences of one single 
displaced atom. They too acquire a body, a nose, an organ, through their laboratories this time, and also 
thanks to their conferences, their literature and all the paraphernalia that make up what could be called 
the collective body of science” (209). In this line of thought, the novel as much as the laboratory 
establishes an artificial set-up, or experiment, to examine the differences between bodies and in this 
way, the reader may similarly learn to be “be affected by hitherto unregistrable differences through the 
mediation of an artificially created set-up” (209). By means of a more articulate sensitivity the 
perception of real bodies may correspondingly change.	
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corporeality and subjectivity lies in precisely the vagueness of the term. The “most 
general, most banal” vocabulary is integral to Latour’s approach—best devoid of 
historical markers whatsoever (Reassembling 29). His so-called “infralanguage” is 
meant to remain “strictly meaningless” in order to avoid a confusion of language and 
landscape, map and territory (30). In this way the notion of “being moved” allows 
incorporating all possible emotional and behavioral output. According to Latour, 
 
[t]here is nothing especially interesting, deep, profound, worthwhile in a 
subject ‘by itself’ … a subject only becomes interesting, deep, profound, 
worthwhile when it resonates with others, is effected, moved, put into motion 
by new entities whose differences are registered in new and unexpected ways 
(“How we Talk About the Body” 210). 
 
It is the resonance and the interaction that makes the subject and the world, and that 
subsequently makes each worthwhile.  
Latour’s call for “biocounterpower” is reflected in his approach in that it 
provides an alternative to the bio-medical model which frames the body as a naturally 
given and discrete entity, constituted by a fixed set of properties that are enclosed in 
the individual (“How to Talk about the Body” 227). Latour not only brings society 
into view but also the objects involved in embodiment and subjectivity. 
 
 
2.3.2 Towards a New Disability Realism 
 
As seen above, a new realist style is informed by negotiations of “matters of concern” 
rather than “matters of fact.” With regard to literature, Latour wonders “what is it for 
any sort of entity to appear to be real in the narrative” (“Powers of the Facsimile” 5). 
Moreover, he continues his interrogation by asking how “the distribution of agencies 
between humans and non-humans [can] be made visible instead of being taken for 
granted” (5). Latour argues that a new realistic literary representation of life does, 
above all, not assume existence as a given. In the case of embodiment this means that 
the progressive acquisition and possible transformation of bodies need to be explicitly 
thematized in narrative. In his discussion of Richard Powers as the “novelist of 
‘science studies’,” Latour extols how, “[e]xistence for a character in Power’s novel is 
not a natural birthright but a risky achievement” (2, 7). Powers’ literary strength 
resides in the deployment of a vocabulary which allows achieving greater proximity 
to the matters at hand.  Hence, a new realist style (or matters-of-concern writing) 
provides a close look at the mechanisms producing, as well as complicating, existence 
and embodiment. When the representation comes together “bit by bit, layer by layer 
without deciding in advance what it means for a human, for an automaton, for an 
image … to have a shape,” then the progressive nature of embodiment becomes 
visible (10-11). 
Furthermore, a new realist style does not ground its figurations on average 
notions of the human, the body, or the computer. While this is the recipe for most 
traditional science fiction, Latour’s notion of literary realism is concerned with 
making the “unexpected beings necessary for any entity to exist” visible. As a vital 
characteristic of a new realist style, such a critical stance on the variability of 
existence necessitates a marked focus on the material and immaterial relations 
between actors, both human and non-human. For a discussion of the body, Latour’s 
rhetorical question: “What, then, is more realistic? To act as if continuity of existence 
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was an unproblematic given? Or to show that it can be a highly variable gradient, 
which can be intensified or attenuated as the story unfolds?” translates into the 
imperative to emphasize the material variability and interconnectedness of the body in 
a narrative (5). Latour states that, “[f]or any sort of humanoid character to exist they 
must become connected, or have life breathed into them, from some sort of other non-
human entity” (5, emphasis added). It is not the independence of characters or their 
sovereign acting upon a passive setting that makes a narrative representation of 
(extraordinary) corporeality and subjectivity realistic but rather the foregrounding of 
associations in general, the process of their establishment and transformation, and 
more specifically a detailed look at the entanglement with and the constitutive role of 
actors, human and non-human. Latour’s “incredible confidence in the capacity of 
description” is a confidence in the powers of literary realism to help us “understand 
the stuff out of which we, as living, breathing, speaking creatures, are made” (12, 10). 
Within disability scholarship, it was Siebers who reclaimed attention to the 
reality of the body in 2006. Against decades of social and linguistic constructivism, 
largely influential within disability studies in the 1980s and 1990s, Siebers’ essay 
invokes a “new realism of the body” (“Disability in Theory” 179). It is in the “gritty 
accounts of … pain and daily humiliations” that he identifies “the rhetoric of realism” 
(179). While Siebers articulates a concern for a particular “rhetoric,” he is equally (if 
not more) interested in the ontology of disability. An embrace of, “not what we think 
it is but what it really is” marks his interrogation as less constructivist, and more 
essentialist (180). Neglected in semiotic discussions of the body, the “realism” 
Siebers insinuates points at the explicit physical reality, materiality, and daily living 
conditions of people with disabilities, which, as he notes, may help to establish a 
“renewed acceptance of bodily reality” (179).   
Siebers’ criticism is directed against an overly shadowy, theoretical 
negotiation of pain in current body theory where “pain … is rarely physical” (177). 
Conceptualizations of suffering and disability that celebrate an “opening up [of] new 
possibilities of pleasure” cannot be integrated into Siebers’ vision of pain as “an 
enemy” (177). According to his uncompromising position, 
 
[p]ain is not a friend to humanity. It is not a secret resource for political 
change. It is not a well of delight for the individual. Theories that encourage 
these interpretations are not only unrealistic about pain; they contribute to an 
ideology of ability that marginalizes people with disabilities and makes their 
stories of suffering and victimization both politically impotent and difficult to 
believe. (178) 
 
This account refrains from any differentiation of pain, envisioning it as a universal 
corporeal condition. While Siebers, on the one hand, concedes that “[p]hysical pain is 
highly individualistic, unpredictable,” he nevertheless decides to operate with “pain” 
as a common and unambiguous experience, and a unifying element for people with 
disabilities (178). When addressing the sources and triggers, Siebers emphasizes that 
it is not exclusively the disability in itself but instead the “innumerable daily actions” 
and “the difficulty of navigating one’s environment” that causes pain (177). People 
with disabilities face a “hundred daily obstacles that are not merely inconveniences 
but occasions for physical suffering” (177). In other words, pain is not by default an 
inherent quality of the disabled body but results from the interplay between body and 
environment. The “grittiness” that Siebers finds in “realistic” accounts of disability is 
nothing but an explicit negotiation of the body’s materiality, of bodily fluids, 
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excretions, orifices, tubes penetrating, and bags attached to the body. He enumerates 
the material objects “that people with disabilities are forced to live with – prostheses, 
wheelchairs, braces, and other devices” that he considers “potential sources of pain” 
rather than “marvelous examples of the plasticity of the human form or devices of 
empowerment” (177). A recognition of Siebers’ demand for a detailed description of 
the body’s attachments and associations as a prerequisite for any approximation of the 
lived material body necessitates a terminology that accounts for the various actors and 
volatile connections that make the body. The strength of actor-network theory lies in 
providing the ontological leveling of human and non-human actors to make visible 
how prostheses, physician, physiotherapists, as well as personal attitudes, academic 
propositions, healthcare plans, institutions and legal regulations all have a certain 
agency in the articulation of a particular body. 
While Siebers stresses the importance of “resisting the temptation to describe 
the disabled body as either power laden or as a weapon of resistance” in his struggle 
for “a realistic conception of the disabled body,” I suggest that it is equally important 
to resist any over deterministic tie between disability and suffering (180). Siebers 
states, 
 
I am claiming that the body has its own forces and that we need to recognize 
them if we are to get a less one-sided picture of how bodies and their 
representations affect each other for good and for bad. The body is, first and 
foremost, a biological agent teeming with vital and chaotic forces. It is not 
inert matter subject to easy manipulation by social representation. The body is 
alive, which means that it is as capable of influencing and transforming social 
languages as they are capable of influencing and transforming it (180). 
 
He characterizes the relationship between immaterial representation and material 
body as mutually transformative and foregrounds the physicality and capabilities of 
the body. Yet, the physical transformations involved in complex embodiment remain 
nebulous in his account. Only implicitly does Siebers bear testimony to the material 
relationship between body and environment. In his attempt to carve out the vitality 
and capabilities of the human body, he resorts to defining it against inert and passive 
matter, thereby reiterating a long-held ontological opposition between life and matter.  
The ways in which things like prostheses, braces, and wheelchairs move the 
disabled user are, according to Siebers’ definition, painful. Being put into motion is 
always difficult and materiality is always negative in its instances of elucidation. In 
following what Eve Sedgwick calls a “paranoid reading” method, there is little to be 
gained that is more productive about an encounter with disability materiality in 
Siebers’ work.70 In Siebers’ negotiation, pain is not conceived of as an inherent 
quality but results from the interaction between person and environment. It is this 
interaction that holds the potential for sensory experiences, which are thus relational 
in nature. From this continuous gritty interaction within the individual network of 
interrelations, the Self emerges. Siebers asks, “What would it mean to esteem the 
disabled body for what it really is?” (181). My provisional answer to this 
ontologically driven question is that by means of the discernment of the disabled 
body’s unique material interrelations its appreciation can be approached.  
Rather than pain, it is creativity, pleasure, and plasticity that Shildrick is 
concerned with in her negotiation of the concept of disability. While she parts ways 																																																								
70 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling (2003). 
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with Siebers with regard to the ramifications of unstable corporeality, Shildrick does 
assert the fundamentally messy (i.e. material) nature of embodiment pleading that, 
“all corporeality is inherently leaky, uncontained, and uncontainable” (Ethics of the 
Body 7). With recourse to the works of Jacques Derrida, as well as Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, Shildrick provides a vantage point that focuses on the body’s 
“plasticity … and the capacity of disparate parts to constitute hybrid assemblages” 
(“Border Crossings” 148-9). Her account moves far beyond an “endeavour to restore 
the clean and proper body” (138). The incorporation of “non-self matter [cannot 
restore any] originary wholeness [since the body has] never been self-sufficient [and 
a] ‘natural’ self-complete and singular embodiment is an illusion” (140). Prostheses 
can thus be understood to “contest the illusion of an originary unified and singular 
body, exposing instead the fluidity of categorical boundaries” (142). In search of 
adequate conceptions and terminologies to describe the conditions of what is 
considered “disability,” Shildrick advocates to “open the field to a nexus of 
unexpected but constitutive assemblages that disorder the very idea of normative 
corporeality” (140). Shildrick manages to capture this “fluidity” by drawing on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of “desire,” according to which the “embodied 
self—rather than being goal-driven and singular as it would be in a modernist 
model—becomes a network of flows, energies and capacities that are always open to 
transformation” (143). Adopting this notion of the embodied self enables Shildrick, 
even more forcefully, to move away from what the (disabled) body is and towards 
what the (disabled) body can become.  Shildrick holds, 
 
[i]n shifting the emphasis from the integrity and co-ordination of the whole 
body to the provisional imbrication of disparate parts, it is no longer 
appropriate to think of bodies as either whole or broken, able-bodied or 
disabled. Embodiment is simply a provisional manifestation in a process of 
becoming driven by the circulation of desire. For Deleuze and Guattari, such 
flows of energy extend embodiment beyond the merely human (145). 
 
In “the dynamic and always unfinished processes of assemblage [that] point to the 
unlimited potential of becoming,” Shildrick identifies value for contemporary 
discussions of the disabled body (146).  
In this book, I argue that the productive becomings of disability in Shildrick 
and Siebers work analogous to the progressive development of the extraordinary 
bodies that are represented in Gibson’s work. There is a humanist undercurrent in 
Gibson’s early fiction in that the conceptualizations of the disabled body are grounded 
in the notion of a coherent, rational, autonomous self that is contained in the visceral 
tissues of the body. Yet, these conceptualizations evolve towards an extended notion 
of embodiment, especially from the Bridge trilogy onwards. Parallel to developments 
in disability studies, Gibson’s fiction mirrors the ways in which the days of repair as 
the answer to corporeal deficiency or damage are long gone since the illusion of the 
norm has been exposed. In accordance with Mitchell and Snyder’s argument in 
Narrative Prosthesis, one recognizes that the “prostheticized body is the rule not the 
exception” (7). Corporeality, rather than static or enclosed, is now considered 
dynamic and fluid. Moving through a field of diverse forces, the body is constituted 
by its possibilities of entering into relations with other bodies. In Shildrick’s 
approach, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “assemblage” aids in organizing the 
incessant change and reconstruction of the embodied self that exists in a condition of 
perpetual becoming.  
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It is against the backdrop of new materialism theories, which update the 
problematization of the life (vital, active) versus matter (inert, passive) binary, that 
disability studies has come to conceptualize a “new disability materialism.” In their 
volume New Materialisms, Diane Coole and Samantha Frost aim for a return to “the 
most fundamental questions about the nature of matter and the place of embodied 
humans within a material world” (3). Coole and Frost argue that,  
 
materialism's demise since the 1970s has been an effect of the dominance of 
analytical and normative political theory on the one hand and of radical 
constructivism on the other. These respective Anglo-phone and continental 
approaches have both been associated with a cultural turn that privileges 
language, discourse, culture, and values . . . we believe it is now timely to 
reopen the issue of matter and once again to give material factors their due in 
shaping society and circumscribing human prospects (3). 
 
Along similar lines, political theorist Jane Bennett draws on a plethora of 
philosophers to develop the idea of “vibrant matter” in a politico-philosophical take 
on materiality. Indebted to the critical vitalists, Hans Driesch and Henri Bergson who 
provided a vocabulary to address the power and drive, as well as the productivity and 
creativity inherent to matter, Bennett develops her own, more radical 
conceptualization. Bennett explains: 
 
While Driesch does not go as far as I do toward a materialist ontology, he does 
insist that the ‘vital principle’ has absolutely no existence independent of 
‘physio-chemical’ matter. He makes the relationship between matter and life 
as close as it possibly can be while still retaining the distinction … he pushes 
the life-matter binary to the limit, even though at the very last minute, he 
draws back from taking the plunge into a materiality that is itself vibrant or 
active (“Vitalist Stopover” 49). 
 
Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (2010) presents a two-fold undertaking in that it is a 
philosophical, as much as a political intervention. In the philosophical strand, Bennett 
concentrates on “thinking beyond the life-matter binary” in order to “theorize a 
materiality that is as much force as entity, as much energy as matter, as much 
intensity as extension” (20). Methodologically, her work develops “a vocabulary and 
syntax for, and thus a better discernment of, the active powers issuing from 
nonsubjects” (ix). Thus indebted to ANT, and further “cultivat[ing] the ability to 
discern nonhuman vitality,” Bennett ultimately intends “to promote greener forms of 
human culture” (Vibrant Matter 14, x). This project involves “the ethical aim … to 
distribute value more generously, to bodies as such” (13). How could Bennett’s 
appeal for the revaluation of bodies in general, which seems to resonate well with the 
new realist demand for an explicit appreciation of the disabled body, inform the 
conceptualization of non-normative corporeality?  
In her new ontology of matter, Bennett develops the concept of “thing-power” 
with reference to atomists like Lucretius and Epicurus, as well as cutting-edge 
sciences like complexity and chaos theory. In acknowledging the vitality of matter, 
defined as “the capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not only to 
impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or 
forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own,” she decidedly sides 
against the paradigms of social and linguistic constructionism (viii). This is because 
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social and linguistic constructionism take matter primarily as the carrier of meaning, 
the passive product of discourse. With recourse to Bennett, I will argue that Gibson’s 
figurations raise awareness of “the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to 
act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle” (Vibrant Matter 6). Moreover, reading 
Gibson with Bennett’s vital materialist approach in mind, allows us to discern and 
esteem not only “humans and their (social, legal, linguistic) constructions” as actors 
but also “some very active and powerful nonhumans: electrons, trees, wind, fire, 
electromagnetic fields” (Vibrant Matter 24). From such a perspective, the interactions 
with prostheses, wheelchairs, braces, and other devices come into a different light. 
The new relationship is one of symmetrical, rather than hierarchical, interrelation 
between human and non-human actors, and disability becomes one of many various 
forms of agential embodiment rather than the categorical other to normative 
embodiment.  
New materialist approaches have already found their way into disability 
studies, as in Mitchell and Snyder’s latest publication The Biopolitics of Disability. 
The two scholars discuss in depth what they call “antinormative novels of 
embodiment” in which they identify narratives that “employ disability’s radical 
potential to unseat traditional understandings of normalcy” and “explore disability as 
revelatory of variation’s potential for innovation” (182, 181). Mitchell and Snyder 
refer to alternative modes of representing non-normative corporeality in contemporary 
novels by, among others, Richard Powers and Stanley Elkins, to develop the notion of 
“capacities of incapacity.” Their analyses draw on new materialist discourses and 
thereby embrace a vocabulary that allows for a recognition of the agency of matter. 
The power of alternative representation resides in the novels’ foregrounding of 
“imperfection as a creative, biological force,” which echoes Siebers’ emphasis on a 
“biological agent teeming with vital and chaotic forces” (182, 180). While non-
normative corporeality is crucial to all three approaches, for Siebers it is mainly 
associated with the experience of pain. By contrast, Mitchell and Snyder 
conceptualize the vital, chaotic, biological forces of the body in terms of capacities for 
creativity and innovation. Here we can observe Siebers’ impulse of a “new realism of 
the body” converging with what Mitchell and Snyder call “new disability 
materialism” (182). By incorporating “materiality” into their analytical vocabulary, 
Mitchell and Snyder put renewed emphasis on the agentive and dynamic nature of the 
non-normative material body and depart further from the notions of passivity and 
deviance that are rooted in the medical parlance of pathology and dysfunctionality. 
Their process-oriented notion of biological multiplicity is read with considerations of 
neoliberalism, in particular its “unethical profiteering practices” and a value system 
mainly based on economic productivity (189).  
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3. Revisiting the Body in Gibson’s Reception 
 
 
THE BODY IN GIBSON’S CYBERPUNK FICTION 
 
Before I turn to my analysis of Gibson’s representation of extraordinary bodies in 
chapter 4 of this book, I provide an overview of how Gibson’s novels have been 
received in general and to what extent the body has been considered significant for his 
work. Gibson’s debut novel Neuromancer (1984) has been received as a literary 
breakthrough. With “a new intensity of emphasis [and] sharpness of focus” on 
traditional science-fiction (sf) motifs, a new subgenre was born (McHale, “Towards” 
7). Although the term “cyberpunk” is said to originate in Bruce Bethke’s eponymous 
short story from 1983, cyberpunk fiction only came into view a year later with 
Gibson’s first novel.71 In accord with Brian McHale, Neil Easterbrook holds that 
“Neuromancer represents both a radical break with sf and a profound revivification of 
its most cherished conventions” (“William Gibson” 88). Gibson has not titled any of 
his trilogies himself, Neuromancer, Count Zero (1986) and Mona Lisa Overdrive 
(1988), but critics determined “the Sprawl,” or the vast cityscape that provides the 
setting for all three narratives, as the common denominator. Others choose the virtual 
setting instead and speak of the “cyberspace trilogy” or “matrix trilogy.” Both titles 
are much less common. 
Although the building blocks of traditional sf and cyberpunk sf generally 
coincide, they differ in the style of representation. Traditional sf presents more 
“glamorous showcases of high technology” whereas those of cyberpunk are evocative 
of “orbiting slums—shabby, neglected, unsuccessful, technologically outdated” 
(McHale, “Towards” 8). McHale elucidates:  
 
[t]he novelty of cyberpunk … lies not in the absolute newness of any 
particular component or components, but in a shift of dominance or center of 
gravity reflected in the combination of components and their relative 
conspicuousness in cyberpunk texts (6).  
 
Neuromancer is, therefore, as Easterbrook puts it, “less notable for its exciting plot 
than the rich texture of its prose, its foci of attention, its engagement with mass 
culture, and the way it crystallizes many separate threads that would subsequently 
transform sf” (“William Gibson” 87).  
Often compared with and defined in opposition to postmodern fiction, 
cyberpunk literalizes what in postmodern fiction merely “occurs as a configuration of 
narrative structure or a pattern in language” (McHale, “Towards” 6). For instance, the 
concept of a fragmented self, a common trope in postmodern fiction, is taken literally 
as Gibson portrays the physical break-up and technological re-composition of bodies 
in his cyberpunk novels. As another example, the common literary technique of 
allowing the reader to view the same events through the lens of different characters in 
the same story is often achieved by alternating the narrative point-of-view. This 
																																																								
71 In his brief essay “What is Cyberpunk?” (1986) Rudy Rucker points towards science fiction author 
and editor Gardner Dozois as presumably the first to have used the term with reference to the fiction of 
William Gibson. 
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principle undergirds Gibson’s fictional technology of “simstim,”72 which literally 
allows characters to access other characters’ perceptual sensorium. Through the use of 
implanted software, characters are able to slip into foreign nervous systems and share 
all sensory information. On a similar note, new digital media allows for human 
existence as digital uploads in cyberspace, as well as the literal unification of man and 
machine. These examples may illustrate McHale’s contention that cyberpunk, “tends 
to ‘literalize’ or ‘actualize’ what in postmodernist fiction occurs as metaphor” 
(“Towards” 6). All these literalizations, or personifications, partake in the negotiation 
of the boundary of the human body. Moreover, this desire for unification can be read 
in romantic terms.  
This novel type of representation in cyberpunk can be traced back to a new 
presence and accessibility of media. As Cavallaro holds, 
 
Cyberpunk writers and artists have actually witnessed the birth and growth of 
technologies that earlier generations of science-fiction authors could only 
fantasize or speculate about. As Steve Brown points out, instead of having to 
invent visions of the future practically from scratch, they have been in a 
position to collect ‘bits and pieces of what was actually coming true, and feed 
it back to the readers who were already living in Gibson’s Sprawl, whether 
they knew it or not (19). 
 
William Gibson wrote Neuromancer in the early 1980s, a decade marked by the 
radical change provided by the ubiquity of personal computers and the internet which 
began to invade not only the realm of personal lives but of identities as well. 
Fascinated by the upcoming technological suffusion, Gibson explains in an interview 
that he, “had a hunch that it was going to change things, in a way the advent of the 
ubiquity of the automobile changed things. It changed how we dress, how we eat” (No 
Maps 26 min). His friend and literary affiliate Bruce Sterling adds that, “this thing 
[computer technology] was a supermodel among technologies ... the boundaries of the 
human body would be crossed” (26min). This is a statement that I see as heralding the 
departure from hitherto conceptions of the human body, its boundaries and potentials, 
its limitations and abilities.  
Given the interest in the body the genre appears to take, it is almost surprising 
to find the reception of the Sprawl trilogy focused to a great extent on a supposed 
celebration of the mind. Sherryl Vint holds, “[t]he world of cyberspace is the 
consummate world of the Cartesian dualist: in cyberspace, one is the mind, 
effortlessly moving beyond the limitations of the human body” locating “[t]he appeal 
of cyberspace [in] the repression of the material body” (Bodies 103). Vint’s 
description reads less of Sterling’s prophetic announcement of the crossing of the 
boundaries of the human body but seems to declare a desire for its overall elimination. 
The introduction of cyberspace, which is often read as a suitable illustration of 
Cartesian dualism, appears to overshadow the negotiations that take place on the 
corporeal side of the interface. What in Vint’s observation still functions as an 
illustration, dwindles into cliché in other receptions of Gibson’s work. Misreading 
Gibson’s depictions of bodies as longing for transcendence led critics to ascribe an 																																																								
72 Henthorne explains the technology of “simstim” in his glossary as follows: “An immersive form of 
virtual reality that directly stimulates the brain, simulating the experience of others. In the novels and 
stories set in the Sprawl, simstim is a primary form of entertainment. Simstim technology is also used 
in navigating cyberspace, users connecting their nervous systems directly into cyberspace with 
cyberdecks” (137).	
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uncritical celebration of the virtual in his work. Consider, for instance, McCarron, 
who states, “[t]he interest cyberpunk writers take in the body is of strictly negative 
kind; a kind which consistently affirms, and even celebrates, the Cartesian 
dichotomy” (262). The negotiations of the nexus between body and mind that do exist 
in Gibson’s trilogies, are misread as depicting the Cartesian split along with its 
devaluation of the body. McCarron detects a “fascination with the ways in which the 
flesh is inessential, irrelevant” and a desirable portrayal of “pure mind” attested as 
“the genre’s ultimate goal” (267, 262). Vint resumes this type of criticism in stating 
that cyberpunk is, “a genre best known for its rejection of embodiment and embrace 
of an existence in cyberspace” (Bodies 102). In the following, this thesis explores the 
ways in which Gibson’s work demonstrates an acute interest in embodiment and 
rejects easy solutions of an existence exclusive to cyberspace. My argument defines 
itself against McCarron’s conclusion that, “[t]he body’s accidental and ultimately 
unnecessary corporeality is stressed throughout Gibson’s work” (267). Furthermore, 
my analysis contrasts with Vint’s reading that Neuromancer is about the 
“consequences of forgetting that we are embodied human beings” (Bodies 112). 
Not blinded by the occurrence of new media in Neuromancer, some critics 
have recognized that literature by the father of cyberspace is, in fact, all about the 
embodied human being. In a short essay contributing to a collection on key figures in 
science fiction, Easterbrook states that Neuromancer’s “treatment of prosthetic or 
cybernetic modification suggests a step toward a coming posthuman or cyborg 
amalgam of human and machine, the confrontation and conflation of which have 
remained a central trope in sf since the beginnings” (“William Gibson” 88). Hence, 
there are occasional instances demonstrating awareness of Gibson’s negotiation of the 
boundaries, the extension, and the interdependence of the body. Critics have often 
linked discussions of the body in Gibson to the figurations of the cyborg and the 
posthuman. Easterbrook, furthermore, points to the, “decentralized personal agency, 
often aided by prosthetic or cybernetic alternations of the human body” in 
Neuromancer, highlighting a preoccupation with prostheses (87-8). With its treatment 
of the technological modification and rehabilitation of the insufficient human body, sf 
presents itself as a discourse distinctly predestined to, “allow us to concretely imagine 
bodies and selves otherwise, a discourse defined by its ability to estrange our 
commonplace perceptions” (Vint, Bodies 19). Against the backdrop of the 
pervasiveness of “Other” bodies, cyberpunk, I argue, like no other genre, manages to 
capture the material reality of physical disability. Despite her awareness of the ways 
in which discourses can shape how we think and feel about the human body, Vint 
seems oblivious of disability: 
 
[t]he ideas that we have about what is natural or proper for our bodies 
influence what our bodies can and cannot do, and preconceived ideologies will 
determine what science will or will not find when it looks at them. Ideology is 
the source of these various discourses that inform our ideas about our bodies 
and hence inform our experience of the lived body (Bodies 18).  
 
In other words, science fiction can serve as a testbed to act out ideas offside cultural 
doctrines while maintaining a critical distance. This book seeks to recontextualize the 
body and discuss its representations in Gibson’s cyberpunk as well as post-cyberpunk 
fiction. None of his novels are driven by what Garland-Thomson calls “normates” and 
still the significance of the characters’ corporeal extraordinariness is rarely taken into 
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consideration; discussions of constructions of disability have never fully entered the 
discourse.  
 
 
THE BODY IN GIBSON’S POST-CYBERPUNK FICTION 
 
Three years after its publication in 1993, literary critic Takayuki Tatsumi admires 
Gibson’s first post-cyberpunk novel Virtual Light for its literary co mposition of the 
San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge with the following words:  
 
I have never seen a more brilliant construction of a bridge than William 
Gibson’s fourth solo novel … which beautifully envisions the near-future, 
hyperrealistic, and junk-artistic atmosphere on the postearthquake San 
Francisco Bay Bridge in a fictional 2005 (61).  
 
Tatsumi had not foreseen the significance the Bridge came to have as a unifying 
setting—almost a character itself—for the two following novels. William Gibson’s 
second, “[m]ore sedate and understated” trilogy comprises Virtual Light, Idoru and 
All Tomorrow’s Parties (Easterbrook, “Recognizing” 50). Different from the original, 
the literary Bay Bridge was closed after a huge earthquake called “the Little Grande,” 
disconnecting the traffic between San Francisco and Oakland and unleashing the 
territorialization by ex-hippies, homeless, and street people. In the vein of a “neo-
tribalism” (Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity) and  “neoregionalism” (Jameson, 
Postmodernism), this self-organizing and self-governing community is referred to as 
the “bridge people.” In the Bridge trilogy, Gibson depicts a near rather than distant 
future which, traumatized by devastating earthquakes, grapples with the challenges of 
reconstruction. 
All action revolves around a pair of virtual light glasses that overlay reality 
with virtual information in Virtual Light—a technology that will evolve over the 
course of Gibson’s novels into “locative art” that creates “annotated environments” in 
Spook Country (173). When Chevette, bike messenger and bridge-resident by 
accident (or fate) steals the glasses at a party, she attracts some serious henchman and 
corporate hitman to track her down as the stolen glasses carry top secret plans for the 
total rebuild of San Francisco by nanotechnology. Virtual Light provides the 
introduction to a new universe of the near future, featuring a miscellaneous version of 
the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge as a significant backdrop for all three novels, 
and a revolutionary new technology that operates on a scale so small that it borders on 
virtuality, and yet facilitates the manipulation of matter. With regard to the 
significance of materiality to Gibson’s post-Sprawl novel, Tatsumi notes that Virtual 
Light “gives priority to junkyard over cyberspace, bike messenger over cyber-
cowboy” (114).  
In Idoru, which is set for the most part in Tokyo, the San Francisco-Oakland 
Bay Bridge, while providing the start and end point of the trilogy, only appears in the 
form of a “virtual analog” of cyberspace’s Walled City (Easterbrook, “Recognizing” 
52).73 The bridge as geographical anchor recurs on a conceptual level but is fully 																																																								
73 In contrast to the Killing Floor (“Johnny Mnemonic”) and the Bay Bridge (“Virtual Light,” “All 
Tomorrow’s Parties”), Walled City (“Idoru”) is an entirely virtual space modeled on the actual 
Kowloon Walled City in Hong Kong. Kowloon Walled City has been known for its radical increase in 
population from the late nineteenth century to 1993, when the government demolished it. In the 1990s 
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revisited as a setting in All Tomorrow’s Parties. In many respects, the trilogy depicts 
a bridging from the Sprawl to the Bigend novel. This is especially true for Idoru, 
whose transitional element not only lies in one of its main protagonists, Colin Laney, 
but also “bridges the relation between Case and Cayce” in a continued negotiation of 
the nexus of body and environment (51). The idoru,74 a computer-simulated idol, is 
the lynchpin of the story. News about the rock star Rez’s (from the band Lo/Rez) 
announcement to marry the “personality-construct” gives reason for concern to fan 
clubs and Rez’ staff so that both Colin Laney, a data specialist, and Chia McKenzie, a 
fan club representative, are set up to clarify the rumors. It is in the idoru’s liminal 
status between the virtual and the material that the notion of the body is recurrently 
problematized throughout the entire trilogy. Similar to the Sprawl trilogy, Gibson is 
concerned with the corporeal extension and entanglement into cyber- and physical- 
space, which is negotiated with marked bias for materiality. In this regard, one can 
observe a stronger focus on the body’s visceral contingency on its environment and its 
mutual influence and interference. Instead of employing the concept of disability 
merely as a narrative prosthesis, Gibson begins to interweave disability into a more 
complex fabric of forces. Through more ambiguous entanglement, issues of disability 
are given increased conceptual depth. In the Bridge trilogy, the characters’ bodies are 
neither wholly repaired nor strikingly enhanced, and yet the commodification of the 
body still pervades in all three novels. 
This post-cyberpunk trilogy closes with a paradigm shift. All Tomorrow’s 
Parties finally resolves the idoru’s desire for corporeality in providing the nano-
assembling technology that allows for her materialization by a nanofax device in a 
Lucky Dragon drug store on the Bay Bridge. Facilitating this historical event, data 
analyst Laney indulges in data complexity to an extent that classifies as addiction and 
leads to his death rather than salvation.  
With its evolution away from cyberpunk tropes, the Bridge trilogy invests in 
posthuman data-architectures, nanotechnology, and meticulous descriptions of the 
Bay Bridge which do not satisfy “technofetishistic desires” and thus do not resonate 
well with all readers. Ross Farnell notes that, 
 
by the time he came to write Virtual Light  the notion of “cyberspace,” if not 
completely discredited, had at least fallen into the realm of predictable cliché, 
a standardized trope of cyberpunk fiction. Like cyberpunk itself, the novum of 
cyberspace had moved from potent narrative device to cynical marketing 
technique and commodified hyperreality, thereby attaining an escape velocity 
which transported it from the realms of sf and text and into the mainstream 
media-hype of technofetishistic desire (461-2). 
 
This has lead to an initial decrease in Gibson’s reception. Farnell bemoans, “three 
years between the publication of Gibson’s Virtual Light and his latest novel, Idoru, 
the critical silence has been deafening” (459). After the publication of All Tomorrow’s 
Parties, Graham Murphy concurs “[y]et two decades following the publication of 
Neuromancer (1984), and critics continue to focus on Gibson’s first trilogy, even 
though the publication of All Tomorrow's Parties (1999) closed out what can now 																																																																																																																																																														
it hosted around 50.000 residents on two and a half hectares of land and was the most densely 
populated and largely ungoverned area (Routley). 74 ‘Idoru,’ a term coined by Gibson, suggests a pun on its function. Short for ‘I adore you,’ this is 
exactly the response the Japanese virtual idol and commercial media entity by the name of Rei Toei 
generates in her audience.	
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loosely be called the Bridge sequence” (72). Most of the literary criticism that did 
emerge, as in the case of Farnell and Murphy, focused primarily on media topologies, 
hyperreality, and the modes and significance of the posthuman. 
In contrast to voices that attest a clear hierarchy of interest in Gibson’s work 
as prioritizing technology above all else, Tom LeClair argues, “Gibson has never been 
much interested in people except as products of or reactors to his high-tech and 
lowlife environments” (4). Kyle A. Wiggins observes not only a deliberate 
attentiveness to but also significant changes in the negotiation of human beings and 
human bodies in Gibson’s Bridge novels. Wiggins remarks, “William Gibson’s 
revision of his own theory on bodily transcendence is perhaps the most substantive 
evidence of the transition of cyberpunk literature into a postcyberpunk mode” (79). In 
All Tomorrow’s Parties, Wiggins also emphasizes that, “Gibson reverses the trope of 
the cyberpunk leaving his/her body behind and mapping consciousness onto 
cyberspace,” instead an “existence on the informational plane is the new prison and 
only substantiation can spring a person” (81).  
Even in discussions explicitly focused on the status of the body in Gibson’s 
post-cyberpunk novels, the category of disability goes unheeded by most critics. In 
his analysis of digital space and the idoru, Murphy refers to the extraordinary 
corporeality of character Zona Rosa—a disabled, racialized, and female figure that is 
central to this thesis—uncritically, only in passing, and misspelling her name: “Zone 
[sic], a disfigured character who spends every waking hour online” (82). In seeking 
the re-evaluation of extraordinary bodies in the Bridge novels in this chapter, this 
thesis thus supplements excised readings of Gibson’s fiction with the consideration of 
the visceral topologies of his work. To that end, my discussion of extraordinary 
bodies and their extension in cyberspace considers Gibson’s increasing focus on 
materiality, the character’s interactions and relationships with the data, material, and 
interpersonal environments, and the narrative style that begins to reflect subjectivity 
increasingly more mimetically.  
 
 
THE BODY IN GIBSON’S NEW REALIST FICTION 
 
Set a year before their actual publication, Pattern Recognition (2003), Spook Country 
(2007), and Zero History (2010) foreground questions that have been lingering in the 
periphery of Gibson’s fiction since the 1980s. The novels comment on the distribution 
pathways of art, advertisement, and the military as well as the relationship between 
these supposedly distinct areas touching upon the nature of information, the purposes 
of surveillance and espionage, methods of data encryption, and technologies such as 
WiFi, GPS, and RFID. In his review of the novel, Anthony Byrt states that Spook 
Country provides a “sharp analysis of the international impact of America’s ‘war on 
terror,’ and of the way that globalization allows unseen organizations to access 
information and wealth” (par.8). Em McAvan states that,  
 
Gibson’s recent writing foregrounds the technologically mediated status of the 
present, and in particular the ways in which surveillance and paranoia have 
marked everyday life during the war on terror … Each of the characters is 
potentially a terrorist, or working for one (407).  
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With recourse to Frederick Jameson’s notion of “postmodern sublime” and the idea 
that “paranoia is necessary to correctly grasp the full nature of the globalized world, 
for an exhausted realism cannot do so,” McAvan discusses the ways in which,  
 
Gibson foregrounds the fact that contemporary surveillance is used for 
commercial as well as governmental reasons, persistently associating 
advertising with spying. In doing so, Spook Country effectively collapses the 
distinction between the two” (McAvan 407).  
 
The fact that the Bigend trilogy overtly negotiates contemporary societal issues of a 
local and global scale rather than portraying conflicts of a distant future or virtual 
reality has led critics to declare “the return of repressed materiality” in Gibson’s work 
(Jones, “Second Life” 271). 
However, Gibson has always asserted that his (science fiction) novels are not 
prophecies of the future but rather that he draws on a science fiction toolkit to reflect 
on the weirdness of the present.75 The degree of weirdness in reality has perpetually 
increased in a way that begs the question whether a science fiction toolkit is still 
appropriate to reach the required cognitive dissonance for grasping the present 
moment. Gibson’s move towards a contemporary setting in the Bigend trilogy is 
moreover motivated by the fundamental dissolution of a clearly cut boundary between 
“the real world” and “cyberspace” or “virtual reality.” No longer is cyberspace this 
distinctly other space that one needs to actively log into but the virtual overlies our 
realities and computer technologies infiltrate our lives. 
In this sense, the reception of Gibson’s Bigend trilogy has widely revolved 
around shifts in genre classifications. It was particularly Pattern Recognition, the first 
of the three novels that received scholarly attention because it struck a new note in the 
cyberpunk-father’s narrative repertoire and initiated a new direction in his work. 
Ranging from post-cyberpunk, science-fiction realism, socioeconomic science fiction, 
to alternate history, speculative fiction, post-9/11 as well as post-post-9/11, critics 
have had difficulties placing the novels somewhere between science fiction and 
realism.76 This struggle is exacerbated due to the fact that these two genre strategies 
appear to collapse into one another. Considering Gibson’s work, Byrt observes, that 
“[s]ince 9/11 there has been a definite shift in his work” (par.1). Nevertheless, the 
Bigend trilogy does not quite fit the criteria of David Holloway’s new genre category 
“The 9/11 Novel” which he sees applicable to, for example, Philip Roth’s The Plot 
Against America (2004), Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredible Close 
(2005) or Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006). In his book 9/11 and the War on 
Terror, Holloway introduces the staging of “the child” as a “repository of goodness, 
hope, innocence” as a central trope in 9/11 novels (111).77 The highly globalized 
world order depicted in these novels has motivated critics to reconsider the 
characteristics of contemporary literature as they are informed by such globalizing 
standards—for instance illustrated by Phillip Wegener’s question “What Is Literature 
																																																								
75 See, for instance, an interview with Gibson by Matt Roskoff (2016). 
76 See Krawczyk-Łaskarzewska’s “Space over Time: The Urban Space in William Gibson’s Techno-
thriller Novels” (2015); Konstantinou’s “The Brand as Cognitive Map in William Gibson’s Pattern 
Recognition” (2009); Easterbrook’s “Alternate Presents: The Ambivalent Historicism of ‘Pattern 
Recognition’” (2006); Itzkoff’s “Spirits in the Material Word” (2007).  
77 For a more detailed discussion see McAvan’s “Paranoia in Spook Country: William Gibson and the 
technological sublime of the war on terror” (2010). 
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Now?.”78 While socio-politically inclined critics concentrate on the corollaries of 
globalization and the aftermaths of 9/11, and technophile critics focus on the meaning 
and implications of the instances of new, hi-end or retro technologies,79 others engage 
in a general reflection on the impossibility of science fiction literature in the 21st 
century. 80 Now, the question arises how this thesis will handle this variegated 
reception. Any attempt to reconcile these positions or scrutinize Gibson’s work even 
more thoroughly in order to classify it for good would mimic a modernist quest for 
purification, clear borders, fixed categories and definitive answers. Instead of settling 
the overall concerns, this thesis intends first “to feed off the controversy” in order to 
explore Gibson’s textual hybridity.  
Defined as a strategy to not only slow down an analytical process, Bruno 
Latour explains that, “feeding off controversies” also allows us “to trace more sturdy 
relations and discover more revealing patterns by finding a way to register the links 
between unstable and shifting frames of reference rather than by trying to keep one 
frame stable” (Reassembling 24). Secondly, after reviewing the actors operative in the 
representation of bodies and subjectivities, this thesis proposes to frame the respective 
narrative strategies under “New Realism.” With this in mind, I cannot but agree with 
science fiction scholar Roger Luckhurst who considers Latour’s actor-network 
approach a “useful guide to articulating the hybridity of recent sf” (“Scientification” 
15). In his 2006 essay “Bruno Latour’s Scientifiction: Networks, Assemblages, and 
Tangled Objects,” Luckhurst introduces actor-network-theory into science fiction 
scholarship by asserting that, 
 
Latour allows us to read how these bizarrely heterogeneous formations 
operate. The complex socio-politico-scientific embeddedness of sf could be 
considerably clarified by Latour’s approach to networks and assemblages, 
chains of weaker and stronger association that cut across science, technology 
and society (12). 
 
While Luckhurst embraces ANT for its potential to help “explain why sf has become 
such a vital node in the collective for thinking through our contemporary matters of 
anxious concern,” my goal here is more specific (“Scientification” 15).  
Although the presented genre criticism, almost always framed by a 
Jamesonian perspective on postmodernism, is an essential part of the reception of 
Gibson’s work, its extent overshadows much of what else is going on within as well 
as across the novels, namely the amount of diverse depictions of embodiment, 
particularly in Pattern Recognition. On the basis of a conceptualization of Gibson’s 
extraordinary bodies, the mode of representation, so it will be argued, is “new realist.” 
Most critics agree that Pattern Recognition (as a representative of the Bigend trilogy) 
is “[b]oth thematically and structurally, very much about presentness” (Easterbrook, 
“Alternate Presents” 485). Furthermore, critics often cite that the novel is about the 
“volatility and fluidity of the present moment” (Hollinger, “Stories” 462). To clarify, 
this present is understood as a “process-without-progress” (467). As much as this 
might be true with respect to the future of technological development, it is not true 
regarding Gibson’s depictions of non-normative bodies. Indeed, in Gibson we find 
process and progress. It is important to note that Gibson’s depictions of future 
technologies primarily function as a carrier medium for the incomparably wider 																																																								
78 See Phillipp Wegener’s “Recognizing Patterns” (2007). 
79 See, for instance, N. Katherine Hayles’ “Traumas of Code” (2006). 
80 See Veronica Hollinger’s “Stories about the Future” (2006).	
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negotiations of entanglement between technological environments and the human 
animal. In an interview with John Johnston, Gibson notes that he is less “concerned 
with technological ‘toys’” than with how the technologies behind them “impact the 
social animal in ways that the developers never thought of” (Henthorne 21). In other 
words, Gibson is less interested in understanding computer technologies as such, than 
in observing how people are entangled in them. For example, in 2007 he told PC 
Magazine, “I’m anything but an early adopter, generally. In fact, I’ve never really 
been very interested in computers themselves. I don’t watch them; I watch how 
people behave around them” (“Q & A” 19). 
In this sense, Pattern Recognition marks the pinnacle of a progressively 
centrifugal expansion of embodied subjectivities in Gibson’s fiction. It is indeed 
tempting to read Gibson in support of this line of argument when he states in a 2003 
interview with Locus magazine, “I’ve been threatening to write a book like Pattern 
Recognition for a long time: a novel that makes what I’ve always been doing overt” 
(“Locus interview” n. pag.).  
Even more poignantly and explicitly than in any of his previous novels, 
disability in the Bigend trilogy presents itself affirmatively, less than ever before in 
need of resolution via prostheses, rehabilitation and/or enhancement. Corporeal 
wholeness is finally unmasked as an illusion. On that note, I read Neil Easterbrook’s 
comment that “in the recent work Gibson has refused all evasive alibis and instead 
confronted both characters and readers with authentic, because unresolved, 
problematic[s]” as in line with my observation of Gibson’s shift towards realistic 
representations of unresolvable (extraordinary) corporeality (“Recognizing Patterns” 
57). In a similar vein, Janine Tobeck observes that, “the Bigend trilogy marks a turn 
for Gibson, not just into the present, but into new explorations of humanness, history, 
and community” (“Klein Blue Suit” 30). Not only Gibson’s heterogeneous stylistic 
strategies, but also the abundant thematic knots, will in the course of this argument be 
read in relation to bodies and subjectivities. Thus, rendering their dynamic, relational, 
and semi-sovereign nature visible. In order to conceptualize Gibson’s problematizing 
but irresolvable explorations into humanness, which manifest in the extraordinariness 
of the depicted characters, chapter 4.3 draws on an actor-network theory that is 
infused with new disability materialism. 
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4. The Extraordinary Body in Fiction 
 
4.1 The Body and Medicine: The Sprawl Trilogy 
 
When William Gibson started publishing in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was a 
time of radical social upheaval followed by a series of redefinitions of social 
identities. Among movements fighting for civil rights were people with disabilities. 
From years of disability rights activism, the academic field of disability studies was 
established within the Humanities. Reading Gibson’s novels in terms of bodies 
through a socio-historical lens his portrayals open up negotiations of multifaceted 
positions on corporeal otherness. At the same time, it is possible to read Gibson’s 
depictions of bodies through the category of literary genre. Science fiction and 
particularly Gibson’s early métier cyberpunk is interested less in the normal than the 
deviant; less in the hero than in the outsider, and less in the moderateness of life than 
in alternative ways of living. Even though there is something “wrong” with most 
characters in his novels, Gibson writes these disabled figures without reverting to the 
eugenic or clinical gaze.  
Bodies in the Sprawl trilogy are extraordinary on many levels in that 
characters display individual corporeal or mental deviations from statistical norms as 
well as epitomize the marginalized status of social outsiders such as: drug addicts, 
hackers, hustlers, prostitutes, and street fighters. While the novels also feature 
extremely wealthy characters, these do not occupy the “normate” position on a 
physical or social level because their affluence is either obtained on illegal terms or 
they pursue illegal goals by means of it. Besides an elaboration of the typology of 
corporeal extraordinariness, I will examine the ways in which Gibson’s novels 
question the normalistic complex by means of language, formal structure, and 
narrative perspective, and how these novels present alternative ways of being and 
living socially, individually, and corporeally. This chapter focuses on the modes by 
which extraordinary bodies are depicted while paying particular attention to the forms 
and rhetoric of prosthesis and embodiment, the underlying conceptual framework of 
the human body, as well as the literary functions of figurations of disability. 
 
 
4.1.1 Prosthetics Paradise 
 
Gibson’s depiction of extraordinary bodies, I argue, can be best understood through a 
prosthetic logic which extends the analysis of prostheses to an examination of their 
underlying concepts of the human form and the relationship between the human body 
and its environment. Prostheses are the first form of corporeal extraordinariness 
encountered in Neuromancer. The start and end point of the protagonist’s journey is 
the Chatsubo bar81, which hosts a wild assortment of the Sprawl’s most dubious 
figures including: drug dealers and addicts, street warriors, prostitutes and cyberspace 
cowboys. The signs of “Otherness” exhibited by the guests’ extraordinary bodies 																																																								
81 The Chatsubo bar is also referred to as the “Chat” can also be read as the short form for “chat room.” 
The meaning of the “chat room” in the sense of “an online messaging facility (esp. an Internet site) 
dedicated to real-time exchanges, usually on a particular topic” only appeared in 1989. The antecedent 
was the “chat line” which usually referred to “a telephone or electronic messaging service which 
enables subscribers to exchange casual conversation, either individually or by means of a conference 
line, with other subscribers or with employees of the service” (“chat room”). 
 87	
relate to physical alterations that involve bio-software and technological interfaces, 
and expose novel relations and boundaries of the human. The opening page introduces 
Case entering his most frequented bar and the first character he encounters is the 
barkeeper Ratz, who is primarily identified by his prosthetic arm: “Ratz was tending 
bar, his prosthetic arm jerking monotonously as he filled a tray of glasses with draft 
Kirin” (3). Whereas the cause of Ratz’s lost limb is never clarified, his rehabilitation 
is the focus of attention. The execution of his job visually, as well as acoustically, 
marks his deviance and draws attention to his prosthesis: “the antique arm whined as 
he reached for another mug” (4). Further specified, his, “Russian military prosthesis, a 
seven-function force-feedback manipulator, cased in grubby pink plastic” qualifies 
Ratz as the classic example of an amputee and prosthesis wearer (4). The form of the 
bartender’s prosthesis reflects the earliest versions of professionally manufactured 
prosthetic products.  
Prosthesis suggests an idealized one-to-one replacement of a missing body 
part with an artificial substitute.82 The specification of the military background of 
Ratz’s prosthesis points to the historical origin of the proliferation of prosthetic 
technologies. Owing to medical advancements and the improved medical conditions 
on the battlefield at the time of World War I, more soldiers survived and returned 
home seriously injured. So-called war invalids, or disabled veterans, posed an 
economic and political problem; on one hand, disabled veterans reminded society of 
the collective trauma and on the other hand, of the soldiers’ failure to maintain his 
culturally ascribed role as the male breadwinner. In order to appease society’s desire 
for inconspicuousness and social “passing” as well as facilitate productivity, cosmetic 
prostheses with various optional attachments (hand, hook, cork screw) were 
designed.83 After World War I, a whole new branch of research and industry was born 
and majorly financed by the military. For the first time, prostheses became a mass-
produced good serving the integration of veterans into stable social relations and 
increasing their efficiency and performance. What these developments indicate about 
the cultural concept of the body in the 1910s and 1920s is its potential to be 
dismembered and partially replaced. In her book Prothesen: Figuren einer lädierten 
Moderne, Harrasser presents a lucid summary of the history of prosthetics, and the 
calculated fit between amputee and prosthesis, prosthesis and tool, tool and operation 
to demonstrate how prosthetics created a system of discrete interlocking units that can 
be taken apart and recomposed. 
Historically, the 1940s and 1950s constitute another peak in the developments 
of prosthetics because the end of World War II produced another large influx of 
injured veterans. Endangering the “qualities of a certain brand of normative 
masculinity [such as] independence, reliability, efficiency, resiliency” war wounds, 
again, compromised the ur-attributes of the male American worker (Serlin, “The 
Other Arms Race” 49). At the same time, the era represents the pinnacle of new 
material science and new bioengineering principles. The confluence of these two 
phenomena gave rise to prosthetics as “its own biomedical subdiscipline” (51). 
Arising from this site- and time-specific context, “prosthetics developed during the 
1940s and 1950s were linked explicitly to the fragile politics of labor, employment, 
and self-worth for disabled veterans” (51). At that point, prostheses had not yet been 																																																								
82 According to the Oxford English Dictionary Online, the Greek word prósthesis originally denotes a 
grammatical addition. Only in the eighteenth century does the term enter into the medical discourse and 
begins to signify “the replacement of defective or absent parts of the body by artificial substitutes.” 
(“prosthesis, n2”). 
83 See also Serlin’s Replaceable You: Engenieering the Body in Postwar America (2004).	
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connoted with enhancing purposes in creating “supermen or cyborgs” but basically, 
“provided veteran amputees with the material means through which individuals … 
imagined and negotiated what it meant to look and behave like a so-called normal, 
able-bodied workingmen” (51).  
Gibson’s portrayal of Ratz’s missing arm as replaced by a prosthetic 
supplement demonstrates a repair and re-composition that erases any notion of 
disability or invalidity.  By means of a most likely mass-produced replacement, Ratz 
is able to pursue his profession, regain the status of able-bodiedness, and even more 
importantly, he maintains his masculinity as a resilient and self-reliant bartender. It is 
no coincidence Gibson introduces prosthetics by highlighting the hand as it is 
particularly the hand, more than any another body part, that makes the human a 
reasonable animal Georg Schlesinger, a German theoretician of machine tools, argues 
with reference to Immanuel Kant (Harrasser, Körper 2.0 93). Ratz’s hand prosthesis is 
an extension of his body, satisfying cultural requirements of functionality and 
retaining humanness.    
The cultural service and meaning of prosthetics only becomes problematic 
when the desired “normal” life and an “able-bodied” status is disclosed as an 
exclusive cultural construction. As illustrated earlier, “the norm” replaced the 
preceding concept of “the ideal” that delimits the human body from the mythopoetic, 
or the unattainable body of the Gods. This change in the ideological unconscious 
demarcates a crucial shift from a unifying to a separating conception of the human 
body. The introduction of, “the concept of the norm, particularly a normal body, 
[creates] thus in effect … the concept of the disabled body” (Davis, “Constructing 
Normalcy” 6). The progression in the field of prosthetics as developed in the way 
described above was guided by the underlying equation of disability with incapacity, 
disease, trauma, dysfunction, and other health conditions which were considered as 
requiring medical care. Known as the medical model of disability, this conception 
locates the source of disability in the individual body and aims at cure (Scully, 
“Variations” 59). Fundamental to this approach is the “rehabilitation paradigm,” 
which articulates “the explicit objective” to facilitate clients to “attain [their] maximal 
potential for normal living” (qtd. Phillips, “Try Harder” 214, emphasis added). 
Potential for living outside the norm have not yet overhauled the normative impetus. 
Harrasser’s observation that in neo-capitalist times, “[n]o one is a cripple, as long as 
they are productive” reverberates in the prevalence of normalizing technologies in 
Gibson’s future paradise of prosthetics (Körper 2.0 95, my translation).  
However, the availability of prostheses—in fiction as well as reality—comes 
in degrees as in neo-capitalist times it is profoundly dependent on social status and 
economic capital. Industrialization, the Gaussian distribution, World War I and II, and 
new materials are only some of the non-human actors contributing to the tightly-knit 
bond between disability, prosthetics, and economic productivity. Conditional 
availability is still a key parameter in the negotiation of disability to date, it is against 
this backdrop that Gibson’s exceptional characters need to be read.  
Given its post-industrial nature, the Sprawl trilogy displays a pluralistic 
society that is situated within a clear differentiation of mainstream and sub-/ or 
countercultures each providing their distinct set of rules and norms. At times, Gibson 
reflects on these varying norms explicitly, as in the example cell phones in Count 
Zero. Being mass-produced devices, phones are standardized industrial products that 
simultaneously standardize, or rather normalize their users: 
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Most phone programs were equipped with cosmetic video subprograms 
written to bring the video image of the owner into greater accordance with the 
more widespread paradigms of personal beauty, erasing blemishes and subtly 
molding facial outlines to meet idealized statistical norms (Count Zero 234). 
 
Similar to our modern Western societies, mainstream culture in the Sprawl is built on 
“idealized statistical norms,” while subcultures consist of their own set of norms. For 
example, in the Gothicks:  
 
The majority approached the Gothicks ideal: tall, lean, muscular, but touched 
by a certain gaunt relentlessness, young athletes in the early stages of 
consumption. The graveyard pallor was mandatory, and Gothick hair was by 
definition black. Bobby knew that the few who couldn’t warp their bodies to 
fit the subcultural template were best avoided; a short Gothick was trouble, a 
fat Gothick homicidal. (46) 
 
Both, technical and material strategies aim at the adaptation of the individual body. 
Neither mainstream nor countercultures provide an all-inclusive environment but 
according to their particular rules, those not “fitting in” are excluded, avoided, or 
mistrusted.  
 
 
4.1.2 Dis|Embodiment 
 
Although Gibson depicts radically new relations between man and technology in the 
Sprawl trilogy, he insists on the embodied nature of the self. Following his insight 
that new personal computer technologies were going to change the human being’s 
interlinkage with its environment, Gibson portrays an undated distant future 
rigorously ruled by retrofitted technology that enforces the integration of man and 
machine. The dystopian kaleidoscopic cityscape of the Sprawl is the shabby and 
desolate site from which characters embark on their individual journeys through 
spaces tinted with the paraphernalia of, “Japanese, Western, and Third-World, high-
tech and low-tech, elite and popular, mainstream” subcultures (McHale, “Towards” 
10). Entirely in line with the dismal depictions of a future typical of the 1980s, the 
Sprawl evokes the rainy, trash filled and neon lit streets from Blade Runner (1982), 
and dwellers traversing the Sprawl are subjected to a “maximally intimate 
juxtaposition of maximally diverse and heterogeneous cultural materials” (McHale, 
“Towards” 10).  
Neuromancer’s protagonist Case is entirely drawn to the new medium of 
cyberspace and accesses it through “a custom cyberspace deck that project[s] his 
disembodied consciousness into the consensual hallucination that was the matrix” (5). 
As a netrunner, Case professionally surfs the internet and hacks through security 
systems in order to obtain the requested data. Gibson’s expression for logging into the 
matrix is to “jack in,’” which depends upon the interface between the nervous system 
and the computer system that is an electrode and a deck, with optional goggles, 
gloves, or implants. Lives in Neuromancer can, thus, not only be lead corporeally but, 
in addition, parallel on the vertical axis84 of virtuality. As shown above, this modality 																																																								
84 The term goes back to McHale, who, while elaborating the forms of existence in the Sprawl trilogy, 
states that, “[i]t is possible, in other words, to adventure from parallel world to parallel world on the 
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of living is taken as specificity of the genre and from it the transcendence of the mind, 
and the outpacing of the body by the mind is extrapolated. Even though Case’s name 
is evocative of a cheap computer case, the body is not a shallow container that is 
simply given or easily discarded but embodiment is questioned and ambivalently 
embraced. 
What needs to be underscored is that the material body plays a central role in 
this constellation; it is retained as a fundamental prerequisite to jack into the matrix. 
Secondly, despite the fact that spending too much time in cyberspace implies the fatal 
real-life consequence of death, death does not need to be final. “Flatlining” while 
jacked into the matrix allows for the possibility of a wholly virtual existence. Indeed, 
there is the option of transcending corporeality because only the body dies while the 
disembodied mind continues to move freely through cyberspace. If this is the 
celebrated option of the disembodied mind and the dismissal of the burden of the 
body, this option is not favored by any character in Neuromancer. Gibson presents the 
epitome of becoming a disembodied mind in the character of Pauly McCoy, who 
“flatlines” during a run through the matrix and from then on “continues his life” under 
the name of Dixie Flatline, wholly in virtuality. With reference to the misconception 
that cyberpunk literature advocates the “embrace of an existence in cyberspace,” it 
seems surprising that Dixie does not appreciate his virtual life. In fact, neither does he 
consider it virtual life at all—“I’m dead, Case” (105). Nor does he relish his state of 
being, wishing to be erased: “Do me a favor, boy … This scam of yours, when it’s 
over, you erase this goddam thing” (106). Life in the novel is, thus, ultimately bound 
to the body. Dixie is not the only character actively breaking with the preference of 
mind over body. Case, too, is offered an existence in cyberspace, lured by the promise 
of redemption from earthly pains (244). At this turning point in the novel, the 
protagonist faces the decision between disembodied virtual or embodied material 
existence. Gibson presents a protagonist who takes conscious decision for the body. 
Count Zero introduces a malicious wealthy art collector, Josef Virek, whose 
embodiment is extraordinary because it is fundamentally fragmented and distributed 
across a virtual and a material plane. Reminiscent of the philosophical “brain in a vat” 
thought experiment, Virek’s cells literally live in a vat in “some hideous industrial 
suburb of Stockholm…a thing like three truck trailers, lashed in a dripping net of 
support lines” (16, 223).85 Instead of a disembodied brain, Josef Virek consists of 
cancerous body cells hooked to a cyberspace deck. What drives the narrative thread 
revolving around Virek is his desire to “free himself” from, “the cells of [his] body 
[which] hav[e] opted for the quixotic pursuit of individual careers” (19). The wish to 
abandon his sick body and “overcome” disability indexes limitation, burden, and 
confinement—all common references in the literary depiction of disability. Virek is 
thus not looking for cure or maintenance regime for his disability, but rather an 
omnipotent virtual existence in cyberspace. Moreover, he believes he can be given 
this existence by the maker of anonymously distributed Cornell boxes. In order to find 
the artist, he hires Marly Krushkhova, a former art gallery owner, who at the end of 
the novel reveals the artist as an AI plotting against Virek given his menacing 
objective. Virek’s embodiment is marked by an utter “reliance on technology” which 
when coupled with his “unnatural density of wealth” results in a massive extension 
(16, 18). The uncontrollable growth of his somatic cells is mirrored on a virtual plane 																																																																																																																																																														
vertical axis, just as one can from the microworld to microworld on the horizontal axis of the primary 
reality plane” (“Towards” 12).  
85 For a more detailed discussion of the “brain in a vat” trope see Cavallaro’s “The Brain in a Vat in 
Cyberpunk: The Persistence of the Flesh” (2004). 
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in that Marly perceives Virek’s “articulated structure” of his fiscal extremities 
everywhere she goes (93). Indeed, as Virek explains, he is “many things” and 
“[a]spects of [his] wealth have become autonomous…[h]is money has a life of its 
own” (16, 95). When Marly refers to a previous encounter, Virek explains that she 
must have seen “a double. A hologram perhaps” (16). The means of Virek’s 
manifestation vary from projections, holograms to more abstract “subtle mechanisms” 
(93, 222). When Virek states, that he is “the world’s most expensive invalid” it is fair 
to say that he is also the most expansive one (20). Virek’s pursuit can serve as a prime 
example for how the quest of overcoming disability drives narratives. While most of 
Gibson’s short fiction as well as the Sprawl novels in parts center on and thus may be 
read to exploit a character’s corporeal extraordinariness, most post-Sprawl works 
revolve around a “McGuffin.” As Westfahl elucidates, “Gibson combines these 
innovative elements with a traditional sort of story, with characters intent on obtaining 
a valuable object—what Alfred Hitchcock termed a ‘McGuffin,’ the director’s way to 
convey that its nature is unimportant, since its function is solely to keep the plot in 
motion” (36). 
Count Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive present an increasing interest in the 
relation between embodiment and the category of humanness. Characters in the 
novels constantly debate and question the extent of one another’s humanness on the 
basis of corporeal configuration. The degree of Virek’s extension makes Marly and 
her friend Andrea ponder his status as a human individual. Andrea cites theories that 
declare Virek as “already far from human” and asking, “is he an individual? In the 
sense that you are, or I am?” she answers with a simple “No” (130, 128). Both, the 
category of humanness, and individuality are grounded in the body. Virek’s pursuit to 
discard his “sick” body and perform an “evolutionary jump” fails due to what his 
security system calls “overextension” (292). Human existence can only be stretched 
so far. The novel suggests humanness is bound to the (extraordinary) body, which for 
that alone is explicitly valued. While Gibson underscores that the body does not end 
at the skin, its boundaries do exists be they neither clear, nor definitive.  
Despite the fact that the undertones of the “body is meat” slogan of 
Neuromancer pops up now and again, the Sprawl trilogy champions a reliance and 
appreciation of corporeality by focusing on intuition and affective experience. To find 
the maker of the Cornell boxes and ultimately salvation, Virek hires Marly on the 
basis of her intuition: “I suggest, however, that you work on a scale with which you 
yourself are comfortable. Otherwise, you run the risk of losing touch with your 
intuition, and intuition, in a case such as this, is of crucial importance” (19). Intuition 
is bodily in that it expands perception, it allows affectation, and it recognizes one’s 
involvement in an interplay of activities. Or, in Brain Massumi’s words: “‘Intuition’ 
is the feeling for potential that comes of drawing close enough to the autonomous 
dynamic of a variational process to effectively donate a measure of one’s activity to 
it” (“Sensing the Virtual” 22). It is noteworthy that in a world suffused with 
technological aids Virek, the richest and most influential man, resorts to and confides 
in mammalian instinct and human intuition rather than advanced technology for the 
purpose of his existential endeavor. The concept of intuition re-appears in the guise of 
“hyperfocus”86 and “hypersensitivity”87 in the characters of Colin Laney (Idoru and 
All Tomorrow’s Parties) and Cayce Pollard (Patter Recognition) in the later trilogies. 
																																																								
86 See chapter 4.2 of this book 
87 See chapter 4.3 of this book.	
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The fascination for and appreciation of sensory and affective experience is 
illustrated in Neuromancer when Case finds actual pleasure in the nexus of body and 
mind. This is especially apparent when the two cannot be told apart easily, when the 
Cartesian line blurs:  
 
He couldn’t think. He liked that very much, to be conscious and unable to 
think. He seemed to become each thing he saw: a park bench, a cloud of white 
moths around an antique streetlight, a robot gardener striped diagonally with 
black and yellow (155-6, emphasis added).  
 
In this Romantic desire for the unity of body, mind, and environment, the idea of 
taking pleasure in embodiment is taken even further. In destabilizing the boundary 
between himself and his environment, Case savors the material extension of 
embodiment. 
The sensation of fear appears as another instance of the embrace instead of the 
rejection of the body. Case’s description of this basic emotion as a “half-forgotten 
friend” reveals a relationship that defies the oblivion of embodiment (18). Case 
“remembered … the meat, the flesh the cowboys mocked. It was a vast thing, beyond 
knowing, a sea of information coded in spiral and pheromone, infinite intricacy that 
only the body, in its strong blind way, could ever read” (239). It is sentences like 
these that epitomize Gibson’s literary style. By means of a coalescence of technical, 
medical, and imaginary language Gibson manages to capture the lived experience of 
embodiment as well as convey an appreciation of the body. It is not the matrix that 
represents the pinnacle of information, the source of infinite intricacy, but it is the 
body that is valued in its vastness, its unreadable and infinite coding, and its 
unknowable potential. In contrast to the alleged repression and devaluation of the 
body in cyberpunk, the above figurations highlight Gibson’s interest in the body, its 
modalities and the acknowledgment of “a certain visceral appeal” (Count Zero 133). 
 
 
4.1.3 The Body is a Machine 
 
Given this interest in embodiment, Gibson explores the mechanical notions of the 
body even more dramatically in the successive novels. In Count Zero, Gibson draws 
the picture of Turner, a soldier and “specialist in the extraction of top executives and 
research people,” who is hired to facilitate the enticement of a high-profile biochip 
developer, Christopher Mitchell (5). However, the mission is not completed as 
planned, since Mitchell himself is not on the rescue plane but instead his daughter and 
company kid Angela (Angie) Mitchell. Turner’s team is attacked and Christopher 
Mitchell dies. One strand of the narrative follows Turner who, as we are told in a 
flashback, fell victim to a bomb explosion and was torn to pieces on his last mission 
in India: 
 
Because he had a good agent, he had a good contract. Because he had a good 
contract, he was in Singapore an hour after the explosion. Most of him, 
anyway. The Dutch surgeon liked to joke about that, how an unspecified 
percentage of Turner hadn’t made it out of Palam International on that first 
flight and had to spend the night there in a shed, in a support vat. It took the 
Dutchman and his team three months to put Turner together again. They 
cloned a square meter of skin for him, grew it on slabs of collagen and shark-
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cartilage polysaccharides. They bought eyes and genitals on the open market. 
The eyes were green (1). 
 
Since cloning and the availability of organs from the open market are presented as 
common cultural practice, the limiting factors are, by implication, money and time 
and not the feasibility of restoration as such. Such representation is undergirded by 
the metaphor of the body as a machine. That is, the body as a collection of working 
(and nonworking) parts that can be individually exchanged without affecting the 
person’s subjectivity. Turner is first recycled in a clinic and then reactivated for 
another mission by his employer—both activities reverberate in his name.  
In the case of Angela Mitchell, technology invades the body when she 
receives an implant that guarantees a permanent connection with cyberspace, a 
channel that is open both ways. She can access cyberspace and individuals who are 
jacked in, and the AIs pervading the matrix can access and guide Angie. Her 
extraordinary body is thus partly material and partly virtual. Upon the realization 
thereof, she verbalizes the feeling of having several lives, and “no hope for 
wholeness, ever” (Mona Lisa Overdrive 2). The mechanical undercurrent in the 
description of her embodiment becomes even more apparent in Angie’s regular 
check-up, which is tellingly not performed by a doctor but a technician. The narrator 
declares, Piper Hill was the “best troubleshooter” (97). Just like a machine, Angie’s 
sensory organs are calibrated for optimal adaptation. While Angie “did as she was 
told, running the tips of her fingers lightly across the raw silk and unbleached linen of 
the rumpled bedspread,” Piper adjusted her perception, so that “Angie felt the weave 
thicken beneath her fingertips” until “[s]he could distinguish the individual fibers 
…know silk from linen” (96). Only after “[h]er nerves screamed as her flayed 
fingertips grated against steel wool, ground glass” the optimal setup was announced. 
One after the other the tactile, olfactory, and gustatory senses are tested until they are 
“up” (96, 97). 
 In line with the “the body is a machine” metaphor, after the surgery is 
completed, Turner is released with the words: “You can go home now, Turner. We’re 
done with you. You are good as new” (Count Zero 2). Literalizing the potential of 
dismembering the body and the replaceability of its individual units in a mechanical 
fashion, the novel carries this concept to the extremes and starts off with the re-
assemblage of its protagonist. Yet, on an interpersonal rather than functional level, 
Gibson leaves room for doubt. On their first encounter after the medical procedure, 
Turner’s brother Rudy observes: “You look different … The same, but different … 
You get a face job or something?” (169). At this point the narrative can be read as 
subverting the machine logic of (re)producing identical copies in that any 
reconstruction cannot but bring about something or somebody new.  
In addition to being reassembled almost from scratch, Turner is not only 
“good as new” but effectively better. He received “[b]ehind his left ear a socket to 
plug things in” (3). This additive feature allows him, with the appropriate software, to 
upload new abilities instantaneously, be it language or technical skills. The narrator 
informs that, “Turner extracted the dustplug from the socket behind his ear and 
inserted a silver of microsoft. The structure of Spanish settled through him like a 
tower of glass, invisible gates hinged on present and future, conditional, preterite 
perfect” (7). At this point, Gibson takes the cultural negotiation of corporeal 
extensions beyond the level of mere reflection. Sites of disability become sites of self-
optimizing processes. Turner’s neurologically interlinked socket serves his profession 
by providing him with additional abilities through the insertion of the respective 
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microchips. As in Western societies, the social and economic forces that drive the 
technological restoration of the body in the futuristic world of Gibson also lead to its 
enhancement. Thus, Gibson’s corporeal extensions in the form of add-on prosthetic 
devices serve at least three functions. First, the satisfaction of a desire for the 
invariably feasible “cultural return to the land of the normative” is realized (Mitchell 
and Snyder, Narrative Prosthesis 8). Second, the promise of previously unimaginable 
degrees of restoration asserts the ultimate prevention from the expulsion into the 
“defective class.” Third, the site of disability is transformed into a site of 
enhancement.   
There are numerous minor characters that also use prosthetic profession-
enhancing techniques. An actress, depicted in Count Zero, exchanges her eyes for a 
pair of augmented ones, suiting her profession and raising her market value: “She was 
both actress and camera, her eyes worth several million New Yen” (116).88 In Mona 
Lisa Overdrive, we read that Mona, a sixteen-year old illiterate addict and prostitute 
goes through plastic surgery to look like simstim star Angie (144, 173, 174). The 
character of Danielle carries a “subdermal switch” for her implanted “recording gear” 
(186)—a useful enhancement for an interviewer. These forms of prostheses or 
modifications can be read as operating in service of neo-capitalist forces, rather than 
statistical averages causing a profound commodification of the body and a 
subjugation to normalizing power relations. 
In her book Körper 2.0, Harrasser observes similar tendencies with regard to 
bio-medical technologies. In her discussion of the 2012 Paralympic Games, she 
illustrates how the cultural forces of productivity motivate strategies of self-discipline, 
self-conquest, and self-mastery. These tendencies have various effects on the 
construction of the “disabled-bodied” and increase the pressure on self-enhancement. 
As in the case of Oscar Pistorius and Aimee Mullins, amputation may be preferred to 
deformity because it qualifies as distinctly beneficial for technical improvement (18). 
Especially in the case of the athletes’ “Flex-Foot Cheetah legs,” hooked up to their 
knee joints, prostheses can offer an entry point into the corporeal system of 
interlocking units. This logic, however, bridges from the deficient disabled to the 
enhanced super-abled body without any in-between states prompting Harrasser to fill 
the gap with a new term. She counters the augmentative techniques prominent in 
contemporary neoliberal bio-techno-politics with the concept of the “parahuman” 
which explicitly incorporates the idea of extended embodiment. 
The trajectory of prosthetic extension, from repair to rehabilitation and finally 
to self-mastery, results in self-optimizing processes that no longer rely on specific 
entry points of dysfunction but, in acknowledgement of an inherently fragmented 
body allow for the conquering of any possible part. Case’s counterpart and iconic 
female heroine in Neuromancer, Molly Millions, is a “street samurai” hired by an AI 
named Wintermute to protect and support Case in accomplishing his mission 
(Neuromancer 30). Molly, however, is not a regular street warrior, but instead 
exhibits several corporeal enhancing prostheses. For example, “she held out her 
hands, palms up, the white fingers slightly spread, and with a barely audible click, ten 
double-edged, four-centimeter scalpel blades slid from their housings beneath the 
burgundy nails” (25). Apart from her technologized catwoman-like weapons, Molly is 
equipped with “lenses [of] empty quicksilver” which provide “a readout chipped into 
[her] optic nerve” (30, 32). In order to pay for the implemented techno-gear, Molly is 																																																								
88 Besides in the figuration of Molly Millions and her mirrorshades, Gibson’s interest in eyes and the 
visual is played out in the short story “Burning Chrome” which features various ocular implants, such 
as “Sendai eyes” or “Zeiss Ikon eyes.” 
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in constant need for money. A “cut-out chip” that disconnects consciousness from 
physical experience facilitates her part-time work as a “meat puppet” (147). Molly 
opts for prostitution until the market value of her enhanced warrior self alone is 
sufficient to sustain a living. Molly’s prostheses are not material surrogates that 
compensate for an incapacity or failure in embodiment but augment her body, 
actualizing an improved self. No longer do her prostheses provide the material means 
through which she looks and behaves like a normal, able-bodied workingwoman. 
Instead, they are proof of power, self-conquest, and self-mastery—three 
characteristics that according to Harrasser, mark the commodified prosthetic body 
(“Superhumans-Parahumans” 1).  
This development calls for an updated definition of “prosthesis.” According to 
Margrit Shildrick, a prominent contemporary scholar in the field of disability studies, 
the zeitgeist of prosthetics has long changed: “where in conventional usage the term 
prosthesis has intended some material object that compensated for a perceived lack or 
failure in embodiment, the emphasis now has turned to enhancement and 
supplement.” (“Border Crossings” 138). Kirby Farrell advocates the broadening of the 
term prosthesis to denote that “prosthetic extensions … enable us to overcome our 
physical limits” (Post-Traumatic 175). When pondering cheetah legs and wheelchairs, 
glasses and seeing-eye dogs, life support systems und nurses, one faces the blurring 
boundaries of the traditional definition of “prosthesis”. Reflections on prosthetics 
splinter into diverging fields of substitution, repair, normalization, extension, 
enhancement, and self-mastery prompting us to reconsider the relation between man 
and machine:  
 
In changing our bodies to accommodate the use of machines, we change 
ourselves. In order to use a tool successfully, humans must incorporate that 
tool into their body image. Even without the physical invasiveness of ‘socket’ 
technology, our tools – our machines – become extensions of ourselves: ‘The 
writer would be unable to type, the musician unable to perform, without the 
word processor or musical instrument becoming part of the body image. It is 
only insofar as the object ceases to remain an object and becomes a medium, a 
vehicle for impressions and expression, that it can be used as in instrument or 
tool (Grosz cited in Vint, Bodies 119).  
 
While the first definition conceives of the prosthesis as a surrogate object meant to 
meet normative cultural requirements of appearance and functionality, the direction 
Grosz is pointing to foregrounds the prosthesis as a tool mediating via impression and 
expression between the human and its environment. This modified conception 
recognizes prostheses as extensions of the sensory system, and translocates the 
boundaries of the human further into the milieu. However, as the milieu enters the 
human to the same extent, their borderline begins to blur. Ratz’s prosthetic hand 
becomes an external organ. Coded digital knowledge can be inserted into Tuner’s 
head. A layer of quicksilver covering Molly’s eyes translates information back and 
forth. What kind of a world is it that Ratz perceives through the impressions and 
expressions of pink rubber plastic, that Turner is able to articulate after the insertion 
of a language chip, and that Molly experiences via symbolic readout? These are 
extraordinary perceptions, extraordinary modes to access and interconnect with the 
world.  
The Sprawl trilogy, as much as Gibson’s other works, reflects corporeal 
extraordinariness in language. Experience is presented as inherently informed by 
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technological media as already underlined by the opening sentence of Neuromancer. 
“The sky above the port was the color of television, tuned to a dead channel” reveals 
the inversion of the relation between human perception and technological media (3). 
The narrator’s perception of the sky operates within the scaffolding of televisual 
media. The sky above the port is not gray but it is instead perceived through the 
color’s digital, televisual version. On that basis, the notion of “port” needs to be 
recognized in its polysemy of “haven” and its techno-related version of a “portal” to 
access the matrix. A similar logic underpins Turner’s observation that, “Conroy’s 
voice was flat and uninflected, as though he’d modeled it after a cheap voice chip” 
(Count Zero 10). The expectation that technology “comes second,” that it is modeled 
on the basis of (human) nature is turned on its head. Kenneth Burke argues in 
Language as a Symbolic Action (1966) that, “the computer can’t serve as our model” 
because “it is not an animal, but an artifact” (63). But, Evelyn Fox Keller observes in 
1995 that, “it is the computer that dominates our imagination” (118). From the 1960s 
to the 1990s, there must have been a shift in the ways humans conceptualized human 
nature, in the terms and pre-conditions that were available to think about oneself. That 
change was the pervasive spreading of computer technology, moving from military 
facilities and offices, to homes, cars, and supermarkets. A fundamental change that 
Gibson foresaw, and maybe even spurred by means of his fiction. Paying attention to 
Gibson’s use of language, including his frequent creation of neologisms, is significant 
because human beings are rhetorical beings.89 Metaphor “is not just a matter of 
language,” as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson famously claim, but instead “human 
thought processes are largely metaphorical” (6). Rhetoric not only constructs and 
constrains our thought, and thus our reality, but it is also a means of persuasion. Segal 
explains this notion in Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine: 
 
Persuasion is a central element in many medical situations. Patients may have 
to persuade physicians that they are ill and in need of care; physicians seek to 
persuade patients to adhere to courses of treatment; experts persuade the 
public to count some states and behaviors as pathological and others not; 
pharmaceutical companies persuade consumers to request their products, and 
physicians to prescribe them. Moreover, the very terms in which persuasion 
takes place in health and medicine themselves condition outcomes (1-2, 
emphasis added).  
 
In this way, “[m]etaphor is a means, then, by which thought is structured and a means 
by which debate is, to some extent, determined” (119). By focusing closely on the 
language and rhetoric in which we talk, write, and think about the body we may 
realize the inherent power of these words. As a strategy of influence, the metaphors 
operative in medicine are usually below our radar. As long as the metaphorical and 
value-laden nature of bio-medical terminology remains hidden, it exerts the most 
power. On the topic of biomedicine, Laurence J. Kirmayer commented that, “[w]hen 
values are explicit, they may be openly debated but rhetoric uses metaphor to smuggle 
values into discourse that proclaims itself relational, even-handed and value-free” 
(57). Contrary to an understanding of scientific terminologies as neutral, there are 
“resident values in the most innocent-seeming locutions” (Segal 118). Pointedly Segal 
alerts us that, “the terms of a discourse constrain not only the outcomes of debate but 																																																								
89 See Jacques Derrida’s Monolingualism of the Other (1998), and Derridian scholar David Wills, 
Prosthesis (1995).	
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also what it is possible to argue at all” (116). One of the three primary metaphors 
effective in bio-medical theory is the body is a machine,90 which derives from a 
mechanical model of medicine. There is a prevalence of mechanical self-descriptions, 
such as “run-down,” or “worn-out” (121). And many diagnostic systems are based 
“on the assumption that parts ought to work for the life of the machine” (121). 
In addition to the inherent the body is a machine metaphor, the figuration of 
Angela Mitchell in Count Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive displays narrative strategies 
akin to those present in contemporary medical discourse. Explaining her physical 
condition, Angie narrates how she was told that as a child she was “sick,” that she 
was not “smart enough” (Count Zero 198). At one point an employee of hers is 
interviewed about her “congenital defect”—a question that is intended as a 
devaluating attack (Mona Lisa Overdrive 186). These diagnoses lay the groundwork 
for surgical interventions that in Angie’s case neither had she given her consent to nor 
had she voiced any suffering or pain in the first place that may have called for such 
procedure. Her father implanted “things in her brain” that were supposed to make her 
smarter, but this invasive technology actually links her permanently to cyberspace 
(198, 256). Later we learn that Mitchell struck a deal with an AI, trading virtual 
access to his daughter for information on new technologies. Within the narrative, the 
alleged failure to meet the physical and psychological norm is used as a strategy to 
legitimize the modification of the child’s body. This strategy of legitimation is 
common in the growing industry of “health services.” Similar to Mitchell and 
Snyder’s criticism of the body’s status under neoliberalism (2015), Segal’s analysis of 
the rhetoric of medicine lead her to the observation that,  
 
More and more, our identities are health identities. We think of ourselves as 
healthy or not, able-bodied or not—but also as fit or not, vegetarian or not, 
sexually “safe” or not, menopausal/andropausal or not. Some of us think of 
ourselves as cosmetically repaired and surgically altered or not. As we age, 
our hair (which is thinning), our teeth (which are yellowing), our bones (which 
are brittling), our eyes (which are failing) and our skin (which is wrinkling) 
are all sites of medical intervention, product promotion, and public 
information (20). 
 
Without any explicit reference to disability studies issues, Segal’s lines of 
argumentation time and again coincide with concerns brought forth regularly by 
disability studies scholars. For instance, when she quotes Robert G. Evans and 
Gregory L. Stoddart on the question of what determines health. Evans and Stoddart 
underscore the variety of “determinants of health” including social class, housing, 
income, education, and exposure to environmental agents. In an unknowingly 
disability activist voice, such position points straight to the social factors involved 
with health and disability and emphasizes their relevance rather than solely examining 
and pathologizing individual conditions. While such observations are articulated 
again and again in research, “health (care) policy takes almost no account of such 
elements” (123). Instead, health (care) policy is, “acutely sensitive to even the 
possibility that some new drug or piece of equipment or diagnostic procedure may 
contribute to health” (123). Evans and Stoddart argue for “a somewhat more complex 
framework” for health (care) policy, that takes accounts of a wider range of 
relationships among determinants of health (1349).  																																																								
90 According to Segal, the others primary metaphors are medicine is war and medicine is a business. 
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 Gibson’s literary style aims at what he refers to as “cognitive dissonance”—a 
characteristic that falls in line with the key characteristics of science fiction, which is, 
as Darko Suvin states in 1979, the genre of cognitive estrangement (Metamorphoses 
of Science Fiction). By means of various literary strategies reaching from microscale 
neologisms to de- and re- contextualization of terms, and the macroscale combination 
of specialized discourse with everyday language or slang. Thus, Gibson 
defamiliarizes the reader with what they know or what they assumed to know. In this 
way, Gibson’s descriptions of extraordinary bodies destabilize common categories of 
the human body, and challenge dualistic registers of living and dead, natural and 
artificial, human and nonhuman, whole and fragmented, healthy and disabled, and 
their hierarchal order. Furthermore, over the course of his trilogies the acuteness 
towards the embeddedness of characters in relationships that determine their states of 
health, disability, and the overall extraordinariness of their bodies increases.  
 
 
4.1.4 Cyberstatic Bodies 
 
Approaching the question of how Gibson’s depictions of the relation between the tool 
and the body, and the shifting boundaries of the human can be understood, I suggest 
that instead of relying on a truly cybernetic logic, they can be conceived of as what I 
call cyberstatic. “Where does the self stop and the tool begin? If a house or a piece of 
clothing functions as a shell, where does the self stop and the environment begin?,” 
Farrell asks (Post-Traumatic 176). This conceptual expansion of the term transfers 
prosthetics from the limited site of “the disabled” to that of any human being. In 1929 
Freud announced that, “[m]an has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God” (38-
39). With reference to man’s tool making abilities, Freud continues: 
 
When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those 
organs have not grown on to him and they still give him much trouble at times 
… Future ages will bring with them new and possibly unimaginably great 
advances in this field of civilization and will increase man’s likeness to God 
still more (39). 
 
Setting the tone between prophecy and metaphor, Freud invokes the superhuman as 
well as the cyborg. Echoing Freud, Farrell holds: 
 
We are virtuoso toolmakers, continually expanding ourselves through 
prosthetic engagement with the world. Although the word prosthetic usually 
signifies an artificial replacement for a missing or defective body part, I use 
the term to emphasize the ways tools and relationships make up for our 
creaturely limitations (Post-Traumatic 175). 
 
The expansion of the term in line with Farrell proves fertile regarding the abundance 
and diversity of an organism’s interdependence and interlinkage with a milieu 
consisting of human and non-human actors—a notion that will be particularly relevant 
for chapter 4.3 of this book. Farrell adds another layer to the notion of prosthetic 
relationships which he also sees between mother and child, servant and master. In 
stating that, “[p]rosthetic relations … can also be symbiotic and are grounded in 
biology and the basic operations of culture,” Farrell pushes the conception of 
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prosthesis to its limit (175). In its fundamentality, his notion of the prosthetic nature 
of relationships brings to mind Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s concept of 
the structural coupling. In 1973, the two Chilean biologists formulate the first 
definition of autopoietic systems on the basis of living cells which they characterize 
has having inherent qualities of self-organization and self-maintenance. The 
autopoietic system is connected to its environment through mutual influence, and is fit 
to establish couplings of more intense and conditional nature with the milieu. 
Therefore, according to Maturana and Varela, the system does not further differentiate 
its environment. With Maturana and Varela in mind, Farrell’s push of “prosthesis” to 
almost any kind of relationship (biological, cultural, familial etc.) is not a stretch—
given the relationship is in some way conditional for the system.  
Defined as a “cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a 
creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction,” Donna Haraway’s cyborg 
appears to suit the new techno-realities and has become one of the conceptual 
emblems of cyberpunk fiction (“The Manifesto for Cyborgs” 7). Ultimately 
dissolving the boundaries between the human, the animal, and the machine and 
underscoring its constructed nature, Haraway claims that “[b]y the late twentieth 
century… we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and 
organism” (8). Hence, not only “contemporary science fiction is full of cyborgs—
creatures simultaneously animal and machine, who populate worlds ambiguously 
natural and crafted” but “we are [all] cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology” (8). Thus, 
on the basis of the many other scattered, individual, and cracked notions of the cyborg 
in the discourse, Haraway is the first to put forward an explicit formulation of a long 
overdue concept. Her “argument for the cyborg as a fictional mapping our social and 
bodily reality and as an imaginative resource suggesting some very fruitful couplings” 
indeed, suggests new perspectives on human reality (8). “[A] cyborg world might be 
about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint 
kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and 
contradictory standpoints” (13). Parallel to Gibson’s fictional accounts, Haraway’s 
theoretical trajectory is interested in the boundary breakdowns between animal, 
machine, and the (non-)physical environment in terms of which the human is usually 
defined. She thereby “suggest[s] a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have 
explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves” (39). It is only on the basis of “The 
Manifesto for Cyborgs” that Molly becomes readable as a cyborg. For instance, 
Palmer recognizes Molly as being “stylishly at ease with her being a cyborg” (228). 
Additionally, Hayes claims that Molly’s technological “modifications transform her 
into a dexterous cyborg warrior” (2). Despite Haraway’s observation that already in 
1985 “science fiction is full of cyborgs,” her pivotal essay continues to stir ever new 
depictions of posthuman nature (8).  
In contrast to Haraway’s cyborg, the concept of the posthuman is even less 
contoured. For example, Badmington asserts at the end of his contribution to The 
Routledge Companion to Literature and Science: “There is, in conclusion, no 
convenient consensus when it comes to questions of posthumanism” (381). 
Countering humanist paradigms of the autonomous human being as the “hegemonic 
measure of all things,” posthumanism no longer locates the human at the center and it 
disrupts firm and fierce distinctions “from animals, machines, and other forms of the 
‘inhuman’” (374). The notion that,  
 
the human being occupies a natural and eternal place at the very center of 
things, where it is distinguished absolutely from machines, animals, and other 
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inhuman entities; where it shares with all other human beings a unique 
essence; where it is the origin of meaning and the sovereign subject of history; 
and where it behaves and believes according to something called ‘human 
nature’ (374) 
 
leaves an outdated aftertaste. Due to a “theoretical and practical inadequacy – or even 
impossibility,” humanism is disqualified as a “myth” and gives rise to its counter 
movement (374, 378). In order to grasp Gibson’s innovative prose, figurations like the 
cyborg as well as the posthuman are indispensable, though not without pitfalls. As 
Haraway points out, owing to simplistic reductions of her conceptions, she has now 
abandoned the figure of the cyborg and devotes herself to animal studies. She states: 
“[s]till, human/posthuman is much too easily appropriated by the blissed-out ‘Let’s all 
be posthumanists and find our next teleological evolutionary stage in some kind of 
transhumanist technoenhancement’” (379). Owing to an often overt application of 
technological devices, “disabled” bodies have often been cross-referenced with 
Haraway’s cyborg; a concept seductive to disability studies. A cyborg world, in 
Haraway’s terms, is not (only) a world of humans depending on pacemakers and 
hearing aids but rather a world of carbon, bacteria, bicycles and alarm clocks 
interacting in feedback loops, and correspondingly constituting cybernetic 
organisms.91 In this sense Molly Millions, no more than any other character, qualifies 
as a cyborg, and yet she has been the character most frequently associated with the 
concept.  
That said, my notion of cyberstatic aims to highlight a lack in focus in 
Gibson’s descriptions of bodies with respect to the nature of the coupling between 
organism and machine, how exactly control and communication are distributed 
between the two parties, what kinds of feedback occur, how the mutually formative 
powers of the agents operate. Only when figurations base on the specific nature of 
such interactions in some way, a conceptualization as cybernetic appears appropriate. 
Although the milieu of cyberculture suggests feedback loops and cybernetic self-
regulation, there is as of yet little of the dynamism characteristic of cybernetics in the 
rigid organization of prosthetic bodies such as in Ratz or Molly. Despite the fact that 
bodies in the Sprawl trilogy display intimate relationships with (cyber)technology and 
descriptions of bodies hinge on machine terminology, descriptions clearly focus on 
individual states, rather than interactions. Exploring the boundaries of the human and 
the interaction with prosthetics, Gibson’s figurations of extraordinary bodies build on 
a mechanical and bio-medical understanding of the human while leaving room for 
criticism of precisely that. In comparison to his later novels, Gibson pays little 
attention to the minute processes and interactions on both an individually corporeal 
and ecologically social level in the Sprawl trilogy.  
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
91 Yet, Disability Studies scholar Tobin Siebers remains very skeptical of the emancipatory potential of 
Donna Haraway’s cyborg with respect to people with disabilities: “Prostheses always increase the 
cyborg’s abilities; they are a source only of new powers, never of problems. The cyborg is always more 
than human – and never risks to be seen as subhuman. To put it simply, the cyborg is not disabled.” 
(Disability Theory 63) 
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4.1.5 Disability as Punishment 
 
At the outset of the novel, Case is presented at the low-point of his existence. As a 
highly talented hacker he lives in a tiny apartment in Chiba City located somewhere 
in the Sprawl, he frequents underground bars, and appears more like a petty criminal 
than a successful freelancer. The initial conflict of the novel arises when Case 
commits data theft and thus betrays his employer. His misbehavior is described as 
“the classic mistake” and met by a drastic consequence (5). Case is “[s]trapped to a 
bed in a Memphis hotel,” where “his nervous system [is damaged] with a wartime 
Russian mycotoxin” and “his talent burn[s] out micron by micron” (6). The narrator 
concludes that, “[t]he damage was minute, subtle and utterly effective” in physically 
disabling Case to access cyberspace ever again (6). In the milieu of the Sprawl, the 
deprivation of the ability to jack in meant “the Fall” for the netrunner “who’d lived 
for the bodiless exultation of cyberspace” (6). Paradoxically, this bodiless bliss is 
expressed in corporeal terms, namely in a constant physical adrenaline high. The 
actual bodily harm done is twofold. On the one hand, Case is no longer able to savor 
the corporeal high, and on the other hand, he can no longer pursue his job as a 
netrunner. The severed relation that impedes Case’s access to the matrix is between 
his nervous system and his deck. The deck serves as a prosthetic tool to overcome 
physical limits and extend one’s embodied subjectivity into cyberspace. Without the 
capacity to access this mediating tool, however, Case cannot maintain his habitual 
experience of the world. This results in an impending disintegration of his entire 
system.92 Case is described as “coming apart at the seams” and his limbs feel “cold 
and disconnected” (29, 68). His condition indicates the preliminary stage of his 
passive suicide attempt when Case tries “to con the street into killing [him] when [he 
is] not looking” (28). All there is left of Case is apparently a shallow container which, 
according to the societal value system, does not appear worth living. In the universe 
of the Sprawl, enveloped in the “constant subliminal hum” of business, “death [was] 
the accepted punishment for laziness, carelessness, lack of grace, the failure to heed 
the demands of an intricate protocol” (6, 7). On the basis of his vulnerable condition, 
Case is blackmailed into performing a particularly challenging hack by cunning 
Wintermute who promises to restore Case’s nervous system in turn. Thereby, Case 
becomes the nodal point in an elaborate plot that culminates in the cosmic merging of 
two powerful disembodied artificial intelligences. 
The literary strategy of depicting disability as a form of punishment and using 
it as a metaphor for doubtful morals is also used in the characterization of Slick Henry 
from Mona Lisa Overdrive. Slick is penalized for car theft by a procedure referred to 
as ‘Korsakov’s’93  conducted in the “Chemo-penal unit” of prison (137). As a 
punishment for his ethically corrupt behavior, Slick is neurologically impaired in a 
way that keeps his short-term memory fading. Stress becomes a trigger for the 
syndrome’s characteristic blackouts. The long-term memory is, however, unaffected 
by these episodes of short-term time loss which put Slick in a state of fear and 
confusion. After his imprisonment, Slick becomes an artist, lives reclusively in a 																																																								
92 This is typical trope typical of the cyberpunk genre; it is depicted “literally, in the persons of 
characters who undergo some kind of literal disintegrative experience” (McHale “Towards” 14). 
93 	The Korsakov’s syndrome actually exists under a slightly different spelling. Referred to as either 
Korsakoff’s syndrome or Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome, it describes a form of dementia, which can be 
observed during the last stages of severe chronic alcoholism. The syndrome entails the loss of memory 
for recent events while long-term memory stays intact. See Nelson Butters and Laird S. Cermak, 
Alcoholic Korsakoff’s Syndrome: An Information-Processing Approach to Amnesia (1980). 
 102 
place named after Andy Warhol’s studio “The Factory,” and builds large robotic 
sculptures.94 In the course of the novel, he is hired to provide a hideout for Bobby 
Newmark (alias Count Zero) who is permanently “hooked up to pumps, and bags and 
tubes and some kind of simstim rig” and needs to be safely stored (13).  
In line with the general observation made by literary disability studies 
scholars, that disability is often represented negatively, the depiction of Case, more 
than of Slick proves devastating. The description of the netrunner’s incapacitation as 
his “Fall” not only indicates economic effects but evokes Biblical registers. The 
betrayal of his employer is presented as Case’s original sin. Due to this disobedience, 
not to God but to capitalist conduct, Case becomes morally corrupted (i.e. he starts 
working as a hired killer). As a consequence, Case is expelled from the “Garden of 
the Able-Bodied” and his disability is presented as a punishment and an indicator of 
his culpability. In a mode of the technoromantic grotesque, Gibson portrays a 
psychodrama of sin, guilt, and redemption. While both figurations frame disability as 
a result of punishment, the major difference between them—already indicating a shift 
in Gibson’s work—is that Case’s disability drives the story in the form that the entire 
narrative revolves around his attempt to make up for his fault and the pursuit of the 
restoration of his ability to access cyberspace again. In the end, Case seems to 
succeed. As reward for his successful Straylight run, his nervous system is restored. 
By “overcoming” his disability, he not only is able to jack in again but may 
approximate a cultural ideal of success. As the narrator explains, “[Case] spent the 
bulk of his Swiss account on a new pancreas and liver, the rest on a new Ono-Sendai 
[a deck] and a ticket back to the Sprawl. He found work. He found a girl who called 
herself Michael” (270). While this resolution suggests a convergence with the 
normalistic ideal at first glance, Gibson’s ending of Neuromancer is not without irony 
in the spontaneous enumeration of physical and social achievements. Finally, the 
resolution turns askew, and indeed ambiguous, when Case encounters a projection of 
himself next to his ex-lover Linda in cyberspace. This moment raises questions 
regarding the possibility of reaching any conclusive resolution of the body-mind 
dualism. 
 Instead of decisively perpetuating normalistic structures as Davis suggests 
happens in traditional novels, these two figurations seem to mock the normalistic 
imperative. Drawing on the close Socratic link between a healthy body and intact 
morals,95 disability follows moral misbehavior in Gibson’s figurations, which thereby 
taps into a long history of conceptualization of the “unfit” and “undesirables.” 
However, in view of Gibson’s overall work this link is already relegated to the 
background in Count Zero, and completely abandoned in the following trilogies. 
Gibson’s foregrounding of extraordinary characters resonates with what 
Mitchell and Snyder identify to be the employment of disability as “narrative 
prosthesis.” Examining classical and contemporary works of literature and film, 
Mitchell and Snyder identify the ubiquity of disability as a common narrative motif. 
They hold: 
 
Disability provides a common formula for differentiating a character’s 
uniqueness through the identifying features of physical and behavioral ‘quirks’ 
or idiosyncrasies. Yet, while disability often marks a protagonist’s difference 																																																								
94 The figure of Slick Henry as a reclusive artist who makes cybernetic / robotic sculptures has been 
read as a reference to Mark Pauline and his Survival Research Labs (Markley, Virtual Realities and 
Their Discontents 100).	
95 See footnote nine of this thesis. 
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and is the impetus to narrate a story in the first place, a complex disability 
subjectivity is not developed in the ensuing narrative (Narrative Prosthesis 
10). 
 
For example, in Sophocles’ tragedy Oedipus the King disability serves as a metaphor 
of Oedipus’ personal and social ruin which is, according to Mitchell and Snyder, 
grounded in materiality (10). At the same time, it is precisely the characters’ 
extraordinariness that often provides the reason for telling a story in the first place 
and, thus, disability itself serves as an enhancement of the narrative. As a result of this 
observation, the core function of disability in many narratives is that of a narrative 
prosthesis. A crucial insight the two scholars provide for the current discussion is that 
“representations of disability tend to reflect the medicalized view that restricts 
disability to a static impairment entombed within an individual” (19).   
The extraordinary bodies portrayed in Gibson’s fiction constitute another 
salient example of the construction of disability in contemporary literature. The 
Sprawl trilogy features characters that by means of a “quick repair” are allowed a 
supposedly renewed convergence with the cultural norm of corporeal integrity and 
functionality (Narrative Prosthesis 8). Gibson’s early fiction partly questions and 
partly endorses repair and self-optimization in order to facilitate the cultural return to 
the norm which reflects an underlying adherence to the bio-medical model of 
disability, is inclined to a mechanical notion of the human, and moreover reveals the 
characters’ subjection to neo-capitalist forces.  
What corresponds in many figurations of extraordinary embodiment, despite 
their different modalities of corporeal extension is their effect. Vint holds, 
“Molly…has had to modify her body in order to obtain employment in this extremely 
commodified world” (Bodies 108). Moreover, it is not a coincidence that Ratz pursues 
a profession as a bartender, where his prosthetic arm might circumvent muscular 
fatigue. Furthermore, Turner’s status as a specialist can only increase with the 
advantage of unlimited skill updates. Gibson portrays modifications that, with 
reference to Davis’ observation, “successful disabled people… have their disability 
erased by their success” all reveal the neo-capitalist logic of self-optimization 
(Enforcing Normalcy 9).  
 
 
4.1.6 Technoromanticism 
 
With respect to genre and the modes of representation in the Sprawl trilogy, Gibson 
draws on a repertoire of Romantic/Gothic tropes and symbolisms beyond the disabled 
body and translates them into the information age. Hackers like Case possess 
computer skills that are considered as mysterious arts in the way the Romantics 
thought of medieval alchemy or black arts; AIs inhabiting cyberspace are regarded as 
spooking voodoo gods; the setting involves ruins and the castles of dynasties in the 
form of abandoned spaceships; and we encounter the characters’ doubles or read how 
they confuse their bodies and faces with those of dolls and masks.  
 Different from utopian technoromantic tales of transcendence, Gibson’s 
technoromantic fiction actively complicates the role of the material body instead of 
celebrating its overcoming. According to Coyne, most digital narratives neglect the 
overall setting that allows a person’s navigation though cyberspace, namely their 
body’s entanglement in a “configuration of cables, satellites, transmitters, receivers, 
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computer processors, monitors, keyboards” (68). “Cyberspace narratives,” Coyne 
criticizes, “commonly speak of being immersed in a virtual world while making only 
in passing reference to the materiality of the computer, the ergonomic environment, 
the clumsiness of the headset, or the inertia of the dataglove” (68). Instead, “the body 
in front of the machine becomes subservient to the abstract system, the logic diagram, 
the utopian vision” (68). On the contrary, the Sprawl trilogy pays attention to the 
involved objects, and their limiting as much as enhancing relation to the body. The 
role of the body in relation to the attached computer is increasingly in focus over the 
course of Gibson’s novels arriving at a depiction of Flynne Fisher in The Peripheral 
which incorporates both the sensory experience of the material body and the 
experience of the virtual avatar by intertwining them. Flynne “Took the jerky out of 
her mouth, put it on the table. The bugs [i.e. drones in the game] were back … Her 
free hand found the Red Bull, popped it. She sipped” (14). Consider also: “Back 
around, the bugs were already bobbing, waiting. She flew through them, making them 
vanish. Tongued the cud of jerky away from her cheek and chewed. Scratched her 
nose. Smelled hand sanitizer. Went after bugs” (22). In anticipation of Gibson’s latest 
works, I underscore that the body’s materiality and particularly its sensorium come to 
play an increasingly significant role. 
• 
My discussion of Gibson’s Sprawl trilogy crystalizes how identity is fundamentally 
conditioned in one or another way on bodily extraordinariness foregrounding the 
significance of corporeal extension. While depictions of disability tend to follow the 
logic of the medical conception of prosthesis, which yields to the restoration and 
enhancement of the body, I have emphasized how Gibson examines the demarcation 
lines of the human body and complicates common notions of normality and humanity. 
As I have argued, characters offer resistance to the vision of overcoming their 
physiological apparatus instead of aiming for transcending it via new technologies.  
The narrative perspectives in the novels illuminate how the characters’ 
ascription of or self-identification with disability is far from clear, despite the fact that 
according to medical rubrics their physical, physiognomic, and psychological 
conditions are clearly non-normative. Thereby, if protagonism is at least to some 
degree propaganda, Gibson’s fiction offers an exploration into “disability 
subjectivity.” Thus, narratives question the normalistic complex, and provide a chance 
to reflect on the implications of common notions of disabled and non-disabled bodies 
and minds. In this way, Gibson’s fiction is compatible with a category of novels that 
Mitchell and Snyder’s classify as “antinormative novels of embodiment.”96 Gibson’s 
novels deviate from traditional literary formulas in many ways: be it that a supremely 
scarred and maimed character never turns out to be the villain of the story, that almost 
all main as well as side characters have some kind of abnormal corporeal feature, or 
that the narrative structure of most novels is non-linear with regard to time and place 
and alternates narrative voices. As the following chapters show, Gibson refashions 
this logic in resonance with cognate developments in disability studies. 
The wide-ranging criticism of the mechanical model of medicine and by 
extension of the (disabled) body, evokes the question of how else we might 
conceptualize the human body. In what other ways, terms, and pre-conditions could 
the human body be understood? How do we deal with the fact that historically grown 
social structures, practices and metaphors cannot always simply be exchanged for 
new ones? On the theoretical level, disability studies scholars have countered the 																																																								
96 See chapter three of Mitchell and Synder’s Biopolitics of Disability.	
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hegemony of normalcy by conceptualizations that account for the historical and socio-
political factors and power relations of modern Western societies. On the artistic 
level, depictions of disability are reevaluated while new representations by 
nondisabled, as well as disabled artists, begin to emerge.  
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4.2 The Body and Society: The Bridge Trilogy 
 
This chapter interrogates the shift from discrete to interrelated, from virtual to 
material, and from a rehabilitation of the body to a rehabilitation of mindset in the 
depictions of extraordinary embodiment within the Bridge trilogy and alongside the 
historic-political changes of the concept of disability of the 1990s in the U.S. and the 
U.K. This analysis of literary characters will be intersectional where the material 
demands it due to the problematic interlocking of identity categories. Thus, my 
analysis does not follow an anticategorical approach but instead takes the opportunity 
to reflect on disability in relation to race and gender. A staple characteristic of 
Gibson’s globalized universes is the irrelevance or liquidation of governmental 
structures and instead the rule of oligarch families, advertisement companies, fashion 
brands, and mafia groups. With this in mind, I offer a critique of the propositions and 
regulations of the legal system or the body politic particularly with regard to disability 
that is neither comprehensive nor conclusive. Moreover, this chapter focuses on the 
attitudinal barriers as part of social model criticism and implicit in the figures 
confronted with extraordinary bodies in the novels. Oftentimes too elusive or tacit to 
be grasped, ableist attitudes manifest in interpersonal interactions and are arrested in 
the literary form, allowing for a detailed examination of otherwise fleeting instants. 
 
 
4.2.1 Social Toxicity 
 
LA PURISSIMA 
 
As my discussion of the figuration of Zona Rosa illustrates, the Bridge trilogy 
initiates a shift in focus and overtness in negotiating the extraordinary body. 
Cyberspace offers the potential to be somebody else, which in turn reveals the inner 
struggles characters have in their lives offline. Focusing heavily on the figure of 
Mercedes Purissima (who is mostly referred to by her avatar name Zona Rosa), a 
Mexican girl whose disability is revealed at the end of the novel, shows how these 
inner struggles are related to the characters’ own extraordinary embodiment as much 
as to their social environment.  
 Mercedes Purissima and her friend Chia are members of a virtual clique of 
teenage girls who share the same taste in music and engage in their fandom as 
members of the online fan club of their favorite band Lo/Rez. Nonetheless, Zona Rosa 
is an outsider figure due to her rough, aggressive attitude, her constant threat of force, 
and her slang vocabulary. In conversations about their real lives, Zona Rosa prides 
herself on being “the leader of a knife-packing chilanga girl gang. Not the meanest in 
Mexico City, maybe, but serious enough about turf and tribute” (12). Explaining to 
her friends that they, “would not last an hour, in [her] world,” Zona frequently 
stresses her difficult living condition (110). In order to get some quiet and (at least) 
virtually away from the perilous milieu of Mexico City, Zona Rosa squats at an 
abandoned website which she transforms into her very own personal space.97  
																																																								
97  Conceiving the avatar name “Zona Rosa” in this context as a reference to Mexico City’s 
neighborhood of the same name produces dissonance between the girl’s secret unpopulated place and 
the real vibrant neighborhood that is busy with tourists, and known for its diverse communities, 
nightlife, and street culture. 
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Only in the denouement does Chia learn from another character about Zona 
Rosa’s actual identity. When in the course of events Chia’s life is threatened, Zona 
Rosa reveals her virtual identity and her secret website. This results in a sacrifice of 
both her avatar, as well as her secret hideaway in order to save her best friend’s life. 
As a character explains to Chia, “she had exposed her presence in her website. The 
original owners became aware of her. She abandoned her site. They pursued her. She 
was forced to discard her persona” (285). This final demystification of Zona Rosa’s 
offline character entails the revelation of her as the “victim of an environmental 
syndrome” that caused severe deformations (285). The exact environmental causes 
and the nature of the deformities remain unclear. Chia is told that due to her physical 
disability, her friend has lived for the past five years in complete denial of her 
physical self. Hooked to a deck, cyberspace is depicted as the last resort to escape her 
intolerable corporeality. Cyberspace becomes her prosthesis and provides a substitute 
for her perceived physical deficiency. With this in mind, the violence and sensitivity 
towards the topic of physicality in some of Zona Rosa’s previous statements comes 
into a different light.  
 
‘We must attack,’ said Zona Rosa, punctuating it with a quick shift to Aztec 
death’s-head mode.” … Passivity is death … ‘You,’ said Gomi Boy to Zona 
Rosa, ‘are in Mexico City. You are not physically or legally endangered by 
any of this!’ ‘Physically?’ said Zona Rosa, snapping back into a furious 
version of her pervious presentation. ‘You want physically, son of a bitch? I’ll 
fucking kill you, physically! You think I can’t do that?’ … The saw-toothed, 
dragon handled switchblade was out now, quivering, in front of Gomi Boy’s 
face (219). 
 
Such revelation of a disabled figure falls into a common formula for the depiction of 
disability in narratives. In a first single-axial observation, Zona’s story appears as a 
tragic biography structured along the lines of passivity, shame, exclusion, isolation, 
and finally compensation through a virtual prosthesis. The attribution of an existence 
not worth living meets the redeeming promise of new technologies. The avatar 
becomes the prosthetic substitute for the real deficient body. Moreover, this common 
strategy includes the fact that the disabled support character saves the life of the 
normal protagonist or facilitates some kind of realization or progress in their 
development. Narrative strategies of this sort are well known in literary disability 
studies and extensively discussed in the work of, for instance, Garland-Thomson, 
Mitchell and Snyder, or Cheyne. 
 When considered from a perspective immanent to Gibson’s work, the 
depiction of Mercedes Purissima’s extraordinary body can be read as a counterpart to 
Case—the protagonist of Neuromancer. The descriptions of their respective 
extraordinary bodies strongly rely on a religious theological register, which in the 
case of Mercedes Purissima begins with her name. In Spanish, “Mercedes” is the 
equivalent of “Maria.” Furthermore, the middle name “Purissima,” despite denoting 
the superlative of “pure,” is most commonly used to refer to the Virgin Mary: La 
Purísima. Zona Rosa’s actual name thus connotes the Catholic female figure known 
for immaculate conception, or conception free from sin. By revealing Zona Rosa at 
the very end of the novel as the unblemished Mercedes Purissima who suffers from 
severe physical disabilities, Gibson (unlike in his depiction of Case), does not 
attribute the character’s physical condition to sin or misbehavior. On the contrary, the 
cause of her deformities lies in an obscure “environmental syndrome.” Locating the 
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source of disability outside the organism not only highlights a shift in perspective on 
disability within Gibson’s work but, moreover, resonates with a conceptual 
transformation in academic negotiations of disability.  
Gibson’s shift in the attribution of responsibility from the individual to the 
environment parallels the conceptual shift from the medical to the social model of 
disability, which claims social and economic factors being fundamental in the 
construction of disability. Far from denying “the reality of impairment [or] its impact 
on the individual,” the internationally recognized social model of contemporary 
society intends to “challenge the physical, attitudinal, communication and social 
environment to accommodate impairment as an expected incident of human diversity” 
and to further unmask “disability” as a social construction (People With Disability 
Australia par. 1). It is especially “the disabled body [that] provides insight into the 
fact that all bodies are socially constructed—that social attitudes and institutions 
determine far greater than biological fact the representation of the body’s reality” 
(“Disability in Theory” 173). Siebers continues that “[d]isability exposes with great 
force the constraints imposed on bodies by social codes and norms” (174). Vint points 
out, “[b]odies which resist disciplining themselves to cultural norms challenge the 
field of the culturally intelligible” (Bodies 19). In light of Davis’ investigation of 
normalcy, it is not difficult to observe that these bodies are constructed to resist, and 
in turn enforce the hegemony of normalcy. On this note, Gibson’s depiction of 
Mercedes Purissima allows a reading of her deformities as not disabling in 
themselves. Instead, it is their deviance from social norms that establishes barriers. In 
other words, Mercedes does not suffer from her intolerable corporeality but from an 
intolerant environment.  
While a literal reading of “environmental syndrome” points to unspecified 
deformities induced by physical toxicity, I suggest reading environmental syndrome 
in the sense of Vorrasi and Garbarino’s concept of “social toxicity.” Considering 
children’s social environment rather than their DNA, psychologists Vorrasi and 
Garbarino developed the concept of social toxicity when studying the causes for 
violence in children. Social toxicity indicates, “the degree to which the social world 
has become poisonous to a person’s well-being” (61). They elucidate: 
 
The term was originally offered as a parallel to the environment movement’s 
analysis regarding physical toxicity as a threat to human well-being and 
survival … In the matter of recognizing, understanding, and reversing social 
toxicity, however, we lag far behind. But what are the social equivalents to 
lead and smoke in the air, PCBS in the water, and pesticides in the food chain? 
They include community violence, child abuse, domestic violence, family 
disruption, poverty, despair, depression, rejection, paranoia, alienation, and 
other social pollutants that demoralize families and divide communities (61). 
 
This analysis of social toxins reveals how nobody is immune to its effects and yet, 
while accepting vulnerability as a basic human condition, Vorrasi and Garbarino 
emphasize that, “vulnerability varies cross-sectionally” (61-2). Children and 
adolescents, belonging to particular social groups, “face an accumulated pattern of 
developmental risk factors” which produces a “synergistic effect” (62). Violence is 
understood as an effect, not a character trait that can be approached by taking account 
of the single factors that feed into its occurrence. In tracing the individual factors that 
inform violent behavior in the lived experience of a child, this psychological approach 
already, albeit tacitly, operates on an intersectional framework. While the ominous 
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environmental syndrome associated with Mercedes Purissima’s deformities suggests a 
poisoning by physical toxins, the devaluing meaning towards her body derives from 
social toxins.  
 
 
DISENTANGLING RACE AND DISABILITY 
 
Starting from the analysis of her extraordinary body, the figuration gains another layer 
of complexity once the matter of race and the historical entanglement of race and 
disability as structural categories are taken into consideration. In the figuration of 
Zona Rosa/Mercedes Purissima, Gibson taps into the complex history of interlocking 
categories of disability and race in the North American context. Needless to say, there 
has been a long-standing struggle with regards to the specificities of the formation of 
these categories. In this particular case, Gibson’s depiction of disability is doubly 
subversive. First, disability is not portrayed as an inherent individual trait in a 
simplistic fashion but instead entertains the idea of the formative impact of 
environment (as vague as it may be). This depiction breaks with the tradition of 
essentialist, biology-based representation of disability, as well as race, in that it shifts 
the focus towards the force of the physical and interpersonal milieu. This shift 
becomes even more significant for a Mexican-American context, since the process of 
racialization brought about the re-essentialization of disability in the sense of an 
inferior physical and mental shape. 98  A type of entanglement that in its 
interdependency has contributed to inequality and exclusion. In Mercedes Purissima 
we find a shift in focus regarding the locus of disability, as well as a conceptual 
disentanglement of the categories race and disability. While Mercedes Purissima’s 
deformations are caused by environmental toxicity, her disability is caused by social 
toxicity. In 2017, The Guardian reported that despite huge grievances in terms of 
accessibility, infrastructure, and health insurance the biggest problem people with 
disabilities face in Mexico City today is a social toxin: attitudes. The author recounts,  
 
All of them [wheelchair users] describe a culture of pobrecito (‘you poor 
thing’) in which wheelchair users are pitied, and assumed to be incapable of 
supporting themselves. As a result, many spend most of their lives in their 
parents’ homes, which can quickly become a prison. On the street, wheelchair 
users say they often receive unsolicited blessings – but they are also regularly 
shunned by those on two feet (par. 19). 
 
This newspaper article illustrates the lived experience of disabled persons in Mexico 
City. In fiction, the figuration of Mercedes Purissima outlines similar consequences of 
living with a disability. The character is depicted as living in isolation, imprisoned in 
her own home, and anxious of people’s reactions to her deformed material body. A 
body which she can, therefore, only deny and “live” instead in the virtual reality of 
cyberspace. The article furthermore emphasizes the importance of support groups and 
solidarity on a local level. The author, Noah Lanard observes that, “policy advocacy 
is a secondary concern; instead they teach wheelchair users to thrive in Mexico City 
as it exists today, buckled pavements and all” (par. 21). The support groups s/he 
introduces focus strongly on teaching a self-reliance that is a sort of relational 
autonomy—autonomy that emerges from supportive relationships, or as interviewee 																																																								
98 Consider the historical conflation of these identity categories in chapter 2.2 of this book. 
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Abraham Plaza says, “it makes you realize how much this alliance has helped” (par. 
28). Only in a few instances, does the Bridge trilogy feature the idea of relational 
autonomy (rather than dependency), whereas the Bigend trilogy grants it center stage.  
 
 
THE INFINITE POSSIBILITIES OF THE AVATAR 
 
From the afflictions associated with her corporeality results the rejection of her 
material body and the embrace of a virtual avatar, which promises unconditional 
design options. However, the infinite possibilities self-projection offers vis-à-vis  
virtual reality do not exclusively pertain to those deemed “obvious” cases of non-
normative embodiment, but also to the protagonist Chia’s assumingly normal 
(because uncommented) physique. Without any evidence to the contrary, readers 
imagine the protagonist as supremely normal (i.e. able-bodied and able-minded). 
Virtual reality is a viable alternative space for Chia as it provides the space 
where the teenager meets her international friends, fulfills fan club duties, and even 
inhabits a virtual version of her actual room. The influential status that cyberspace 
occupies in Chia’s life is underlined by her mother who, “felt that Chia spent entirely 
too much time gloved and goggled” (15). When constructing her avatar, Chia reverts 
to cosmetic prosthesis in order to meet the idealized statistical norms of beauty: “Chia 
herself was presenting currently as an only slightly tweaked, she felt, version of how 
the mirror told her she actually looked. Less nose, maybe. Lips a little fuller. But that 
was it. Almost” (12). Chia is constantly checking “how she [is] presenting … put a 
nudge more depth into her lips” (97). The promise of a disembodied existence 
becomes fundamentally inverted. Instead of the transcendence of the body, normative 
perfection is achieved by the reproduction of Western ideals of beauty. “In a society 
in which appearance is the primary index of value for women (and increasingly for 
men),” Garland-Thomson states, “beautification practices normalize the female body 
and disabilities abnormalize it” (Extraordinary Bodies 28). While in the Sprawl 
trilogy virtual representation takes the shape of geometrical forms, the Bridge trilogy 
critically negotiates cyberspace’s prophetic function to free the mind from the body 
by portraying it is undermined by its users. In accordance with Vint, “cyberspace is 
…the space where the perfect body is paradoxically acquired through an annihilation 
of the flesh” (Bodies 103). The deceptive function of virtuality comes to light in the 
regress to cosmetic enhancement. Therefore, computer technologies, “actually tend to 
reinforce stereotypical notions about the body, gender, and beauty rather than free the 
subject from the restrictions of ‘meat’ judgments” (105). 
In contrast, despite the denial of her body, Mercedes Purissima does neither 
turn to virtual reality in order to escape nor compensate for her condition. Whereas 
her female friends use the infinite possibilities of presentation in cyberspace for self-
optimization, Mercedes Purissima actively and creatively resists the normalizing 
forces of society. Instead of generating a normal, average, or perfect static surrogate 
body image in the form of an avatar, she varies her virtual gestalts, and presents 
herself as sometimes more and sometimes less human. Once as an assemblage of 
flickering fragments, never entirely in focus, always in low resolution: 
  
Zona in her ragged leather jacket over a white t-shirt. In that place she 
presented as a quick collage, fragments torn from films, magazines, Mexican 
newspapers: dark eyes, Aztec cheekbones, a dusting of acne scars, her black 
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hair tangled like smoke. She kept the resolution down, never let herself come 
entirely into focus (Idoru 109). 
 
In Idoru (and by extension the Bridge trilogy), Gibson avails himself of the 
possibilities the genre offers in the exploration of new corporeal conceptions and 
potentials for those located outside the norm. The deck serves as prosthesis for 
interaction and interconnection with others, which Mercedes is denied in non-virtual 
cultural spaces. She seeks extension and connection without the overcompensation of 
functional superiority or cosmetic augmentation. The deck neither leads to Mercedes 
Puríssima’s normalization nor to an enhancement of her abilities.  
In addition to channeling her creativity into her avatar design, Mercedes 
Puríssima creates her own website, a hideout where she finds refuge. As the only one 
privy to this secret place, Chia is allowed to visit and recounts:  
 
Zona Rosa kept a secret place, a country carved from what once had been a 
corporate website. It was a valley lined with ruined swimming pools, 
overgrown with cactus and red Christmas flowers. Lizards posed like 
hieroglyphs on mosaics of shattered tile. No houses stood in that valley, 
though sections of broken wall gave shade, or rusting rectangles of corrugated 
metal set aslant on weathered wooden uprights. Sometimes there were ashes of 
a cooking fire. She kept it early evening there (109).  
 
In parallel with the design of her avatar, Zona Rosa actively and creatively crafts an 
environment that is not sleek or luxurious, but the projected materials distinctively 
carry a history of their own. That is to say that the materials depicted are not as new, 
shiny, and smooth as in traditional science fiction. Instead, materials are corrugated, 
dented, cracked, or weathered.  
 
Zona snapped her fingers and a lizard scurried from beneath a rock. It ran up 
her leg and into her waiting hand. As she stroked it with the fingers of the 
other hand, the patterns of its coloration changed ... Zona Rosa took a knife 
from her jacket pocket and squatted on a shelf of pinkish rock. Golden dragons 
swirled in the shallow depths of the knife’s pink plastic handles. She thumbed 
a button of plated tin and the dragon-etched blade snapped out, its spine 
sawtoothed and merciless … Zona picked up a length of green-barked branch 
and began to shave thin curls from it with the edge of the switchblade (110). 
 
The descriptions of Zona Rosa bring to mind another strong Mexican woman who 
used to portray herself in the midst of items from flora, fauna, and Mexican 
paraphernalia. Frida Kahlo’s work as a painter and feminist is not only highly 
influenced by the Mexicanidad movement, which opposed colonialist thought of 
cultural inferiority of Indigenous cultures, but also by her health condition. As a child, 
Kahlo contracted polio, which made her right leg shorter and thinner than the left. As 
a teenager she was injured in a severe traffic accident, which caused multiple 
fractures to her spine, collarbone and ribs, a shattered pelvis, broken foot and 
dislocated shoulder. In between operations and while recovering in a body cast, she 
began to focus heavily on painting (Souter, Kahlo 2011). Her physical and emotional 
life experience, pain, and passion became dominant themes in her work, which to a 
large degree consists of self-portraits. Consider the depiction of her medicalized body 
in the paintings Henry Ford Hospital (1932), The Broken Column (1944), and Self-
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Portrait with the Portrait of Doctor Farill (1951). A term that has been used to 
describe her portraits, and by extension Kahlo herself is “jolie laide” (French, 
meaning “the beautiful ugly”) and was meant to describe her ‘unconventional’ beauty. 
Kahlo’s work has been understood to vindicate the unique beauty of imperfection by 
means of portraying individual flaws or deformities. The literary depiction of Zona 
Rosa as a disabled female figure amidst Mexican paraphernalia shares Kahlo’s 
aesthetics of extraordinary embodiment; consider Without Hope (1945), Self-Portrait 
with Thorn Necklace and Hummingbird (1940), and Girl with Death Mask (1938). 
At other times, Mercedes Purissima retreats from human resemblance 
altogether and appears as a “blue Aztec death’s-head burning bodiless, ghosts of her 
blue hands flickering like strobe-lit doves … Stylized lightening zig-zag rose around 
the crown of the neon skull in deliberate emphasis” (11). In those passages, the avatar 
re-enacts the composition of Frida Kahlo’s paintings in pixelated virtual form. While 
at the end of Neuromancer, no one stays unrehabilitated, in Idoru Gibson more 
affirmatively begins to explore the forms and potentials of extraordinary corporeality. 
All these avatars contain some sort of negation of the lived identity as disabled 
Mexican woman and yet there is no (over-) compensation in the sense of disciplining 
the body into fitting a normalizing visual regime. Rather, Mercedes Puríssima 
embraces a fluid, dynamic, and ambiguous identity. Thus, actualizing a figuration that 
matches Garland-Thomson’s criticism of formulaic and one-dimensional 
representations of people with disabilities: 
 
Even though the prototypical disabled person posited in cultural 
representations never leaves the wheelchair, is totally blind, or profoundly 
deaf, most of the approximately forty million Americans with disabilities have 
a much more ambiguous relationship to the label. The physical impairments 
that render someone ‘disabled’ are almost never absolute or static; they are 
dynamic, contingent conditions affected by many external factors and usually 
fluctuating over time (Extraordinary Bodies 13). 
 
 
WHOSE VOICE IS HEARD? 
 
What has been neglected in discussions of cyber-human, post-human, and material 
bodies in Gibson’s work, with or without an explicit consideration of disability, is the 
aspect of literary perspective whose consideration occasions a re-evaluation of the 
extraordinary figure in Gibson’s work and simulates alternative visions of 
extraordinary bodies on the conceptual level. While cyberspace is depicted as a means 
to build alliances, friendships, and community, it simultaneously reveals the real-life 
rejection, exclusion, and segregation of people with disabilities. Upon learning about 
Mercedes Purissima’s circumstances, Chia felt “her friend hadn’t even really existed, 
and there was this other girl in Mexico City with terrible problems” (290-1). In the 
aftermath of the events, Chia articulates her desire to contact Zona Rosa because she 
is her best friend and saved her life, and because “Zona would understand” (282). 
However, her request is countered by the advice that “it was better not to try to reach 
her now” and that “she [Zona] would not wish this” (282, 285). 
I read these final interactions as an invitation to reflect not so much on 
disability itself, but rather on the casual conversations that negotiate how to deal with 
people with disabilities. While these reactions at first appear to be caring and sensitive 
towards Mercedes Purissima’s living situation, their ethical implications and real-life 
 113	
consequences are effectively exclusive. The girl’s deformed body appears as a blatant 
violation of physical norms resisting the disciplinary forces of culture, which is met 
with the avoidance of direct interaction. Finally, Chia is told that, “the girl in Mexico 
City, more than anything else, needed to be somebody else” (291). That Mercedes 
Purissima has terrible problems and needs to be somebody else is not a value 
judgement she herself makes but rather the impression she gets from the other, non-
disabled characters. After all, there is no neutral or objective narrator to depict 
Mercedes Purissima’s perspective on her living situation. Indeed, the story is told 
through a fictional non-disabled character’s perspective. Thus, my conclusions rely 
strongly on the narrative situation of the novel. 
I argue that the depiction of Mercedes Purissima not only challenges common 
notions of extraordinary embodiment with regard to disability, and the interlocking of 
disability and race, but also ultimately calls into question common attitudes towards 
disability. Here, the negotiation of how to interact with a disabled person takes place 
without that person’s involvement. Perceived as a tragic deficiency, the characters’ 
reactions unmask the cultural taint of otherness that, as I argue, might be Mercedes 
Purissima’s reason to seize an avatar in the first place. Driven by pity and supposed 
empathy, these casual statements feed into a stigmatizing practice of 
disenfranchisement. Mercedes is deprived of her right to participate in a diverse social 
group between different races and physiques. Her voice is not present in the 
discussion of how to converse with people with disabilities.99 Tacitly discriminatory 
attitudes translate into concrete exclusive realities, be they material, economic, 
political, or interpersonal. Their interaction is limited to the virtual realm where 
embodiment is secondary. In Idoru, Gibson tackles attitudinal barriers, which due to 
their invisibility are usually hard to grasp. The novel offers a reading of extraordinary 
embodiment as not limiting in and of itself but additionally examines how 
interpersonal interactions can prevent social participation. Mercedes does not only 
suffer from an intolerable environment that manifests in the form of an environmental 
syndrome, but also from social toxicity.  
The concealment of Mercedes Purissima’s “true” corporeality on the diegetic 
level engenders the readers’ ignorance about her physical condition. I call this 
mimetic form of narration “narrative repression” as it parallels the mechanisms of 
social repression of people with disabilities from the visibility of public spaces. 
Should she meet Mercedes Purissima’s new avatar online, Chia was still not allowed 
to tell her that she “knows” about the unspeakable (291). At first glance the figuration 
can be read as an overcoming of personal tragedy via the adoption of virtual 
identities. However, Mercedes Purissima does not readily fit the binary of the 
disabled body in its literary depictions of either suffering or overcoming, “at best, 
wanting, and, at worst, humiliating” (Narrative Prosthesis 18). Rather, Gibson’s 
portrayal of this disabled Mexican woman testifies to occasions of ambiguity, 
forestalling hasty unequivocal attributions of reclusiveness, defeat, and tragedy. It is 
not the biological reality that provides the grounds for this representation, but the 
individual characters’ interpretations of that biological reality.  
In laying the emphasis on the manifold constitutive forces of the social 
environment in the literary representation of a disabled Mexican woman, rather than 
on biology and heredity, Gibson re-fashions the historical-political perspective on that 
particular social group. Nevertheless, a critique of the figuration of Mercedes 																																																								
99 To counter disenfranchisement in society the disability rights movement has taken “Nothing About 
Us Without Us” as one of their main slogans since the 1990s. 	
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Purissima is valid in so far as it—as so many narratives—misses a chance to give a 
voice to this particular social group. 
A prominent spearhead in giving a voice to Mexican and Mexican-American 
women and raising awareness of their living situation is scholar and activist Gloria 
Anzaldúa. In her semi-autobiographical book, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New 
Mestiza (1987), Anzaldúa draws on chicana/o cultural theory, feminist theory, and 
queer theory when discussing the social marginalization that arises from structural 
categories, such as race, class, and gender. Anzaldúa’s discussion can easily be 
extended by the category of disability. With regard to the interrelationship of 
attitudes, attitudinal barriers and social change, Anzaldúa illuminates:  
 
The struggle is inner: Chicano, indio, American Indian, mojado, mexicano, 
immigrant Latino, Anglo in power, working class Anglo, Black, Asian--our 
psyches resemble the bordertowns and are populated by the same people. The 
struggle has always been inner, and is played out in outer terrains. Awareness 
of our situation must come before inner changes, which in turn come before 
changes in society. Nothing happens in the ‘real’ world unless it first happens 
in the images in our heads (Borderlands 85). 
 
In this sense, the struggle for disability rights and more realistic representation of 
disability is an inner one. Gibson offers such figurations and images of disability to 
our cultural unconscious, even more so in the Bigend trilogy.  
By means of an intersectional reading it becomes clear that Gibson’s literary 
depiction does not dissolve the categories of race and disability, but first disentangles 
them. Initially marked through the category of race, the final revelation of disability 
changes the entire figuration, demanding a re-evaluation of the character by 
accounting for the categorical interdependencies. In this way, Idoru offers a figuration 
that invites us to re-think the extraordinariness of bodies exemplifying how literature 
as a medium can help make invisible attitudes tangible and thus raise awareness of a 
mainly invisible problem. A literary strategy that provokes such internal negotiation 
of disability and re-evaluation of extraordinary embodiment in the reader is the final 
revelation of a character’s disability at the end of a narrative thus prompting the 
question of how and why such revelation changes the overall meaning of a character.  
 
 
4.2.2 Towards Materiality 
 
VISCERAL APPEAL 
 
Besides the fact that the Bridge trilogy focuses most heavily on characters’ 
interlinkage with the environment on an attitudinal as much as interpersonal level, 
there is another shift in focus: away from virtuality and towards materiality. As seen 
in the avatar designs, the promise of a disembodied existence becomes fundamentally 
inverted. Instead of the transcendence of the body, immaterial normative perfection is 
achieved. Despite buying into the optimization strategies provided by technological 
programs, Chia expresses a clear preference for materiality. The virtual reproduction 
of her room is not granted the same appreciation despite the infinite possibilities 
regarding design, structure and texture. Entering this virtual space makes her feel 
“disappointed” and “somehow … it made her homesick; made her miss the real thing” 
(Idoru 33). This nostalgia for the “real thing,” I suggest, indicates nostalgia for the 
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material thing. This vigorous preference for corporeal experience snatches the appeal 
from cyberspace revealing its cheap simulation. Instead, the “visceral appeal” that 
surfaces ever so slightly in the Sprawl trilogy comes into effect in the Bridge trilogy 
(Count Zero 133). Surely, Chia would not opt for a permanent disembodied existence 
in virtual reality.   
 
 
FROM LIGHT TO MATTER 
 
The primary subject matter of Idoru and All Tomorrow’s Parties is the relation 
between the material and the virtual and the possibilities of their coupling. Arranged 
as the prospective marriage between the mega rock star Rez and as the idoru Rei Toei 
raises the question of how the embodied Rez and the disembodied Rei Toei, the 
biological and the synthetic, can be united. Their different modes of existence are 
mirrored in their names. Rei Toei as the homophone of “ray toy” designates her 
synthetic and projective nature. Rez, on the other hand, resembles the Latin “res” and 
denotes a physical substance, matter, or thing.  
Significantly more complex than an average computer simulation confined to 
the matrix, Rei Toei is a being of light, and appears as a full-color in-space projection, 
thereby penetrating material space and even interacting with her human and non-
human environment. Her virtual being consists of “a congeries of software agents, 
[and is] the creation of information designers” who constructed her as “an array of 
elaborate constructs that [is referred] to as ‘desiring machines’ … aggregates of 
subjective desire … an architecture of articulated longing” (92, 178). Intrigued by the 
ever-spinning software agents and desiring machines, Gibson begins to intensify his 
interest in the processual character of systems: “Rei’s only reality is the realm of 
ongoing serial creation … Entirely process” (202). The idoru embodies another shift 
in Gibson’s work; a shift in focus from integrative corporeal schemes that necessitate 
the underpinnings of fragmentation and supplement, to the processes of on-going 
becoming. Laney says, “how nothing is perfect, really. Nothing ever finished. 
Everything is process (All Tomorrow’s Parties 13)  
In retrospection on the Sprawl trilogy, Rei Toei differs fundamentally from 
artificial intelligences like Wintermute and Neuromancer. It was the technology of 
cyberspace that was developed in and came to characterize the Sprawl books. In this 
spirit, the pursuit and successful accomplishment of the merging of the two virtual 
entities in Neuromancer is entirely bound to the realm of cyberspace. At no point did 
obtaining a physical body appear desirable to the AIs. In the Bridge trilogy, however, 
the novum is nanotech: a technology that allows the manipulation of matter on an 
atomic scale. In the novels, nano-assemblers and nano-faxes serve as translators from 
the virtual to the material, as an interface between the human and the computer. On a 
conceptual level, nanotechnology bridges the gap from virtual cyberspace of the 
Sprawl trilogy to the material reality of the Bigend trilogy.  
Since Rei Toei does not fully convert to a physical existence in Idoru, for the 
time being their marriage takes place on a symbolic level. In their functions as media 
stars, both have generated big data whose intersection in the matrix and the resulting 
data pattern metaphorize their marriage. “Rez exists as thoroughly, in the realm of the 
digital, as it is possible for a living human to exist,” and yet All Tomorrow’s Parties 
declares that a union with “Rez-the-icon” instead of “Rez-the-man” is not satisfying 
to either of the partners (55). Despite his willingness “to go there, literally, to go 
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where Rei Toei is … join her in some realm of the digital or in some not-yet-imagined 
borderland, some intermediate state,” he failed to fully “virtualize” (55). 
Nanotechnology as a yet unthought-of option of corporealization is cause for, 
and effect of, Rei Toei’s longing and reaching out for material embodiment, which is 
eventually met in All Tomorrow’s Parties. Thus, the celebrated union of the virtual 
and material is thwarted in favor of the body. The option of uploading Rez’s 
subjectivity in the sense of him becoming disembodied in order to obtain a union in 
the virtual realm is not entertained at all.  
The trilogy’s climax is reached when the idoru finally materializes from a 
virtual being into an embodied self. Her manifestation prompting science fiction 
critics to detect a “return to human corporeality and agency” (Easterbrook, 
“Recognizing” 48) in Gibson’s fiction. Yet, as this thesis argues, Gibson, on the 
trajectory of embracing embodiment, has been steering towards the point of concrete 
materialization all along. Rei Toei is described as crawling out of a nanofax – a 
device we might associate with a 3D printer – in flesh and blood, “butt-naked … 
black hair, maybe Chinese, Japanese … long and thin … straightening up, still 
smiling” (All Tomorrow’s Parties 268-9). 100  By understanding the eventual 
incarnation of the “ray toy” as a paradigm shift in Gibson’s work, Wiggins remarks 
that in All Tomorrow's Parties at last, “Gibson rethought the importance of 
materiality” (79). The devaluing “body is meat” dictum from the Sprawl trilogy is 
now overtly reversed, “privilege[ing] human corporeality above all else” 
(Easterbrook, “Recognizing” 48). While the promise of blissful disembodiment 
remains unfulfilled by cybertechnology, nanotechnology facilitates the materialization 
of intangible cognitive processes. In line with the overt privileging of the visceral, the 
idoru, in fact, portrays the transcendence of the virtual body.  
 
 
MNEMONIC TISSUES  
 
Taking the interest in the visceral a step further, Gibson pays particular attention to 
the textural specificities of the material body in Idoru. Scarred skin is Keith Alan 
Blackwell’s most apparent characteristic, who is an otherwise secretive figure. In a 
scene depicting Laney’s first encounter with Blackwell, the reader follows Laney’s 
gaze over  
 
[t]he man’s left ear was edged with pink tissue, smooth as wax. [He had] 
heavily scarred hands … Exposed flesh tracked and crossed by an atlas of 
scars, baffling in their variety of shape and texture. [One of his eyebrows] was 
bisected by a twisted pink cable of scar tissue (Idoru 5-6). 
 
Concealing his identity in their meeting, all that is primarily available to Laney is 
Blackwell’s outward appearance. The investigation of skin reveals, almost marvels at, 
the dermal irregularities and pertains less to the reasons for the infliction of former 
wounds or the experience of pain. Instead, the shape that the material inscription of 
past experience takes is exposed. Laney discerns “an obvious dental prosthesis,” a 
“broken nose, never repaired,” and the lack of the reconstruction of Blackwell’s ear 
(5-6, 7).  																																																								
100 Moreover, 3D-printing technology as plays a central role in The Peripheral. In the novel Gibson 
explores 3D printers as a medium to produce weapons as well as narcotics and food. 
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Despite this overt display of extraordinary skin features, Blackwell is not met 
with the onlooker’s gratifying experience of fascination and repulsion thus ensuring 
the latter of their normal physique—a function common to freak shows. Above all, 
Laney is curious, and while there is some discomfort in the scene it might as well 
spring from the secrecy of the situation. While it is Laney’s curiosity that brings 
Blackwell’s scars into prominence as something extraordinary, these do not serve to 
frame Laney as able-bodied, since his own extraordinary embodiment is established 
from the beginning. In this regard, Blackwell is not Garland-Thomson’s freak who is 
simply and passively stared at. Instead, communicative control is balanced between 
“starer” and “staree” (Staring 77). Staring at the remains of Blackwell’s left ear, 
Laney wonders, “why there had been no attempt at reconstruction”—no medical 
intervention for healing (5). The role of the staree in such encounter is essential. 
Ideally, according Garland-Thomson’s “ethics of looking” both parties engage in a 
transitive action—a form of interaction that was prevented in Mercedes Purissima’s 
case (Staring 194). Recognizing Laney’s interested look as an act of communication, 
Blackwell replies “‘So I’ll remember,’ … reading Laney’s eyes. ‘Remember what?’ 
‘Not to forget.’” (5). The portrayal of Blackwell negotiates the physical traces of 
experiences as an engagement with mnemonic textures rather than discrediting stigma 
in Erving Goffman’s sense. Similarly, Molly Millions appreciates her scars for 
reminding her of having been “stupid” in the past (Mona Lisa Overdrive 160). When 
Blackwell touches his scar tissue or squeezes his “lobe-stump,” he does it “without 
hesitation or embarrassment” (27). Instead of depicting the scarred body in need of 
full repair, Gibson foregrounds how experience, be it painful or otherwise, transforms 
not only subjectivity due to made experiences but also the materiality of the body. 
There is no call for the corrective programming of plastic surgery. This blatant 
display of scarred skin and extraordinary physique, I argue, is presented in a manner 
that recognizes realistic and lived corporeality, and in this sense values a person’s 
unique biography.  
Serving the purpose of identification, or accentuating the uniqueness of a 
character, are popular functions of the scar as a motif in the literary tradition and can 
be traced back to the most canonical works of Western culture. It is the scar on his 
thigh that ultimately leads to Odysseus’s identification in Homer’s epic poem. The 
experience of injury reorganizes his body and mind leaving a mental memory as much 
as a physical scar. In the poem, the scar initiates the transition from boy to man—it 
marks a coming-of-age from innocence to experience.  
Moreover, literary genres such as slave narratives, war narratives, and 
disability literature rely significantly on the motif of the scar. In The Scar of Visibility 
(2007), disability scholar and activist Petra Kuppers examines the “painful 
productivity of scars” in poetry, performance, and film (134). Kuppers argues that an 
exploration of scars may illuminate “the complexities and richness of living a 
disabled life” (141). Separate from a pathologizing perspective, Kuppers approaches 
the scar as a 
 
meeting place between inside and outside, a locus of memory, of bodily 
change. Like skin, a scar mediates between the outside and the inside, but it 
also materially produces, changes, and overwrites its site. If skin renews itself 
constantly, producing the same in repetition, the scar is the place of the 
changed script: mountains are thrown up, the copy isn’t quite right, crooked 
lines sneak over smooth surfaces (1). 
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The productivity of scars bears on “an engagement with social and personal realities 
that open up moments of difference, of new alignments of power, individuality, and 
sociality—productive in the sense of allowing spaces for living to come into being” 
(1-2). Kuppers situates scars associated with disability somewhere between the 
complex polarities of pain and pleasure. In an analysis of Cronenberg’s Crash, 
Kuppers identifies “how pleasure emerges in this play on the limit, along these scars, 
in the energies that surround the body/car complex” (127). The scar has a dual 
nature—it refers both to injury and healing, loss and recovery, the cut and the 
connection.  
In the figuration of Blackwell, Gibson’s representation of disability differs from 
those in the Sprawl trilogy in that restorations of the body are no longer complete. 
The extensions are made manifest in their material substructure, and the consequences 
of material embodiment are not neglected. Echoing the character of Turner from 
Count Zero, Blackwell similarly re-assembled is much less masterfully stitched and 
thereby blatantly displays the traces of corporeal reconstruction. In stark contrast to 
Turner’s successful surgery, which results in his smooth able-bodiedness, Blackwell’s 
seams bear witness to the striation of his body. The scars reveal the subliminal 
organization of matter that in a normalizing cultural context is hidden under smooth, 
normal surfaces.  
 Formally, the depiction of a scar allows breaking with the linearity of the plot. 
Odysseus’ scar allows Homer to extend the narrative back into the past and thus to 
explore the connections between past experience and present identity. In a similar 
manner, Gibson’s depiction of Blackwell’s scars occasions to intersperse anecdotes of 
how he met Rez and subsequently saved his life. These jump cuts between past and 
present connect parts of the story that do not strictly follow the chronology of events, 
and can be read as structurally scarring the text itself.  
 
 
4.2.3 Singular Context 
 
While in Neuromancer the body’s condition between corporeal extension into and 
interaction with the environment tingles under the surface, the body’s interrelated 
status is more explicitly articulated in the Bridge trilogy. With his depiction of Colin 
Laney, in both Idoru and All Tomorrow’s Parties, Gibson revisits the perspective of 
the netrunner. But, this time with a stronger consideration of the reciprocally 
informing nature of interlinkages between organism and environment. Laney is a 
stereotypically specialized outsider who professionally “spent his time skimming vast 
flows of undifferentiated data, looking for ‘nodal points’”, an expression of his savant 
idiosyncrasy (Idoru 25). Laney’s extraordinary ability bears on 
 
a peculiar knack with data-collection architectures, and a medically 
documented concentration-deficit that he could toggle, under certain 
conditions, into a state of pathological hyperfocus. This made him… an 
extremely good researcher. (He made no mention of the Federal Orphanage in 
Gainesville, nor of any attempts that might have been made there to cure his 
concentration-deficit. The 5-SB trials or any of that.) The relevant data, in 
terms of his current employability, was that he was an intuitive fisher of 
patterns of information: of the sort of signature a particular individual 
inadvertently created in the net as he or she went about the mundane yet 
endlessly multiplex business of life in a digital society. Laney’s concentration-
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deficit, too slight to register on some scales, made him a natural channel-
zapper, shifting from program to program, from database to database, from 
platform to platform, in a way that was, well, intuitive. And that was the catch, 
really, when it came to finding employment: Laney was the equivalent of a 
dowser, a cybernetic water-witch. He couldn’t explain how he did what he did. 
He just didn’t know (25). 
 
As a result of his hyperfocus, a technique comparable to data mining and data 
evaluation, Laney is able to scan databases and find exploitable information faster 
than any other netrunner. At the same time, his capability to hyperfocus is framed by 
his medically documented concentration-deficit. Seen in this light, Laney occupies a 
hybrid status in that his “most peculiar talent” makes him invaluable to research 
agencies, while his  “illness” identifies a disability that underlies the cultural forces of 
normalization (All Tomorrow’s Parties 126, 167). The cause of his hybrid condition is 
not congenital, but the result of drug trials conducted during his childhood at the 
orphanage he was raised in. As one character in All Tomorrow’s Parties ambiguously 
summarizes:  
 
‘Laney is a sport, a mutant, the accidental product of covert clinical trials of a 
drug that induced something oddly akin to psychic abilities in a small 
percentage of test subjects. But Laney isn’t psychic in any non-rational sense; 
rather he is able, through the organic changes wrought long ago by 5-SB, this 
drug, to somehow perceive change emerging from vast flows of data’ (56). 
 
Ultimately completely contingent on the context the one or the other prevails making 
hyperfocus and concentration-deficit not only mutually dependent but also identical at 
the core. What Gibson brings to the fore with this portrayal is how physical disability 
and physical superiority can stand in a sensitive and reciprocal relation. The fact that 
the deficit is not regarded as a disability per se points to the direction of what Jürgen 
Link calls “flexible normalism.” This variant of traditional normalism describes how 
present-day social negotiations of “otherness” only becomes problematic when an 
individual does not or cannot opt for any of the culturally given sets of acceptable 
behavior (Link, “From the ‘Power of the Norm’ to ‘Flexible Normalism’”). In other words, 
people with disabilities are not “a problem” as long as they are Paralympic athletes, 
theoretical physicists or soul singers. In the attempt to compensate for his deficit, 
Laney seeks gainful employment which he finds at the sensational television show 
“Slitscan,” whose self-understanding it is to make and destroy media personalities.  
From a disability studies point of view, the neo-capitalist undercurrent in 
Gibson’s depiction is conspicuous. With regard to the accepted behavioral patterns 
which actually allow social recognition and admission of individuals, only 
economically-driven contexts are presented, thereby implicitly propagating a 
pervasive commodification of the body. Although Gibson already dissociates from 
overtly technological self-optimizing techniques, the body is still strictly subjected to 
a high degree of commercialization. Only when meeting the condition of successfully 
generating capital, does disability change into extraordinary talent, intuition, or touch. 
The participation in social life is reduced to the realm of economics. Laney’s social 
life apart from his job is non-existent in the narrative. Rather, “Laney’s ability to 
locate key data in apparently random wastes of incidental information [which] earned 
him the envy and grudging admiration of more experienced researchers” alludes to a 
social exclusion on the basis of his above-average ability (Idoru 38).  
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The metaphors that are meant to capture Laney’s talent—the dowser and the 
water-witch—both index a fundamental dependence on feedback. The cybernetic 
water-witch resonates with digital information. Dowsing, on the other hand, originally 
describes the act of locating subterraneous substances, such as water, oil, metals, or 
mineral deposits. The various instruments used by dowsers ranges from rods, sticks, 
pendula, or to their own bodies, which usually indicates an attraction to the respective 
materials. Although explanations vary widely and wildly, many center on the flow of 
corpuscles or atoms between the respective material and the body, between the 
environment and the dowser. As a consequence, Laney’s ability cannot be regarded as 
an inherent skill enclosed in the individual. Instead, his ability emerges from the 
interaction and represents a system in resonance with its data environment.  
The reciprocal nature of this relationship manifests in another character’s 
observation of “what Laney can do with data, and what data can do to Laney” (All 
Tomorrow’s Parties 6). How data acts on Laney is depicted in All Tomorrow’s 
Parties and features Laney as a homeless, desolate addict living in a shelter made of 
cardboard cartons. Addicted to complexity, Laney neglects actual material 
relationships, which leads to an intensified experience of information so much so that 
the data interconnection constitutes his being: “Laney’s progress through all the data 
in the world (or that data’s progress through him) has long since become what he is, 
rather than something he merely does” (163). In this line of thought, the data 
environment co-constitutes Laney as much as he co-constitutes the data environment.  
 Laney is intertwined in feedback loops with the data he scans for nodal points, 
and with Link’s notion of flexible normalism in mind Laney’s activity on a virtual 
plane is mirrored on the material level in the form of his interactions with the social 
milieu. The netrunner is thus not only provided with, but also actively shapes, a niche. 
This allows his cultural integration as well as consolidates the dichotomy between 
talent and deficit. Gibson writes, “Slitscan allowed him [Laney] to do the one thing he 
possessed a genuine talent for” (Idoru 40). But, Laney’s talent, strictly speaking, only 
arises in his “singular environment” (All Tomorrow’s Parties 56). Or, in what 
philosopher and cognitive scientist Andy Clark would call a “proper context” (272). 
The fundamental embeddedness of the organism within its context allows them to act 
in the first place. Clark argues that the organism’s capabilities emerge precisely at the 
nexus of brain, body, and world, which he refers to as a “deeply interanimated triad” 
(272). Concerned with the consequences of his claim regarding the limits of the 
human extension, he wonders: 
 
how far we should then press this notion of cognitive extension … Should we 
just think of ourselves as cognitive agents who co-opt and exploit surrounding 
structures (e.g., pen and paper) … or is there a real sense in which the 
cognitive agent (as opposed to the bare biological organism) is thus revealed 
as an extended entity incorporating brain, body and some aspects of the local 
environment? (273). 
 
Advocating that “[o]ur cognitive profile is essentially the profile of an embodied and 
situated organism,” Clark turns to studies on Alzheimer patients and tuna fish to show 
how both human and animal abilities cannot be attributed to the physical and mental 
disposition alone, but to a large degree result from an actively sought interaction with 
the environment (273). With regard to Alzheimer patients, Clark observes that they 
were able to  
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maintain an unexpectedly high level of functioning within the normal 
community. These individuals should not—given their performance on a 
variety of standard tests—be capable of living as independently as they do …  
external props and aids turn out to serve important cognitive functions. Such 
props and aids may include the extensive use of labels (on rooms, objects, 
etc.), the use of a ‘memory book’ containing annotated photos of friends and 
relatives (273). 101 
 
Hence a “reliance on various forms of wideware … as a means of counterbalancing a 
neurally-based deficit”102 positively affects the performance and behavior of actors in 
their environment (273-4). Clark holds: 
 
there will be dense complementarity and cooperation between neural, bodily 
and environmental forces and factors. What the brain does will thus be 
precisely fitted to the range of complementary operations and opportunities 
provided by bodily structure, motion and the local environment. In the special 
case of human agency, this includes the humanly-generated ‘whirlpools and 
vortices’ of external, symbol-laden media: the explosion of wideware made 
available by the ubiquitous devices of language, speech, and text (272-3). 
 
In other words, contrary to approaches of human (and animal) capabilities as inherent 
properties of the body, these examples show how what is commonly understood as a 
human (or animal) ability only emerges in the conjunction with the proper context, 
which in turn is shaped by the organisms living it. The illusion of an autonomously 
acting, independent, and powerful individual bears on both the use of innumerable 
technological props and the aids that structure our daily lives, as well as the 
simultaneous oblivion in doing so. According to Clark, the bare biological organism 
needs to be re-conceptualized as an extended phenotype always already an “organism-
plus-wideware” since “[c]ertain aspects of the external world … may be so integral to 
our cognitive routines as to count as part of the cognitive machinery itself” (274). 
With the reconfiguration of the organisms’ contour, not only the notion of “the 																																																								
101 A fascinating example paralleling the performance of Alzheimer patients is that of tuna fish. Clark 
explicates: “The tuna is paradoxically talented. Physical examination suggests it should not be able to 
achieve the aquatic feats of which it is demonstrably capable. It is physically too weak (by about a 
factor of 7) to swim as fast as it does, to turn as compactly as it does, to move off with the acceleration 
it does, etc. The explanation (according to the fluid dynamicists Michael and George Triantafyllou) is 
that these fish actively create and exploit additional sources of propulsion and control in their watery 
environments. For example, the tuna use naturally occurring eddies and vortices to gain speed, and they 
flap their tails so as to actively create additional vortices and pressure gradients which they then exploit 
for quick takeoffs and similar effects. The real swimming machine, I suggest, is thus the fish in its 
proper context: the fish plus the surrounding structures and vortices that it actively creates and then 
maximally exploits. The cognitive machine, in the human case, looks similarly extended . . . We 
actively create and exploit multiple linguistic media, yielding a variety of contentful structures and 
manipulative opportunities whose reliable presence is then factored deep into our problem-solving 
strategies.” (272) 
102 Clark defines “wideware” as “states, structures or processes that satisfy two conditions. First, the 
item in question must be in some intuitive sense environmental: it must not, at any rate, be realized 
within the biological brain or the central nervous system. Bodily aspects and motions, as well as truly 
external items such as notebooks and calculators, thus fit the bill. Second, the item (state, structure, 
process) must play a functional role as part of an extended cognitive process: a process geared to the 
promotion of adaptation success via the gathering and use of knowledge and information, and one that 
loops out in some non-trivial way, so as to include and exploit aspects of the local bodily and 
environmental setting.” (268) 
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human” but also the prerequisite of “the individual,” in the sense of a discrete entity, 
begins to falter.  
Moreover, the relationship between the characters Chevette and Skinner spans 
from Virtual Light to All Tomorrow’s Parties, and delineates how their association 
enables both of them to act. Skinner, one of the first settlers of the San Francisco-
Oakland Bay Bridge, who took runaway Chevette in, suffers from hip pain so that the 
range of his activities is co-dependent on his community. The narrator explains that 
“[t]oday, with his bad hip, the old man was in effect an invalid, relying on his 
neighbors and the girl” (Virtual Light 73). In All Tomorrow’s Parties, Chevette 
reminisces about what resembled a caring father-daughter relationship:   
 
How he had found her, too sick to walk, and taken her home, feeding her 
soups he bought from the Korean vendors until she was well. Then he’s left 
her alone, asking nothing, accepting her there the way you’d accept a bird on a 
windowsill, until she learned to ride a bicycle in the city and become a 
messenger. And soon the roles had reverse: the old man failing, needing help, 
and she the one to go for soup, bring water, see that coffee was made (65). 
 
While his passage may bring to mind Farrell’s notion of the prosthetic relationship 
between mother and child, the enabling (or disabling) nature of associations exceeds 
mere human relationships and extends to interactions with objects, such as Chevette’s 
bike or the wild assortment of entities populating the Bay Bridge. Deeply affected by 
the sight of the bridge, Yamazaki, the sociologist who documents the events taking 
place over the course of the trilogy, describes his experience as follows:  
  
Its steel bones, its stranded tendons, were lost within an accretion of dreams: 
tattoo parlors, gaming arcades, dimly lit stalls stacked with decaying 
magazines, sellers of fireworks, of cut bait, betting shops, sushi bars, 
unlicensed pawnbrokers, herbalists, barbers, bars. Dreams of commerce, their 
locations generally corresponding with the decks that had once carried 
vehicular traffic; while above them, rising to the very peaks of the cable 
towers, lifted the intricately suspended barrio, with its unnumbered population 
and its zones of more private fantasy... Everything ran together, blurring, 
melting in the fog. Telepresence had only hinted at the magic and singularity 
of the thing, and he’d walked slowly forward, into that neon maw and all that 
patchwork carnival of scavenged surfaces, in perfect awe. Fairyland (Virtual 
Light 69-70).  
 
Appreciating the heterogeneous and self-organizing nature of the bridge, Yamazaki 
cannot but draw on a variety of language registers—medical, mythical, technical, 
romantic—to convey his affect. Revisiting the Bay Bridge after her abrupt escape, 
Chevette realizes that is was here where, “she was sometimes happy, in the sense of 
being somehow complete, and ready for what another day might bring” (82). I argue, 
it is the high degree of interconnectivity between the various people, objects, 
materials, and subcultures of the bridge that translates into Chevette’s feeling of 
completeness and empowerment. However, if its extensions and connections co-
constitute the body and the self, by implication a lack of interrelations leads to their 
decline or resolution.  
As All Tomorrow’s Parties strikingly illustrates, Laney’s data connection 
alone does not sustain his body and self. Instead, his physical isolation brings him to 
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the verge of death—a form of disembodiment not anticipated by the netrunner. When 
the “stalker syndrome” as a long-term effect of the 5-SB trials kicks in, he becomes 
obsessed with the media figure, PR genius, and antagonist Cody Harwood, who 
leaves only negative traces in databases. Following his addiction to data complexity, 
Laney detects an impending paradigm shift that will change the world “as we know 
it” and “the points from which change was emerging, would repeatedly bring 
Harwood to his attention” (163). In the nodal points Laney sees that Harwood, who 
had taken 5-SB deliberately to enhance his data mining capacities, is equally aware of 
the upcoming historical shift and attempts to manipulate them in his favor. Harwood 
is framed as “an agent of change” and to understand the nature of the complex 
entanglement of parties Laney is instructed to “[t]hink network” that is to consider 
relations and follow the flow of action rather than to evaluate functions and causalities 
(209). Impeding Harwood’s evil, yet never revealed, plans is Laney’s primary and 
only goal. However, this as a last consequence leads to his abandonment of the 
subject as well as the object position, becoming “merely adjectival: a Laney-colored 
smear, meaningless without context. A microscopic cog in same catastrophic plan. 
But positioned, he sense, centrally. Crucially. And that is why sleep is no longer an 
option” (71-2).  
Context does not only produce meaning, but may enable action and articulates 
the body and self. This radical relationality is epitomized by its negative: a drastic de-
contextualization on the material level in form of a lack in social participation 
whatsoever results in the physical deterioration and a mental “Hole” at the center of 
Laney’s being.  
 
Laney is in drift. That is how he does it. It is a matter of, he knows, letting go. 
He admits the random. The danger of admitting the random is that the random 
may admit the Hole. The Hole is that which Laney’s being is constructed 
around. The Hole is absence at fundamental core” (40).  
 
Jacking into cyberspace is no longer associated with either a transcendent 
experience or an adrenalin high, but a form of disembodiment that bespeaks dire 
excavation, an absence of the body, and an emptiness of the mind. Gibson presents a 
scenario in which “Laney tastes blood. It is a long time since he has brushed his teeth, 
and they feel artificial and ill-fitting, as though in his absence they have been replaced 
with a stranger’s” (222). Since the enmeshment with technology is not permanent, 
Laney time and again becomes “suddenly and terribly aware of his physical being, the 
condition of his body” (178). Exceedingly disregarded in the Sprawl trilogy, the 
material consequences of the body’s connection to a cyberspace deck receive all the 
more attention in the Bridge novels.  
Besides his physical disintegration, Laney realizes that there is no final 
essence of the self, which is actually a hybrid product of both material and immaterial 
interrelations. In dissociating from the material world, Laney decontextualizes and 
observes his demise:  
 
‘That Hole at the core of Laney’s being, that underlying absence, he begins to 
suspect, is not so much an absence in the self as of the self. Something has 
happened to him since his descent into the cardboard city. He has started to see 
that previously he had, in some unthinkably literal way, no self’ (71). 
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Inherent to the conceptualization of the organism-plus-wideware, is the implication 
that a deprivation of such external connections leads to the disabling of action, and 
ultimately to the demise of the organism.   
Such awareness and emphasis on external material aids is common in 
discussions of disability, though it is rare in debates over human ability. While a 
certain dependence on an external setting with regard to disabilities seems to be 
almost too obvious, Clark shows how dependence is integral to the human, and even 
animal, condition. Neither abilities nor disabilities can be ascribed solely to an 
individual’s performance or disposition. Instead, this becomes a relational matter. 
When “wheelchair users describe how the chair becomes ‘part of them’ ” we can 
effectively understand the wheelchair, as much as any other technological prosthesis, 
as what Clark identifies as “wideware” (Reeve 104). Complimentary to Rudy 
Rucker’s cyberpunk preoccupation with software, hardware, wetware, and 
realware,103 a recognition of Clark’s wideware expands concepts of human (and 
animal) modes of embodiment beyond science fiction.  
 All Tomorrow’s Parties introduces another character, who turns out to have an 
extraordinary talent for data retrieval. Silencio is presented as a neglected child from a 
lower-class background, who due to his condition is easily utilized for drug dealing. 
Contrary to what his name suggests, his initial muteness is caused by his lack of 
English fluency rather than a pathological inability to speak. And yet, there seems to 
be something “wrong” with Silencio. He apprehends the world through feeling rather 
than cognition (29). Witnessing a murder, Silencio makes the observation that in this 
instance, “Silencio looks at the black knife, how is rests in the man’s hand. He feels 
that the knife holds the man. That the knife may decide to move. Then the man moves 
the knife” (31). Irrespective of the traditional paradigmatic allocation of agency in a 
subject-object dichotomy, the child discerns goals and agency in both the man and the 
knife. Gibson’s transition to the Bigend trilogy is finalized when All Tomorrow’s 
Parties closes with reference to networks, agents, and material agency—a logic that 
undergirds Gibson’s third trilogy. Central to my analysis of the Bigend novels is the 
material-semiotic method of Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, following which 
Silencio’s “knife-man,” can be read in accordance to Latour’s gun-man—a prime 
example of what Latour calls a “composite agent.” Arguing against both the “myth of 
the Neutral Tool under complete human control” (the knife or gun) “and the myth of 
the Autonomous Destiny that no human can master” (the man), Latour proposes a 
third option (Pandora’s Hope 178). That is, the “creation of a link that did not exist 
before and that to some degree modifies the original two” (179). The link between the 
gun or knife and the man, may result in unexpected results. As Latour over-simplifies: 
“You only wanted to injure but, with a gun now in your hand, you want to kill” (178-
9). Furthermore, Silencio conveys the mode of perception that we should re-learn in 
order to perceive of what Jane Bennett calls “thing-power.” In her new materialist 
approach, Bennett reminds her reader of “a childhood sense of the world as filled with 
sorts of animate beings, some human, some not, some organic, some not” (Vibrant 
Matter 20).  
Silencio’s observations remain uncommunicated and his overall unresponsive 
nature prompts characters to doubt his subjectivity. As one character comments, 
“[t]here is nothing between the boy’s gaze and his being: no mask. No personality” 
(41). Silencio is constantly met with a critical, even clinical gaze: “This one, now, has 
something missing. Something wrong; not a state bespeaking drugs, but some more 																																																								
103 See Rudy Rucker’s tetralogy Software (1982), Wetware (1988), Freeware (1997), Realware (2000). 
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permanent mode of not-being-there” (50). Fontaine, who takes the boy in puts him 
under close scrutiny says of his juggling various diagnoses, “This by now, he very 
likely had some sort of brain damage, and most likely congenital” (130). When 
Silencio takes deep interest in watches, absorbing information on brands, models, 
mechanisms, values, and uses the cyberspace to locate individual exemplars, his 
depictions suggest the diagnosis of an autistic child, or “idiot savant” who is more 
attuned to a watch’s face than a human’s. Drawing on the cliché of an autistic genius 
to make sense of the boy’s behavior shows how this cultural trope is the most readily 
available to the Fontaine. However, the efforts to conclusively diagnose Silencio 
amount to an ultimate ambivalence on the part of Fontaine: “that absence behind the 
brown eyes, staring back at him, either infinitely deep of no depth at all, he couldn’t 
tell” (132). The figuration of Silencio illustrates how culturally over diagnosed, and 
yet sparsely understood, the phenomena of extraordinary embodiment are. It is the 
social model of disability that enforces criticism of the authority the medical sciences 
have held over constructions of disability. 
 In this chapter, I have shown how Gibson continues on his trajectory from 
virtual to embodied characters: corporealizaion is epitomized in the transformation of 
the idoru from light to matter. Moreover, the Bridge trilogy presents more complex 
characters in the sense that their wider socio-political context is taken into view and 
with that culturally informed attitudes and communication strategies. The novels 
reveal an increasing awareness of the significance of external, both material and 
social factors in the construction of abilities and disabilities. The entanglement and 
reliance of a body on its social and material environment has been read against the 
backdrop of the social model approach and supplemented by Clark’s notion of the 
“organism-plus-wideware.” A main concern of this chapter has been the discussion of 
a female disabled Mexican figure, whose identity is posited between the polarities of 
virtual and material existence. To that end, I have drawn not only on the social model 
approach to disability but laid out the theory of intersectionality that facilitates the 
consideration of race, class, and gender as intersecting identity categories. By 
understanding the interlocking of in particular disability and race in the U.S. 
American socio-historical contexts, the subversive quality of Gibson’s narrative 
strategy in decoupling these identity markers becomes transparent.  
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4.3 The Body and Actor-Networks: The Bigend Trilogy 
 
At the heart of each novel of the Bigend trilogy appears marketing guru and founder 
of the Blue Ant Agency, Hubertus Bigend, as the wirepuller. In Pattern Recognition 
he hires Cayce Pollard to find the maker of secret video art. Then, in Spook Country 
he employs ex-rock star Hollis Henry to report on locative art as a means to spy on 
geohacker Bobby Chombo. Lastly, in Zero History he appoints Hollis and ex-addict 
Milgrim to track down the designer of Gabriel Hounds, yet another secret brand.  
 While figurations of extraordinary embodiment feature strongly in Pattern 
Recognition, they only peripherally appear in Spook Country and Zero History. As 
one critic observes with regard to Zero History, “inanimate objects and, in particular, 
the brands of those objects, are more fully illuminated than the characters using those 
brands” (“Review” 25). Both latter novels interrogate the nature and flow of 
information, making the novels what I call “data narratives,” rather than “digital 
narratives” in the sense of Gibson’s early fiction. The locative art introduced in Spook 
Country relies on GPS coordinates, signals from RFID, and stable WiFi to create 
virtual site-specific multimedia installations of, for instance, River Phoenix collapsing 
on the Sunset Strip or F. Scott Fitzgerald having a heart attack. When accessed 
through a virtual reality headset, these artworks overlay actual physical locations with 
spectral 3D bodies, furniture, or architecture. Thus, divergent realities, or “annotated 
environments,” are created (173). Whereas in his technoromantic narratives characters 
enter the virtual space of the matrix, in the third trilogy cyberspace “everts,” and thus 
“[t]urns itself inside out” (28, 30). In this way, cyberspace seeps into reality. 
In the following, I will first focus on instances of extraordinary corporeality in 
Spook Country and Zero History. Then, I dedicate the rest of this chapter to an 
analysis of Cayce Pollard and Nora Volkova from Pattern Recognition. There are 
almost no instances of physical body modifications in these latter novels. The only 
explicit mention of prosthetics is when the character Garreth Wilson, a base jumper 
and Hollis’ later boyfriend, is involved in an accident, and has his thighbone rebuilt 
from a new material. Consider the following dialogue: 
 
‘Rattan. The stuff they weave baskets and furniture out of. They’ve found a 
way to turn it into a perfect analog of human bone.’  
‘You’re making that up.’  
‘They’re just starting to test it on humans. On me, in fact. Works a charm on 
sheep.’  
‘They can’t. Turn that into bone.’  
‘They put it into ovens. With calcium, other things. Under pressure. For a long 
time. Turns to bone, near enough.’  
‘No way.’  
‘If I’d thought of it, I’d have had them make you a basket. Brilliant thing 
about it, you can build exactly the bone you need, out of rattan. Work it as 
rattan. Then ossify it. Perfect replacement. Actually a lot stronger than the 
original. Microscopic structure allows the blood vessels to grow through it.’  
(Zero History 273-4). 
 
In no more than an aside, the restoration of Garreth’s leg is mentioned. The display of 
fascination for new technological procedures in rehabilitation and the enhancement of 
functionality present a reminder of the materiality of embodiment. But Garreth’s 
corporeality is inconsequential to the overall plot, and this minor anecdote is easily 
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missed. A decreasing interest in prostheses is met with an increasing attention to the 
constitutive interactions of organism and environment, as well as the psychology of 
extraordinary embodiment.  
 
 
4.3.1 Psychology 
 
It is within the Bigend trilogy that Gibson’s writing increasingly pays attention to the 
psychology involved with extraordinary embodiment. In Spook Country readers 
encounter Milgrim, a drug addict and translator who is taken captive by an ex-
government, possibly CIA, agent named Brown to spy on a Chinese-Cuban crime-
facilitating family and translate their messages. As a figuration, Milgrim offers a 
negotiation of the corporeal as well as psychological consequences of addiction, 
rehabilitation, captivity, and obedience. When Milgrim remembers that “[h]e hadn’t 
been in a very good state at all, when Brown had turned up, and someone with Ativan 
and orders had seemed like not such a bad idea,” this anecdote links back to actual 
historical strategies for the recruitment of spies and identifies traditional indicators for 
vulnerable targets (66). These indicators were anything from financial difficulty to 
drug abuse. As clinical psychologist Ursula Wilder explains, 
 
A well-trained espionage recruiter will search for vulnerable targets. 
Professional intelligence of officers are trained to spot outward signs of 
trouble in a person’s history or behavior—such as tumultuous relationships or 
frequent job changes—and to evaluate the deeper, more enduring 
psychological dysfunctions that may be at the root of the problems. These 
professional recruiters are trained to deploy sophisticated psychological 
control techniques matched to the vulnerabilities they have detected in order to 
manipulate, apply pressure, or induce a person to commit espionage. Some 
intelligence services do not limit themselves to exploiting pre-existing 
problems, but may actively foster crises to enhance the target’s susceptibility 
to recruitment. Common forms of such aggressive pursuit and manipulation of 
targets include emotional or sexual entrapment and financial manipulation 
through increasing the target’s level of debt. A psychologically vulnerable 
target’s grandiosity, sense of being above the rules, or vengeful impulses can 
all be manipulated in the service of recruitment (34). 
 
When the objective is set on making the target practically and psychologically 
dependent, illegal drugs can serve the purpose of turning an addict into a spy. Either 
the target is already addicted or the agent gets them hooked on drugs; in both cases 
the agent provides the daily supply. In another approach, the target’s use of illegal 
drugs can be made a reason for blackmail. Furthermore, the routine that drug addicts 
have developed in leading a double life (i.e. one private, secret and addictive and the 
other public, official and full-functioning) is advantageous in espionage operations. 104  																																																								
104 Wilder cites a study in which “the CIA surveyed 1,790 randomly selected employees to establish a 
baseline of employee attitudes and opinions regarding counterintelligence and security policies, 
procedures, requirements, and training. The results attest to employee awareness of the links between 
psychological factors and counter- intelligence risks. Those surveyed identified emotional instability 
related to ambition, anger leading to a need for revenge, feelings of being unrecognized and 
unrewarded, and loneliness as the top vulnerabilities on the road to espionage. They ranked such 
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Moreover, Milgrim’s name is a pun on psychologist Stanley Milgram, who in 
1961 conducted social psychology experiments on the question of obedience to 
authority figures. His landmark study claims that, a high proportion of subjects will 
fully obey an authoritative instructor despite some reluctance (Obedience to 
Authority: An Experimental View 1974). Kidnapped and provided with a daily dose of 
Ativan, Milgrim at times ponders disobeying the captor’s authority but never actually 
does:  
 
Milgrim wondered idly, almost luxuriously, what it might be like to pick 
something up, just then, and hit Brown in the head with it. He actually glanced 
around the back of the van, to see what might be available” but “he hadn’t hit 
anyone in the head since elementary school, and wasn’t likely now” (38, 39).  
 
His inability to disobey is not grounded in empathy though. In an almost sarcastic 
tone, Gibson makes Milgrim conclude, “that Stockholm syndrome was a myth. Going 
on a few weeks now, and he still wasn’t empathizing with Brown. Not even a little 
bit” (Spook Country 27). His captivity forcibly limits Milgrim’s possibilities of 
interaction, of learning to be affected. Similar with a Latourian approach, this 
prevents the development of discriminative abilities with regard to oneself as much as 
the world. In other words, it prevents articulation. The restraint of the self articulating 
becomes visible when Milgrim hears himself talk in “a version of [his] own voice, 
somewhere within some remaining citadel of self” (66). In comparison, Milgrim’s 
ability to observe objects is said to be decently developed, while his ability to interact 
with people or be aware of his own feelings is poorly articulated, and makes him both 
solitary and unsociable. 
In Zero History, Gibson presents Milgrim’s rehabilitation from drug addiction 
as well as the articulation process of the self as a social being. Time and again, 
Milgrim remembers his eight-month clinic stay in Basel, the blood change, and his 
cognitive therapist who compared his recovery to “being born” hinting at his pending 
learning processes (11, 26-27, 28). As his therapist notes, “[h]e was more at home in 
the world of objects than the world of people” (111). In therapy, Milgrim confronts 
his experience of “emulating a kind of social being that he fundamentally wasn’t. Not 
that he was unconcerned with the pain he saw in Hollis’ eyes, or with the fate of her 
friend, but that there was some language required there that he’d never learned” (174, 
emphasis added). In a child-like voice, he refers to himself as a “robot” in social 
interactions (82). He realizes that he has “worked very hard to avoid feeling much of 
anything, for most of his adult life, recognizing even the simplest of his emotions 
could require remedial effort” (108).  
It is through interactions with his therapist, Bigend, Hollis, and everyone 
involved in the investigation of Gabriel Hounds that he gradually matures, and that 
his body and subjectivity are articulated. This process of articulation is described in 
terms of an inner expansion, differentiation, and of “[s]omething was unfolding 
within him” (123). For Bigend, who sponsored Milgrim’s rehabilitation, Milgrim is 
no more than a curious test object. But Milgrim himself is motivated not so much by 
the normalizing quality of “overcoming” or “fitting-in” as he is by the exploration of 
his re-discovered self. During the process of maturation Gibson presents scenes of 
Milgrim’s self-discovery. Consider the following:  																																																																																																																																																														
problem behaviors as drug abuse and illicit sex as second, and various mental crises or stresses brought 
on by debt, work issues, or psychological factors such as depression as third.” (20)  
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‘I’m in recovery,’ said Milgrim. ‘I’m supposed to be different. If I were high, I 
wouldn’t be different.’ 
‘You seem angry.’  
‘Not with you.’  
‘But you weren’t angry, before.’  
‘It wasn’t allowed,’ he said, and she heard his amazement, as if in saying this 
he’d discovered something about himself he’d never known before. He 
swallowed (127).  
 
While captivity isolates Milgrim on a physical level, drug use does so on a 
psychological level, thus further reducing his interaction with his environment. In the 
chapter titled “Insulation,” Milgrim compares the effect of drug-induced perception to 
“eating exceptionally hot Szechuan” (Spook Country 179). He further describes that, 
“drinking cold water on top of [this] serious pepper-burn the water fill[s] your mouth 
entirely, but somehow without touching it, like a molecule-thick silver membrane of 
Chinese antimatter, like a spell, some kind of magic insulation” (179-80). While 
Milgrim describes the silver membrane insulation as “strangely delightful,” it is again 
what prevents his psychological maturation (179). Passages like these give testimony 
to Gibson’s phenomenologically driven descriptions of the lived experience of 
extraordinary embodiment. Gibson resorts to a language of the body to capture the 
feeling of detachment, isolation, and numbness that Milgrim perceives due to anxiety 
and drug abuse. This visceral language comes close to what the actual physical 
experience feels like. Similar to the argument made in chapter 4.2 of this book 
regarding the struggle for a more realistic depiction of extraordinary embodiment 
being dependent on mental images in order to imagine lives other than one’s one, 
Gibson’s language comes microscopically close to corporeal experience. 
Methodologically, this is what makes Gibson’s work new realist in the Latourian 
sense. When Mitchell and Snyder call for a “return to a phenomenology of the 
disabled body,” the realization is to take place on the basis of a language dedicated to 
the visceral (“Re-engaging the Body” 368).105  
The physical and psychological experience of addiction and anxiety resonates 
in Milgrim’s description, which does not rest on the metaphor of a machine but 
instead on a structural principle of architecture. Buckminster Fuller’s architectural 
idea of tensional integrity describes how a system of individual components 
in compression inside a net of continuous tension has by now become a common 
model for the architecture of the human body in physiology, further conceptualizing 
the body as stable and yet flexible.  
 
Addicted, not to put too fine a point on it, to substances countering a tension at 
the core of his being; something wound too tightly, perpetually threatening to 
collapse his person; imploding, as though a Buckminster Fuller tensegrity 
structure contained one element that perpetually tightened itself counter to the 
balance of forces required to sustain it. That was the experiential nature of the 
thing, though he was still capable, in the abstract, of considering that 
possibility that the core anxiety as he knew it today was in part an artifact of 
the substance. (Spook Country 231-2) 
 																																																								
105 A similar argument is found in Simi Linton’s Claiming Disability (1998). 
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While Spook Country offers insight into addiction, captivity, and obedience, Zero 
History focuses on the processes of recovery and maturation. The portrayal of 
recovery from psychological and physical abuse is not paraded or exploited for 
literary purposes, but is instead embedded in the character’s overall life activities, 
thus not reducing the character to any one single identity marker. In this sense, I argue 
for a complexity in the sense of Mitchell and Snyder’s “complex disability 
subjectivity” inherent in the depictions of the extraordinary corporeality and 
subjectivity in the Bigend trilogy that can be framed as a new realism of the body 
(Narrative Prosthesis 10). The most notable examples are the two protagonists of 
Pattern Recognition, Cayce Pollard and Nora Volkova. 
 
 
4.3.2 Sensitivity 
 
Pattern Recognition centers on Cayce Pollard, a freelance “coolhunter” who works 
for international marketing companies until commissioned by Bigend to find “the 
maker” of a collection of film clips, enigmatically known as “the footage,” whose 
underground proliferation can be considered viral (6). One of the main characteristics 
of Cayce Pollard, the protagonist of Pattern Recognition, is her ability to be affected. 
She shows a peculiar sensitivity for trends, for the success of products on the 
marketplace, and this grants her the reputation of being “a sensitive” (2). This explicit 
designation highlights that her sensitivity to her surroundings is not of the regular 
kind but of the extraordinary. The ability to discern emerging group behavioral 
patterns is extraordinary in terms of the amount and diversity of actors that Cayce can 
discern.106 As “a dowser in the world of global marketing,” Cayce anticipates markets 
before they surface (2). Cayce’s explains her talent as simply, “pattern recognition. 
[She] tr[ies] to recognize a pattern before anyone else does … It gets productized. 
Turned into units. Marketed” (88). If the perception of a pattern enables action, rather 
than inducing an allergic reaction, this can lead to a transformation of the market, and 
in a sense the world. Her work principally consists of two activities: walking the city 
streets to perceive how and by what people or things are affected, and meeting 
contractors who present her with new product designs in order to determine whether a 
product will succeed on the market or not. Both activities demand confrontation. 
Whereas on the street Cayce’s sensory capacity is constantly requested, the presented 
draft designs impact her in unknown ways and possibly problematize the integrity of 
the body if they were to trigger painful allergic reactions.  
Compared to the meticulous staging of Cayce’s extraordinary sensitivity to 
trends, Bobby Chombo’s sensitivity in Spook Country and Zero History is less 
elaborated on but indicates a similar knack for patterns. Geohacker Bobby has a talent 
for data patterns and the flow of information. Praised as the “king of tech-assist,” he is 
at the same time attested to be, “Strange? Definitely. [and] Difficult” because he “sees 
everything in terms of GPS gridlines, the world divided up that way … He won’t 
sleep in the same square twice” (Spook Country 43, 55). Dividing his environment up 
into smaller squares of a virtual grid might be read as an adjustment, a coping 
mechanism to counteract his agoraphobia (68). New to Gibson’s work is the extent in 																																																								
106 Cayce’s parents are also characterized through their ability of pattern recognition. Her father works 
in “human crowd control” and responsible for the design of barriers for rock concerts, while her 
mother’s talent is constantly doubted and a paranormal ability is implied as she finds messages in the 
electronic noise. While it is the same or at least similar ability the degree of acceptance and recognition 
depends on the context of application.  
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which he blends reality and virtuality, and the directionality which is inherent to this 
particular characterization. To Bobby, the GPS grid is so integral to his reality that he 
acts upon it. His sensitivity to virtual patterns of information is so acute and so 
strongly articulated that the distinction of actual and virtual blurs. While lives in the 
Sprawl trilogy and Bridge trilogy take place on either the vertical axis (i.e. in 
virtuality) or on the horizontal axis (i.e. reality), Spook Country and Zero History 
present a world in which reality and virtuality are no longer completely different 
places but, in fact, overlap.  
The expression of the body’s extraordinary nature in the Bigend trilogy is 
conceptualized with recourse to the notion of context rather than norm. Here disability 
is understood neither as an inherent nor an overridingly deficient quality, despite a 
disability’s sometimes disabling properties. Cayce’s extraordinary corporeality is 
specific, since it is always directed towards some patterns and not others. It is 
therefore always partial and remains invisible until triggered. As long as her “cool-
module” is not set off or an allergic reaction triggered, disabling properties remain 
absent. In her analysis of pain, Winance observes that, “the daily experience of one’s 
body is in fact that of an absent body” (“Pain” 1110). Only with the occurrence of 
irritation does pain, and thus awareness of the body, arise. “Pain prevents us from 
acting,” Winance explains, “it paralyses us” (1110). In this way, the expression of 
Cayce’s extraordinary embodiment varies with regard to the contextual specificities. 
Depending on the contextual arrangement of relations, Cayce is either able or disabled 
to act in different and specific ways. Abilities and disabilities result from the relations 
(or the disruption thereof) that people have with other entities. With reference to 
Elaine Scarry, Winance underlines the destructive power of pain which “deconstructs 
the subject’s world and encloses it within his/her body,” a process of cutting him/her 
off (1112). In her analysis, Winance relies on a phenomenological perspective on the 
“experience of pain as a transformation of ‘the being in the world’ ” (1111). Indeed, 
Gibson leaves ample hints as to how to read Cayce’s on-going articulations of body 
and subjectivity. The narrator describes that, “eyes closed, she finds herself imagining 
a symbol, something watermarking the lower right-hand corner of her existence. It is 
there, just beyond some periphery, beyond the physical, beyond vision, and it marks 
her as…what?” (80). In a striking response to this passage of self-inquiry, the next 
word in the book is “Trans” and is the title of chapter nine (81). Unambiguously 
marked, Cayce’s extraordinary corporeality and subjectivity emerge in a condition of 
“trans”—in constant transition, transformation, and transgression. On a diegetic level 
“Trans” refers to an advertising agency with a peculiar word-of-mouth advertising 
strategy. But, on a formal level Cayce’s markedness as “trans” indexes the central role 
of transformative processes in Pattern Recognition.  
In recent scholarship related to disability studies, this is precisely the direction 
that scholars like Shildrick and Braidotti point to in search for a more viable model of 
embodiment that attributes less value to the contentious dis/ability distinction. In her 
2006 book Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, Braidotti raises a series of questions 
that suggest the emancipatory potential of viewing the subject as fluid. She asks, “so 
what then, what if the subject is ‘trans’ or in transit, that is to say no longer one, 
whole, unified and in control, but rather fluid in process and hybrid? What are the 
ethical and political implication of a non-unitary vision of the human subject? (9). 
With reference to Clark’s conception of the extended phenotype, Cayce can be read as 
not separable from the ever-changing fluidity of her milieu. Her self emerges where 
brain, body, and environment collide and is further marked by what Shildrick in an 
essay fittingly titled “Border Crossings” calls a “fluidity of becoming” (145). Not 
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only does Cayce’s form of subjective embodiment fluctuate in its expression as either 
boon or bane, talent or handicap, but on another level, her physical body is in a 
constant shuffling and swaying through space. Cayce is constantly facing and 
transgressing the “[l]iminal,” and is always surrounded by “thresholds, zones of 
transition” (Pattern Recognition 263). Presented as an American who is never in the 
states, Cayce’s closest place to home is the online Footage:Fetish:Forum (or short 
F:F:F). For Cayce, “the forum has become one of the most consistent places in her 
life, like a familiar café that exists somehow outside of geography and beyond time 
zones” (4-5). The condition that the highly globalized reality enforces is, in 
Hollinger’s terms, a “historical transitoriness of the now, a moment that is virtually 
defined by the fact that it cannot remain itself” (“Stories” 464). What Hollinger 
indicates is that the temporal reality in Pattern Recognition is in a state of incessant 
transformation. As Cayce notes, “I only know that the only constant in history is 
change” (Pattern Recognition 59). This resonates strongly with what Heinz von 
Foerster, in an attempt to arrive at a cybernetic theory of subjectivity, means when he 
states that the self does not appear as something static or solid but rather is perpetually 
produced.107 In light of this, von Foerster proposes to think of the human not as 
human being but as “human becoming” (Kybernethik 96). The cybernetic organism as 
von Foerster imagines it, thus presents itself not so much as a body augmented by 
technology, but as a body in perpetual flux with its environment. In this sense, 
Cayce’s portrayal follows a truly cybernetic logic. 
 Therefore, being affected takes shape in various forms. Cayce is described as 
being “literally, allergic to fashion” (8). Rather than a metaphorical description of a 
style pundit, catching sight of certain logos has real disabling consequence for Cayce 
in the sense that her sensitivity produces violent and painful experiences. For 
instance, when Cayce walks through a clothing store, she is confronted with a variety 
of trademarks and in Gibson’s satirical voice we learn that, “Tommy Hilfiger does it 
every time” and that “[i]t’s something to do with context” (17, 18). Cayce explains 
how the derivative quality of this brand, its high level of simulation and little 
originality makes it “devoid of soul” and thus its sight is unbearable (18).108 The 
Tommy Hilfiger logo triggers “pure reaction, like biting down hard on a piece of foil” 
(18). The comparison here is to the voltaic effect which explains why biting on 
aluminum can be painful. The pressure from biting brings two dissimilar metals, 
aluminum foil and the mercury in fillings or gold in crowns in contact within the 
moist, salty environment provided by saliva. The two metals have an electrochemical 
potential difference and on condition of their connectedness electrons flow from the 
foil into the tooth. The electrical current gets conducted into the tooth’s root, thus to 
the nerve and the brain, which interprets the impulse as pain. While it is said to be 
Cayce’s “psyche” that is affected, a psychological reaction “in her head” that drains 
“her energy,” the representation here is that of a chemical reaction that provokes 
physiological consequences, such as swellings, nausea, and vomiting (17, 18). There 
is also some of Siebers’ grittiness in Cayce’s painful reaction to fashion. However, 
her disability is volatile and the occurrence of pain dependent on the specificities of 
her environment. Closer to Winance’s description of pain, what Cayce experiences is 
depicted as an unstable and multidimensional phenomenon; a physiological, 
psychological, personal, and cultural experience. Acknowledging a high variety in 																																																								
107 See Bernhard Pörksen’s Wahrheit ist die Erfindung eines Lügners (1998). 
108 As the brand implies endless reference, the footage contains no reference at all which constitutes its 
original character and pleasure for Cayce. 	
 133	
sensitivity to pain,109 Winance explains how this phenomenon signals a threat to the 
organism with respect to the “rupture” of the established links with the environment 
and the “constriction” of the person’s composition. In order to overcome the pain and 
regain her mobility, Cayce needs to leave the scene as quickly as possible and 
considers escaping to the bar on the fifth floor where the “swelling can subside” (19).  
While we learn that Cayce’s non-normative sensitivity involves physiological 
and psychological reactions, the formal description denies any profound insight into 
Cayce’s perception of them. Once an allergic reaction is set off, descriptions become 
minimal, fractional, and functional. Cayce’s escape to the bar is depicted as follows: 
“She can go there. There is a lift. Yes, a lift: a closet-sized elevator, small but 
perfectly formed. She will find it, and use it. Now. She does. It arrives, miraculously 
empty, and she steps in, pressing 5” (18-19). Whatever acoustic entertainment is 
playing in the elevator, be it music, voices, or advertisements Cayce “blocks it out” in 
this moment (19).  
It is exactly such raw description, I argue, that allows coming close to what 
Cayce experiences. In the acute experience of pain, the affected person withdraws 
from the world into the body. In pain, the body is predominantly experienced as 
recessive and the capacity to make links with the environment is restricted. Drawing 
on Leder’s idea of “intentional rupture,” Winance explains how the experience of pain 
induces a specific sequence of reactions. Winance says, “as soon as I’m in pain, I shut 
myself off from the world and concentrate on the pain. Pain causes a break in my 
relationship with the world or with other people” (“Pain” 1111). In this way, pain 
reduces the “ability to move and [the] capacity to perceive the world” (1111). Besides 
this rupture between person and environment, pain furthermore provokes an internal 
rupture to occur. With reference to Leder, Winance explains how pain brings about 
the separation of the embodied self into a “body-subject (which perceives) and a 
body-object (which is perceived)” (1111). Callon and Rabeharisoa, on the other hand, 
suggest the distinction between “to be a body” and “to have body” to capture such 
process of division (qtd. Winance 1113). When the character’s links to the 
environment are problematized in Pattern Recognition, the writing does not tell the 
reader about that process but instead mirrors it in language as in the above passage. 
No introspection or reflection on the receding body is elucidated, but the experience is 
formally enacted when the sentence structure becomes “jerky” or, staccato-like. There 
is no longer a continuous flow. There are no smooth transitions between sentences but 
language becomes ruptured, itself receding. This mimetic mode achieves directness. 
The free indirect style in phrases like “Yes, a lift” gives insight into how inarticulate 
and basal Cayce’s thoughts are in a moment of pain.  
A similar mode of description can be found in the scene where Dorotea, the 
antagonist, confronts Cayce with the design of the Michelin Man, a design that is one 
of her worst triggers: 
 
Cayce is about to scream … Cayce tries to open her mouth, to say something. 
How did Dorotea know? The silence lengthens. … ‘Cayce? Are you feeling 
well? A glass of water?’ … She’s clutching the edge of the table. … ‘I…It was 
Heinzi’s design. It…affected me.’ She manages a mechanical grimace, 
something like a smile. … She gets up from her chair, feeling unsteady. ‘I’ll 
																																																								
109 For example, to soldiers the experience of pain signals that they are still alive while to the average 
citizen it poses a danger to life (see Winance, “Pain”). 
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need the car, please.’ … Her legs feel wooden. She gets to the door, somehow 
(99-101). 
 
Again, once the protagonist is in pain, language becomes ruptured and insights into 
the perception of pain are denied. Only when the pain subsides, a movement of 
extension into the world is possible again. Relations to other entities can be renewed, 
interaction becomes possible, and language is connective again. The strength of 
Gibson’s writing lies in its mimetic quality, in how his language and style mirror the 
experience of pain, rupture, and vulnerability. Cayce’s non-normative sensitivity to 
patterns and to group formation processes makes her vulnerable to logos, products, 
their usage, display, and ownership. That Cayce “feels the things she herself owns as 
a sort of pressure” highlights an attentiveness to her enmeshed position in a network 
of heterogeneous material entities (91). Furthermore, such phrasing attends to the 
agency of things. She perceives the pressure that things exert. Here, pressure operates 
on the embodied self and addresses both the psyche and the physique.  
In other words, on the level of plot as well as form, Pattern Recognition 
attends to the painful experiences involved in non-normative corporeality in such a 
way that does not simplify, universalize, or intellectualize the experience. Rather, the 
plot and form of Pattern Recognition values the disabled body by giving room to 
messy, material, and personal expressions of corporeality. This is what makes the 
narrative new realist in method. In an almost Latourian spirit, the narrative establishes 
closeness to the experience of extraordinary corporeality rather than providing an 
objective, truthful, outsider’s description of factual mechanisms involved in disability. 
Channeling Latour, I claim that a focus on the resonance and dissonance of a 
character with other entities, and of a body and its environment, is what makes the 
subject “interesting, deep, profound.”110 In a new realist style, narrative does not 
reduce Cayce’s embodiment as given, static, or essential. Instead, it allows 
transformations and partial articulations to come into view. By portraying 
extraordinary embodiment as a relational, specific, and variable phenomenon, the 
narrative comes to value the complexity of the disabled body. Such approach is 
attuned to a variously articulated sensorium; an articulation that is always situational, 
always partial. Along these lines, disability cannot be understood as a single 
overriding characteristic, but demands the consideration of individually more or less 
articulate abilities. 
In contrast, when literary scholar David Wills narrates his father’s experience 
of phantom pain in his book Prosthesis this is done in a diegetic rather than mimetic 
style. Consider the following:  
 
there is no controlling it in spite of finally leaning way out against gravity with 
all the grace of pure dissent, the candor of a protracted liminal pause that 
provokes its own interruption, dancing on the fluid edges of an affirmative no 
return … the moment seems saturated beyond all logical possibility … for the 
data dam is bursting on its axial pinpoint such that nothing can be said to be 
present there within the bounds of a confinable space, nothing but phantoms of 
the present where all is shifting, crossing, functions of relay, except that 
perhaps, what else to say, across that ghost of a space there comes the change, 
where once there was only shifting there is suddenly a beast rampant in 
triumphant otherness, all fluid and gleaming (2).  																																																								
110 As quoted earlier in this chapter; see Latour, “How we Talk About the Body” 210. 
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Very much like Cayce’s somatic and uncontrollable reactions to her environment, 
Wills frames his father’s experience as ‘dancing on the fluid edges of an affirmative 
no return.’ Expressive of a modality of existence that falls within the limits of what 
would most likely be labeled “disability,” both of their affective responses create a 
feeling of ‘a present where all is shifting, crossing.’ Portraying a human being that is 
not entombed in itself but relational and connected, Wills’ description resonates with 
Cayce’s condition in terms of a common departure from absolute autonomy. Both 
reinforce the conception of an extended and relational organism that, as Wills puts it, 
“go[es] with whatever flow flows” (1). With a similar content matter at hand, it is 
illuminating to see how Gibson and Wills diverge widely with regard to the mode of 
depiction with is partly owed to the difference between novelistic and critical writing. 
In Wills’ we clearly do not perceive the voice of the person in pain, but we are 
presented with a poetic mediation of that experience by an observer. Description is 
thus more remote from the experience.  
 
 
COPING MECHANISMS 
 
Over the course of the novel, various forms of adjustment are presented to help Cayce 
handle disabling situations. One of Cayce’s most problematic triggers is, she 
confesses, “Bibendum. That’s his name. And also the name of a restaurant in the 
retrofitted Michelin House, where of course Cayce has never gone” (100). This short 
passage illustrates how Cayce aims to avoid the experience of pain and the ensuing 
processes of rupture and disconnection, which ultimately leads to a limitation of 
action. The strategy of avoidance informs her geographical whereabouts. Certain 
trademarks make her go to particular streets, stores, and restaurants but not others thus 
contributing in structuring her movements. By taking some and avoiding other 
pathways, Cayce works on remaining active. 
Dedicated to an investigation of the forms of adjustment, and the ways in 
which adjustment can enable or forbid action, Winance analyzed how wheelchair-
users try out and decide on their wheelchairs in her article, “Trying Out the 
Wheelchair: The Mutual Shaping of People and Devices through Adjustment.” 
Grounding her observations in Latour’s ANT, Winance argues that, the “action ‘to 
move’ results from the conjunction of many small impulses coming from everywhere 
and passing from one actor to another” (60). She concludes that “action is partly 
realized by the person and partly by the device” (59).111 In her example it is the 
wheelchair, in mine it is the distribution of trademarks. Adjustment in this framework 
describes “a work on the links” in order to find the most comfortable or enabling 
arrangement (57). The established relations “shape the person and the device, what 
they are, and what they will be able to do” (57). Or more specifically, “the person is 
made through the interactions he or she has with other entities” (67). Adjustment is 
furthermore described as “a double movement of opening and closing the person’s 
world” since certain links allow for certain activities while the lack of other links 
prevents other activities (64). The process of adjustment does not only entail a 
material, but also an emotional, adjustment. In an updated version of her notion of 
adjustment, Winance explains how the process of adaptation can be differentiated into 																																																								
111  This corresponds to Harrasser’s notion of the “semi-sovereign body” in her discussion of 
parahumanism. 
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the reflexive process of adjustment (which is a mutual and planned adaptation 
between person and device/environment) and the non-reflexive process of 
accommodation (which describes the material shaping of body and 
device/environment) (“From Repair to Enhancement” 5). 
  The consequences of her non-normative, highly articulate sensitivity are 
extensive, and necessitate Cayce to adjust her life style. Cayce’s sensitivity to context 
causes her to value everything that is void of temporal or geographical markers. For 
instance, Cayce’s own wardrobe consists of  
 
CPUs. Cayce Pollard Units. That’s what Damian calls the clothing she wears. 
CPUs are either black, white or gray, and ideally seem to have come into this 
world without human intervention. What people take for relentless 
minimalism is a side effect of too much exposure to the reactor-cores of 
fashion (8). 
 
Despite the fact that Cayce carefully removes all trademarks from her clothes, every 
item appears almost generic such as, for instance, “the CPU Damian calls Skirt Thing, 
a long, narrow, anonymously made tube of black jersey, with only the most minimal 
hemming at either end” (53). Cayce’s distinctiveness as “a design-free zone, a one-
woman school of anti,” stands in stark contrast to passages oozing with material 
details (9). Again, through a mimetic mode of description we come close to the 
articulate perception of a restaurant frequented by the protagonist:  
 
Charlie Don’t Surf is full, the food California-inflected Vietnamese fusion 
with more than the usual leavening of colonial Frenchness. The white walls 
are decorated with enormous prints of close-up black-and-white photographs 
of ’Nam-era Zippo lighter, engraved with crudely drawn American military 
symbols, still cruder sexual motifs, and stenciled slogans. These remind Cayce 
of photographs of tombstones in confederate graveyards, except for the 
graphic content and the nature of the slogans, and the ’Nam theme suggests to 
her that the place has been here for a while (14). 
 
In comparison to the fractured and recessive passages depicting pain, here an 
extension into the world and the abundance of associations in Cayce’s perception 
become visible. This sheer density of product information, or in Frederic Jameson’s 
words, “noisy commodities” that oftentimes suffuses Gibson’s fiction explains her 
enthusiasm for the minimalist aesthetics of the footage (“Fear and Loathing” 114). 
After the first appearances of segments online, an underground obsession 
sprouts and the self-proclaimed “footageheads” found the “Fetisch:Footage:Forum” 
for exchanging views over the nature, origin, and meaning of the mysterious 
fragments (Pattern Recognition 4). Its most exceptional attribute is the “careful lack 
of period markers” (59). The indeterminacy of visual information and the ostensible 
randomness of the segments’ upload give reason for speculation and moreover cause 
the two diverging beliefs of it being either a work in progress (the Progressives) or a 
completed and individually distributed work (the Completists). The descriptions of 
the individual fragments resemble each other in their elusiveness of information. 
Consider the following descriptions:   
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It opens on that rooftop, against the oddly shaped chimneys. He is there. Walks 
to the low parapet. Looks out toward a city that never resolves. A framegrab on 
what he sees would reveal only a faint arrangement of vertical and horizontal 
lines. No focus. Definitely a skyline but not enough information to provide any 
sort of identification (125). 
The girl wears a longer coat, equally dark but seemingly of fabric, its shoulder-
padding the subject of hundreds of posts. The architecture of padding in a 
woman's coat should yield possible periods, particular decades, but there has 
been no agreement, only controversy. She is hatless, which has been taken 
either as the clearest of signs that this is not a period piece, or simply as an 
indication that she is a free spirit, untrammeled by even the most basic 
conventions of her day. Her hair has been the subject of similar scrutiny, but 
nothing has ever been definitively agreed upon. The one hundred and thirty-four 
previously discovered fragments, having been endlessly collated, broken down, 
reassembled, by whole armies of the most fanatical investigators, have yielded 
no period and no particular narrative direction (23-4). 
 
For the viewer, the footage provides experience without meaning. On this 
fragmentary basis the footageheads relate, connect, and re-assemble the segments in 
order to obtain a narrative and, eventually, a sense. Whether these relations produce 
actual knowledge or present a case of apophenia is constantly debated in the novel. 
Cayce declares, “maybe you’ve been looking at this stuff for so long that you’ve read 
all this into it. And talking with other people who’ve been doing the same thing” 
(111). Cayce fathoms that “[t]here is a lack of evidence, an absence of stylistic cues, 
that [she] understands to be utterly masterful” (23). The minimalism in the setting and 
the protagonists’ clothing make it impossible to locate the two figures depicted in 
each segment: “He might be a sailor, stepping onto a submarine in 1914, or a jazz 
musician entering a club in 1957” (23). Cayce is deeply “fascinated by its 
timelessness” (23). Perceived as almost outside of culture due to their a-historical and 
a-geographical nature, the segments’ popularity increases steadily and raises the 
attention of Cayce’s employer Hubertus Bigend, an internationally highly influential 
businessman and head of the Blue Ant marketing agency. Employing Cayce as a 
coolhunter turns out not to be Bigend’s primary interest. The top player in the new 
world order of global corporate culture follows a his own agenda and hires Cayce to 
find the maker of the footage. However, Bigend admires the footage as, “the single 
most effective piece of guerilla marketing ever” and because of “[her] talents, [her] 
allergies, [her] tame pathologies” and her private passion for the footage, Cayce 
becomes a valuable asset (67). Despite fearing the footage getting marketed by “a 
nominal Belgian who looks like Tom Cruise on a diet of virgins’ blood and truffled 
chocolates,” Cayce agrees to the mission out of personal curiosity for the origin of the 
segments (7).  
 
 
THE COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY TO ACT 
 
In the fashion of a detective following clues, Cayce traces an array of heterogeneous 
actors and associations in order to identify “the maker.” In Pattern Recognition, the 
footage as new innovative video art moves viewers to engage in controversies about 
the nature of its meaning and thus prompts the formation of a subculture of 
“footageheads,” i.e. of groups in support of disparate theories regarding the origin of 
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the segments and of conflicting interest groups. Confronted with a situation in which 
both the range of the individuals, groups, brands, businesses, technologies, reasons, 
meanings, and agendas fluctuate and the connections between those actors are 
uncertain. Cayce cannot settle for plain cause-and-effect relationships, but by 
following the movement of action makes the highly complex concatenation of actors 
visible.  
In Roland Barthes’ terms, the interlinkages of characters, things, places, and 
events come in a “writerly” rather than “readerly” style112 since they remain without 
any narrative explanation or comment and are thus not self-evident.113 The novel’s 
opening scene depicts how Cayce walking through Nottingham gets mistaken for a 
potential customer of Curta calculators by a group of street dealers. While this chance 
event initially appears completely random and irrelevant for the protagonist, their 
encounter establishes ties between the characters and thus Voytek, Hobbs, and Ngemi 
are incrementally incorporated in the emergence of action.  As is Parkaboy, Cayce’s 
closest friend from F:F:F. Together with yet another friend called Darryl, Parkaboy 
translates conversations about the footage from a Japanese website and finds evidence 
that segment #78 was watermarked. A finding they consider, “the single greatest 
scoop since footage first found web” (75). By creating, in effect, “genderbait for 
nerds” in the form of a fictional girl character called Keiko, Parkaboy and Darryl 
intend to elicit the decryption of the watermark from Taki, a loose member of a group 
referred to as “Mystics” claiming to know a deciphered multi-digit number (76). At 
the same time Blue Ant provides Cayce with partner Boone Chu, a “[h]ands-on 
generalist” in order to facilitate and monitor her work (105). Together they travel to 
Tokyo, where Cayce meets Taki to deliver a signed photograph of Keiko in exchange 
for the code. It is through interactions and relationships with these characters that 
Cayce is able to act.  
In an earlier conversation Cayce turns to Voytek, who has become a trusted 
friend, asking   
 
‘you could use the watermark to follow the dissemination of a given 
image or video clip?’ He nods. ‘Who does this, the actual watermarking?’  
‘There are companies.’  
‘Could a watermark be traced to a particular company, its number?’  
‘Would not be so good for client security.’  
‘Would it be possible for someone to detect, or extract, a secret 
watermark? Without knowing the code, or who placed it there, or even 
being sure it's there in the first place?’  
Voytek considers. ‘Difficult, but might be done. Hobbs knows these 
things’ (84). 
 
Boone finds out that it is a company called Sigil Technologies who watermark the 
segments and as Cayce explains, “Each of these numbers is a code … identifying a 
particular sequence in a piece of information. Each sequence has one of these 
numbers encrypted, for purposes of identification, and to enable it to be tracked” 
(240). Since it modifies the modalities of the input, generating a new and 
unpredictable output, Sigil Technologies functions as what in ANT terminology can 
be considered a mediator, rather than an intermediary, which “transports meaning or 																																																								
112 See Roland Barthes’ S/Z (1970). 
113 Or in Gibson’s own words: “My own pleasure as a reader of that type of fiction is being left in the 
dark, confused, gradually putting it together” (Sturgeon, “Nostalgia for the Future” par.13).  
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force without transformation” (39). Segments sent to Sigil are transformed and 
returned to the sender. More specifically, Sigil encrypts a multi-digit number into 
each segment which makes them traceable and, when taken all together, designates a 
location for each on an imaginary map. Following this chain of transformation, Cayce 
traces an actor-network, which is not pre-given but comes into view with Cayce’s 
exploration of the footage. By means of the number from the decoded watermark she 
obtained from Taki, she attempts to find out to whom Sigil Technologies sent the 
encrypted segment to. Through Voytek and his sister Magda, Cayce learns that Hobbs 
is a former cryptographer and mathematician who can still locate information through 
his NSA “[o]ld-boy networks” (219). Knowing of his passion for calculators and his 
fascination with a specific collector’s piece, Cayce is able to make a deal. She offers 
to buy and trade a valuable collectable for a tiny piece of writing; the email address 
Sigil sent the coded segments to. As with Taki, she counts on a person’s passion and 
exchanges a thing for a piece of writing. Using his channels of information, Hobbs is 
able to provide the email address becoming an enabler of action.  
What does that mean for the conceptualization of Cayce’s ability to investigate, 
to act? Who acts when Cayce is acting? Yes, her articulated sensitivity makes her an 
ideal researcher, investigator and traveler and she appears to be the lynchpin of action. 
But, it becomes clear that without Parkaboy and Darryl’s finding and ability to 
translate from Japanese, Taki’s decryption of the watermark and his libidinal desires, 
Boone Chu’s guardianship and investigation of Sigil Technology, Voytek’s cordial 
support and link to Hobbs, Hobbs’ connections to the NSA and his passion for 
calculators, and Bigend’s infinite financial means and interest in guerilla marketing, 
action would not be possible. All of these characters follow their own interests and 
motivations shaping their trajectories. The events the novel presents happen at the 
nodes, which emerge when these trajectories intersect, and complex concatenations of 
actors come into being. These characters’ abilities, acts and individual ties factor into 
Cayce’s abilities and inabilities. Moreover, it is on the paths of translation processes 
that she travels. Taki’s desire is translated into a piece of customized photo-shopped 
pornography and exchanged for the code. Hobbs’ fascination for math and code 
translates into an affinity for calculators, and so on. 
Despite this abundance in characters, it is not only human actors who enable 
action throughout the novel. In the scene when Cayce formulates the message to the 
Russian email address, the narrative attends to the ways in which non-human actors 
partake in action. The moment of sending off the message by the movement of a 
single finger on a touchpad and thus establishing a link to “the maker” is described as 
an unconscious or involuntarily act. Consider the following passages: 
  
Aware in just that instant of how the park distances the sound of London, giving 
her the sensation of existing at some still point around which all else revolves. 
As though the broad gravel avenues are leys, terminating at Peter Pan. The 
angry child’s fingers, typing. stellanor@armaz.ru And that in the address 
window, as though she would actually send it. Touchpadding down menu to 
Send. And of course she doesn’t. And watches as it sends. ‘I didn’t,’ she 
protests to the iBook on the grass, the colors of its screen faint in the sunlight. ‘I 
didn’t,’ she says to Peter Pan. She couldn’t have. She did  (267). 
Accept that it happened, she tells herself. Table all questions of intentionality. 
She almost feels as though something in the park had made her do it. Genius 
loci, Parkaboy would say. Too much sun. Convergence of lines. (Convergence 
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of something, certainly, she guesses, but in some part of herself she can’t 
access) (268).  
 
This passage may serve as an exemplification of how human decisions and actions do 
not originate in an enclosed human being in any absolute sense but instead emerge 
from within interactions with the milieu. What Hayles with reference to this passage 
understands as a “gesture, taking place as a somatic action below awareness” suggests 
the understanding of human agency as a confluence of internal and external forces 
(“Traumas of Code” 146). What Gibson’s figuration exemplifies is a form of 
collective, collaborative capacity to act. Such notion of agency permits to account for 
all the human and non-human actors involved in decision making and acting in the 
sense Jane Bennett endorses when she questions the strong autonomy of the Western 
autonomous rational subject. 
 
 
4.3.3 Capacities of Incapacity 
 
The negotiation of extraordinary bodies takes another twist when Cayce finally meets 
“the maker.” In response to her message, Cayce is invited to Moscow to meet Stella 
Volkova, the twin sister of a former student filmmaker and then “the maker,” Nora 
Volkova herself. The Volkova sisters come from a rich oligarch family that was the 
target of a bomb attack responsible for the death of their parents and their own 
injuries. As a result of a piece of shrapnel lodged in Nora’s brain, she is paraplegic. 
Echoing the narrative structure of Idoru, Pattern Recognition hinges on a 
character who is at the novel’s grand finale revealed to have a severe physical 
disability. In Idoru it is only at the end of the novel that protagonist Chia McKenzie 
learns about the identity of her virtual friend Zona Rosa. Although Zona, the avatar of 
the Mexican girl Mercedes Purissima, has all along co-determined the plot, her 
identity was repressed in the narrative and her deformities are revealed only at the 
end. In Pattern Recognition, Gibson presents Nora Volkova, or “the maker,” in a 
similar way. Rather than merely suffusing the narrative with her absent presence, the 
unknown creator of the footage appears as an actual driving force of the narrative. 
Without any material appearance or information about her identity, “the maker” 
prevails as an empty signifier until the final pages of Pattern Recognition where 
finally, the creative genius is unveiled as a hidden away paraplegic.  
Contrary to diagnoses abiding by a linear medical model as seen in chapter 2.1, 
Gibson offers the portrayal of a non-linear process of recovery in the depiction of 
Nora’s hospitalization. Like Tobin Siebers’ analyses, the representation of Nora’s 
disability negotiates pain without providing any easy solution. The gritty reality 
becomes visible through its acknowledgement and the requirement of an active 
negotiation. While confrontation with a former film project causes Nora great pain, it 
prompts action as well. 
 
The doctors had asked me her interests and of course there was only film. 
Shortly, we were shown an editing suite which our uncle had caused to have 
assembled there, in the clinic. We showed Nora the film she had been working 
on, in Paris, before. Nothing. As if she could not see it. Then she was shown her 
film from Cannes. That she saw, but it seemed to cause her great pain. Soon she 
began to use the equipment. To edit. Recut (298). 
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This scene presents a situation of collective confrontation among actors: Stella’s and 
the doctors’ willingness to provide a comfortable setting, Nora’s inability to verbally 
communicate her needs and passions, Nora’s prior artwork, her memories, her pain, 
her uncle’s financial assets to provide editing equipment, and Nora’s willingness to 
use the equipment. This collective confrontation and negotiation of the actor’s 
interrelation needs to be considered a work on the person’s body and the joint aid 
(“Trying Out” 57). Stella as sister and caretaker, the doctors, the editing equipment, 
and Nora work together on finding a comfortable arrangement for everyone involved. 
Trying out different settings entails establishing and dissolving connections, such as 
surrounding Nora with different doctors, presenting her with different editing 
equipment and different film material until she is enabled to engage. As Winance 
explains, “adjustment is a work on the links that shape the person and the device, 
what they are, and what they will be able to do” (57). Furthermore, she explains how 
the ties holding a person and their device are “undone to see which ones are ‘rigid’ 
and which ones are ‘flexible’” (57). After Nora edits the film down to a single frame 
which shows a bird in flight, she “went inside” (Pattern Recognition 298). Stella 
explains and continues,  
 
She ceased to speak, then to react. To eat. Again they fed her with tubes. I was 
crazy … In the end they said they could do nothing. It could not be removed … 
The last fragment. It rests between the lobes, in some terrible way. It cannot be 
moved. Risk is too great (298). 
 
In this case, the link between the last fragment and Nora’s lobes is too rigid to be 
disrupted. Through this process of testing “knots appear” and some of “these knots 
are the ties impossible to untie or to replace” (“Trying Out” 57). Consequently, the 
adjustment continues aiming to make new links or attachments that as a hybrid 
collective take shape of something new. Stella recounts the adjustment process as 
follows: 
 
The most clever of the doctors, he was from Stuttgart. He had them put a line 
from that camera into her editing suite. When she looked at those images, she 
focused. When the images were taken away, she began to die again. He taped 
two hours of this, and ran it on the editing deck. She began to cut it. To 
manipulate … That was the beginning (Pattern Recognition 299). 
 
Winance states that, “testing the links that define the person’s body, actors are also 
testing the person’s world, that is, the entities that compose it and the relations that are 
established between those entities” (“Trying Out” 63). The equipment is more than a 
mere utensil Nora uses, its status changes from “world-object” to incorporated object. 
Winance argues that, “the aid becomes part of the body (and the person) in the sense 
that it modifies the way the person perceives, moves and relates to the world” (58-9). 
According to such logic, the body is conceptualized as “extended” and action is 
“partly realized by the person and partly by the device” (61, 59).114 
Pattern Recognition presents adjustment as a continuous process, which is 
facilitated through their uncle’s extensive financial support and allows for situating 
Nora at a derelict cinema, at the site of former creative freethinkers. Through multiple 																																																								
114 Winance’s observation can be read in correspondence with Clark’s idea of the ‘extended body’ 
which in a similar way argues for the crucial role of relationships to non-human entities as exemplifies 
by patients of Alzheimer’s disease (or Tuna fish). 
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micro-adjustments, such as choosing a suitable editing technology, finding a 
comfortable position for Nora and the equipment, darkening the room and so on, both 
strong and weak points gradually take shape and together bring about a heterogeneous 
collective. Moreover, Winance emphasizes that this kind of “adjustment is a double 
movement of opening and closing the person’s world” or more specifically, that “[t]o 
open possibilities is simultaneously to close possibilities and to create impossibilities” 
(64). 
The heterogeneous collective that emerges from such adjustment processes 
involves human as well as non-human actors. Nora is cared for by her sister who is 
the one uploading the video clips onto the internet. Stella explains that her sister, “is 
the artist” (296). Herself she considers, “[t]he distributer … [t]he one who finds an 
audience” (296). In this way, the distribution and delegation of action is suspended 
across diverse channels, human as well as technological. Upon their first meeting, 
Cayce finds Nora’s gestures condensed to the movement of a single finger while the 
rest of her body is motionless. As Cayce watches pixel after pixel on “the largest LCD 
display [she] has ever seen” being assembled into the magical stills, she finds a first 
confirmation of the work-in-progress hypothesis advocated by the Progressives, one 
subgroup of footageheads (314). Observing how the “visual information, the grain of 
that imagery” is manually generated confirms the entirely computer-generated nature 
that footageheads assumed actually exists on the basis of the identical resolution in 
each of the segments (110). What seems to make this hypothesis unconvincing is the 
sheer intensity of the labor it requires. Following this procedure of production, each 
segment needs to undergo a rendering process at so-called “rendering farms”. 
Consider the following description: 
 
Big room, lots of stations, renderers working through your footage a frame at a 
time. Labor intensive. Shakespeare’s monkeys, but working to a plan. 
Rendering is expensive, human-intensive, involves a lot of people, and would 
probably be impossible to keep a secret, for very long, in a situation like this. 
Someone would tell, unless there are unusual constraints in place.  These people 
sit there and massage your imagery a pixel at a time. Sharpen it up. Add detail. 
Do hair. Hair is a nightmare (110). 
 
This insight into the labor-intensive demands on the production of the footage offers 
another glimpse into the immense density/interconnectivity of the network in which 
Nora is entwined. Her uncle is able to contribute the facilities, the high-end 
technology, the man-power, and the financial assets that enable Nora to produce the 
footage. In order to get Nora’s clips rendered, Cayce learns, “one of Volkov’s 
corporations decide[d] to set up a test operation, where healthy, motivated prisoners 
can lead healthy, motivated lives, plus receive training and career direction” (340). 
Thus, the inmates of an entire prison work in the service of the production of the 
anonymously distributed collage of film stills.  
Cayce can only be understood through this connectedness with her material, 
psychological, and semiotic surroundings. Pattern Recognition’s the main character is 
quintessentially defined through her relationality and her dependence, rather than 
through a Western ideal of an autonomous subject acting upon an environment. 
Cayce’s profession simultaneously contributes to further progressive articulation of 
embodiment. This implies that the refinement of her ability to differentiate is always 
specific and, in this respect, always partial.  
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From an interdisciplinary angle, the figuration of extraordinary corporeality as 
presented in the character of Nora reveals the negotiation of the cornerstones of the 
concept of disability. Gibson offers figurations to reflect on the formative processes of 
adjustment, the arrangement of actors into a comfortable constellation, the co-
extensive character of corporeality, and the forms of distribution of competencies and 
transfer of action. In this regard, Winance explains that the fact that action is 
“distributed and delegated, is not peculiar to the case of disabled people surrounded 
by devices. However, in this case, the distribution is only possible through the process 
of adjustment, material and emotional” (60). The notion of partial control over one’s 
body as well as one’s surroundings, media studies scholar Karin Harrasser denotes as 
“semi-sovereign” (112). In Körper 2.0, Harrasser’s criticism of the neoliberal 
ideology of the continuous improvement of the body builds on Latour’s Actor-
Network-Theory. The “semi-sovereign body” serves as an alternative concept to the 
neoliberal myth that all bodies are principally equal and differentiated by individual 
performance depending on individual will-power. This emphasis on how bodies are 
embedded in an infinite meshwork of supra-individual processes and power relations 
is central to her argument. (117). Nobody and nothing decides self-determinately for 
their exact enmeshment in a particular network. It is always partially active and 
partially passive processes that interlock when somebody or something acts (125). 
Such conceptualizations of disability differ fundamentally from the mechanico-bio-
medical, as well as the social, model approach in that they do not locate disability in 
either the individual or society but attend to the interactional processes of all relevant 
actors regardless of their nature. 
In Pattern Recognition, all of these actors (i.e. Stella, the uncle, the inmates of 
an entire prison, the equipment, and the internet) make a difference and are not 
substitutable. It is through processes of transformation that all the actors are 
interconnected. Nora’s subjectivity/creativity is translated into black and white film 
segments, which are then rendered by prisoners, watermarked by Sigil Technology’s 
staff, uploaded by Stella, and re-assembled by footageheads. It needs all these 
transformative processes from the raw CCTV material Nora receives to become “the 
footage.” In the following I direct attention to one final non-human actor, which is 
fundamentally constitutive for Nora’s extraordinary corporeality.  
 
 
NON-HUMAN ACTORS 
 
What dramatically changed the life of Nora Volkova is a piece of metal of whose 
biography we learn in detail:  
 
Something stamped out, once, in its thousands, by an automated press in some 
armory in America. Perhaps the workers who’d made that part, if they’d thought 
at all in terms of end-use, had imagined it being used to kill Russians … And 
somehow this one specific piece of ordnance, adrift perhaps since the days of 
the Soviets’ failed war with the new enemies, and this one small part, only 
slightly damaged by the explosion of the ruthlessly simple device, had been 
flung into the very center of Nora’s brain. And from it, and from her other 
wounds, there now emerged, accompanied by the patient and regular clicking of 
her mouse, the footage (315-16). 
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It is through this stark focus on the material things which both severs and connects 
Nora’s brain that the significance and power of materiality is foregrounded in the 
narrative’s intricate course of events. As illustrated earlier, the shrapnel severs Nora’s 
cerebral hemispheres in a way that irrevocably changes her in ways that entail 
paralysis and pain. From the status of a “world-object,” this piece of metal transforms 
into a non-human actors that is incorporated. It becomes an essential part of the 
organism or to use Winance’s terminology, a “rigid link” is established. Without this 
link, Nora cannot survive. While the shrapnel is destructive in one way, it allows for a 
peculiar productive power in another. Here, the specificity of the material plays a 
crucial role since it is only due to the metallic object’s conductive capacity that the 
communication between the brain’s hemispheres is enabled and entirely new 
pathways of connectivity are set up. Like Jane Bennett’s notion of “thing-power,” this 
particular material-thing acts and thus plays a significant role in the production 
process of the footage. From this perspective, the hemispheres are connected through 
a piece of electrically conductive material, allowing for a discharge that expresses 
itself in the form of digital video clips. Cayce reflects on the fact that it is a 
 
T-shaped city [that] Nora is mapping through the footage … Her consciousness, 
Cayce understands, somehow bounded by or bound to the T-shaped fragment in 
her brain: part of the arming mechanism of the Claymore mine that killed her 
parents, balanced too deeply, too precariously within her skull, to ever be 
removed (315). 
 
The cut Gibson develops in the figuration of Nora operates on three levels. First, there 
is the material cut through Nora’s hemispheres. The re-connection and concomitant 
availability of new channels of interrelation inform her desire to continuously re-cut 
old CCTV video material, which in turn gives the resulting footage a quality of 
“cutting across boundaries, transgressing the accustomed order of things” (20). 
Acutely affected by this transgressive quality, Cayce can only point to the “[t]he feel 
of it”—both emotional and material quality—and stresses that the footage “matters, 
matters in some unique way” (78). This multilayered notion of the shrapnel as a cut as 
well as a link is finally symbolized by two lines captured at the moment of 
intersection, at the T-shape of the object. Gibson’s figurations of non-normative 
corporeality capture the process of becoming a singular network of interdependencies 
and foreground the vibrant materiality involved. Nora’s condition of fragmentation 
and yet connectedness is also mirrored in her being a twin. Stella introduced herself to 
Cayce as “I am twins” (296). While Nora produces the clips, the footage would not 
exist without Stella’s distributive skills.  
Drawing on Mitchell and Snyder’s notion of the “capacities of incapacity,” 
Nora’s non-normative corporeality effervesces with creativity (Biopolitics 187). Its 
efficacy shows in the ways the footage is understood as utterly innovative, as 
“[s]omehow entirely new” and also deeply affecting the lives of others, and changing 
international socio-cultural structures (Pattern Recognition 67). Since Nora’s video 
art “goes viral,” an underground fan community forms and founds an online forum to 
discuss the meaning of the footage. Its impact goes as far as quickening the interest of 
Hubertus Bigend, who sends out Cayce as investigator.  
In the figuration of Nora Volkova, Gibson develops a complex extraordinary 
corporeality that expresses both pain and pleasure, stasis and transformation, as 
contingent modalities of becoming bodies—including paraplegic corporealities. 
Besides the fact that the shrapnel in Nora’s brain cannot be removed, and according to 
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medical rubrics her ‘wholeness’ cannot be restored, all other implications are much 
more ambiguous. Criticism regarding literary depictions of disability often focus on 
frequently depicted overcompensation of the superhuman on the one hand and on the 
deficiency of the subhuman on the other. Gibson’s representations address 
problematic conditions without denying their painful realities or rendering characters 
to a single defining criterion. In an attempt to conceptualize non-normative bodies, 
Gibson circumvents unambiguous and definitive attributions of pity, tragedy, and 
deficit. When Cayce is granted permission to watch Nora work, the description of 
Nora oscillates between fascination and pathologization, admiration and empathy, and 
eventually the recognition of potential without any conclusive deflation into common 
categories: “It is here, in the languid yet precise moves of a woman’s pale hand. In the 
faint click of image-capture. In the eyes only truly present when focused on this 
screen. Only the wound, speaking wordlessly in the dark” (316). The footage, as 
Nora’s creative discharge, requires the shrapnel as well as the individual prisoner, and 
the editing programs as well as Stella’s voice. By tracing the actor-network, Cayce 
makes visible that Nora is in fact not the epitome of a creative genius in any strong 
sense, but rather, that she is part of a hybrid collective and intricately enmeshed in a 
material production network. A network that, as a moving whole, brings forth the 
footage. Her agency is radically distributed and suspended across a multiplicity of 
human and technological nodes. As if to highlight the hybridity of Nora’s corporeality 
and subjectivity, the pseudonym that ultimately leads Cayce onto her tracks, 
“stellanor@,” fuses Nora with her sister, with technology, and with the internet. With 
an awareness of the artist’s immersion into these interrelations, “the creative process 
is,” as Bigend prophetically proclaims “no longer contained within an individual 
skull, if indeed it ever was” (Pattern Recognition 70). The individual skull, similar to 
Clark’s notion of “the skin-bag,” is not regarded as the singular seat of subjectivity. 
Clark, philosopher and cognitive scientist, advocates the fundamental embeddedness 
of an organism within its context. Clark holds that, 
 
what matters are the complex feedback loops that connect action-commands, 
bodily motions, environmental effects, and multisensory perceptual inputs. It is 
the two-way flow of influence between the brain, body, and world that matters, 
and on the basis of which we construct (and constantly re-construct) our sense 
of self, potential, and presence. The biological skin-bag [alone] has no special 
significance here. It is the flow that counts (Natural-Born Cyborgs 114). 
 
The flow of the network facilitates a creative process that, on the one hand, shapes the 
identities of its actors as well as brings forth the footage. When Stella explains, Nora 
“is here, when she is working … When she is not working, she is not here” this 
foregrounds how Nora only exists in process (313). Latour underscores that,  
 
[b]eing connected, being interconnected, or being heterogeneous is not enough. 
It all depends on the sort of action that is flowing from one to the other, hence 
the words ‘net’ and ‘work’. Really, we should say ‘worknet’ instead of 
‘network’. It’s the work, and the movement, and the flow, and the changes that 
should be stressed (Reassembling 143).  
 
Without the interconnection with and the flow of action between, for instance, the 
editing equipment, Nora’s subjectivity lacks all expression. Nora does not merely use 
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the equipment, but it becomes that through which she acts. In the continuous process 
of “[m]ouse-click. Zoom. Into image-grain. Some quick adjustments. Clicks. Out of 
zoom” Nora is in a state of becoming (314). Watching Nora in action, Cayce is moved 
to tears. 
Moreover, disability—when understood as a fixed and unchanging state—is 
no longer a productive category to assess Nora’s mode of non-normative 
embodiment. Shildrick goes against the general assumption that “disability is a fixed 
and unchanging state which pre-exists its observation” in stating that “not only is 
disability a fluid set of conditions but that the body itself is always in process” 
(“Breaking the Boundaries” 436). The disabled body is a “material site of possibility 
where de-formations, ‘missing’ parts and prosthesis are enablers of new channels of 
desiring production unconstrained by predetermined—or at least normative—
organization” (“Prosthetic Performativity” 122). In Nora’s case, the shrapnel creates a 
universe. “[A] universe comes into being,” mathematician and philosopher George 
Spencer Brown explains in Laws of Form “when a space is severed” (v). However, 
the cut, somewhat paradoxically, does not separate her lobes but rather enables novel 
ways of mediation between them initiating the extensive relations and facilitating the 
connections that become the very fabric of her subjectivity. The insertion of the T-
shaped piece of metal significantly contributes to the emergence of something 
“entirely new.” The footage creates, as Cayce explains, “that sense of … I don’t 
know. Of an opening into something. Universe? Narrative?” (112).  
 In this chapter, I demonstrate how Gibson adopts a new realist style that 
allows approximating the experience of extraordinary embodiment in the moment of 
its emergence. Bigend trilogy approaches the topics of sensory sensitivity, paraplegia, 
and addiction recovery through ways that are not concerned with medical values but 
focus on the individual perception of the extraordinary body. In that Gibson portrays 
extraordinary corporeality as an experience of sensory ambivalence apropos pain and 
pleasure. In this way, Gibson presents novel ways to think the extraordinary body 
attending to its volatile materiality, its vulnerable social status, and its interrelational 
complexity. Gibson’s narrative strategies change insofar as the extraordinary figure is 
no longer set against a normal counter figure in the Bigend trilogy, but against the 
readers’ own attitudes. Revealing, for instance, Nora as the disabled artist genius only 
at the end of Pattern Recognition, Gibson bypasses readers’ preconceptions of the 
disabled body, which commonly tend to be imbued with medical values of 
overcoming, compensation, and cure.  
Towards the end of the trilogy the reader is no longer thoroughly informed 
about the protagonists’ bodies in any evaluative sense. In other words, characteristics 
are no longer singled out or marked; instead there is a strong focus on the body’s 
interrelation with various actors, which I have conceptualized as the formative 
process of the articulation of bodies. In conceiving of bodies on a level that precedes 
categorization via actor-network theory, my analysis illustrates how it is the emerging 
constellation of any number and kind of human and non-human, material and 
immaterial actors that determines the abilities and disabilities of a body. When 
abilities and disabilities become a question of enabling and disabling associations, 
autonomy is consequently relational. This insight prompts the call for an ethics of 
care, rather than cure.   
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5. Conclusion: Beyond the Extraordinary Body 
 
Throughout this book I have demonstrated that Gibson puts extraordinary bodies at 
the heart of his work in ways that do not exploit disability as a mere metaphor for 
marginalized Otherness, nor in ways which serve to reassure characters (and readers) 
of the their own normativity. Instead, I have shown that Gibson’s work challenges 
both the notion of the disabled and the non-disabled body to further approximate a 
“disability subjectivity.” Moreover, I have argued that all of Gibson’s trilogies occupy 
a defiant cyberpunk attitude through the subversion of processes of normalization on 
the homodiegetic, as well as heterodiegetic, level. Focusing on the Sprawl trilogy in 
chapter 4.1, I have delineated the ways in which depictions of prostheses and 
corporeal extension are grounded in bio-medical metaphors, which moreover express 
the values of a medical model, which conceptualizes the body in analogy with the 
machine which is mechanical. For this reason, the functionality and practicality of the 
body outweighs the hybrid status of self-identity and the sensory perception of 
protheticized embodiment. Furthermore, Gibson’s literary style engages elements 
from Romantic and Gothic traditions through bio-medical technologies. This new 
combination results in a technoromantic style. As I have argued in chapter 4.2, 
Gibson moves away from the discrete body in the Bridge trilogy and begins to 
approach it as interrelated in social, material, and semiotic terms, thereby expanding 
the spectrum of factors contributing to the construction of disability and its 
interconnections with other subject positions. This relationality rests on the idea that 
the body is dependent on context—whether it be virtual data or concrete city streets—
for the expression of abilities and disabilities. Moreover, I have explored culturally 
informed ableist attitudes and their representations in narrative situations in order to 
demonstrate how the clinical gaze is supplemented by staring (or the avoidance 
thereof) and is rather an act of communication throughout the Bridge novels. In 
chapter 4.3, I have demonstrated that Gibson’s Bigend trilogy focuses even more 
heavily on the processes of the body’s interrelations with human and non-human 
actors and thereby constitutes a new realist style. In relation to extraordinary 
corporeality, the Bigend novels follow an ethics of care, rather than cure. 
 Over the course of my main chapters, I have delineated the ways in which 
Gibson’s thematic interests and literary styles have shifted conceptually and 
stylistically. The liminal position of the body between technologies of the virtual and 
realities of the material in his early work tends toward the prioritization of material 
embodiment. From Casey (“Burning Chrome”) to Case (Neuromancer) to Cayce 
(Pattern Recognition) and beyond, this leads to the incremental corporealization of 
characters, the exploration of lived experience of disability, and the appreciation of 
the material, interdependent human body. Furthering this trajectory, Gibson develops 
an increasingly phenomenological language, which allows approximating the 
processes of the body’s articulation and thus proposes a new realism of the body. In 
turn, the deployment of a new realist style articulates the reader and allows one to 
reach greater sensitivity for the lived experience of extraordinary embodiment.  
 
 
GIBSON’S LATEST 
 
Fourteen years after the Bigend trilogy, Gibson published The Peripheral, 
representing a continuation of his interests in extraordinary embodiment while also 
marking a stark return to traditional science fiction tropes and settings. In The 
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Peripheral, Gibson presents two futures: one of a rural America only about fifteen 
years from now, and the other a distant twenty-second century London. The first 
future follows Flynne Fisher, a professional gamer, who lives in a trailer with her 
veteran brother Burton and takes care of their ailing mother. Flynne lives in a society 
that is culturally, economically, politically, and ecologically on the decline. 
Civilization is just past its peak and the only well-functioning industries are those 
dealing with weapons, narcotics, and video games. Positioning bodies in close 
relation to guns, drugs, and games links corporeality less to the “medical-industrial 
complex” (see Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich) but rather to the “military-entertainment 
complex” (see McKenzie Wark). 
 Between these two futures, eighty percent of the world’s population has been 
wiped out, not due to a singular event such as a meteorite, alien attack, great war, or 
pandemic but to a very slow and thus hardly palpable process that is androgenic. 
Clearly, this marks an allusion to climate change. Only the wealthiest survive what 
far-future characters cynically dub “The Jackpot,” leaving the world in the hands of 
ruthless elites, plutocrats, and celebrities. In Wilf Netherton’s twenty-second century 
London, technology is highly advanced and evokes a broad spectrum of corporeal 
augmentation. Contact between these two futures is established through an ominous 
black market technology known as the “Chinese server,” which allows “continua 
enthusiasts” to reach into the past. To avoid time travel paradoxes, the moment of 
contact creates a fork in time, which causes the contacted time line to split off and 
become a “stub” that leads to another future. The central conflict of the novel arises 
when Flynne, hired to pilot a drone in what she is told to be a video game, witnesses a 
murder which later turns out to have been committed in the future (Netherton’s 
present). Flynne is recruited to help Netherton solve the murder case. In turn, he 
assists her in setting up the assassination of the corrupt president in Flynne’s present. 
 While some critics have celebrated Gibson’s return to science fiction proper, 
others have criticized “how flat and attenuated his prose has become” (Winslow-Yost 
n.pag.). Another source of criticism lies in how simplistic the antagonists are sketched 
as “evil Russians who have turned future London into a kleptocracy, aided by the 
arch-villian, rogue ‘Gulf klept’ and ‘fifth son,’ Al-Habib” (Deb 15). Siddhartha Deb 
notes that it “says something about the state of the culture that such a vision of the 
future is produced, disseminated, and received without much in the way of critical 
comment in countless admiring reviews and profiles” (15). Critics interested in The 
Peripheral’s transhuman cyborgs (Suoranta 2016) or the subjects’ sensory 
connections to technologies (McFarlane 2016) do not discuss disability despite briefly 
mentioning its presence in the text.  
Overall, The Peripheral features a wild assortment of extraordinary 
embodiments in the distant future. The titular peripheral is a humanoid avatar, an 
organically engineered body without consciousness that can be remotely piloted as 
remotely as the past. By means of a headset, Flynne is able to operate a peripheral in 
Wilf’s present in order to identify Daedra’s murderer at a party. In line with 
incremental corporealization, Gibson’s former visions of virtual avatars become 
material semi-human robots to be taken on by the characters. Another form of 
humanoid robots are the Michikoid, embodied AI that perform menial tasks as 
autonomous servants. Wilf and his contemporaries display augmented bodies in terms 
of incorporating communication technologies, such as phone and camera functions 
that are nevertheless operated by touch: “Netherton swiped his tongue from right to 
left, across the roof of his mouth, blanking his phone … he double-tapped the roof of 
his mouth, causing the feeds” (24). In the twenty-second century, embodiment is 
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highly technologized, though not perceived as such. Moreover, Netherton’s client 
Daedra West is a celebrity artist whose performances consist of tattooing her skin 
live, then shedding it in one piece, and marketing each piece as an artifact. The human 
form becomes variable, even ultimately fluid as the protean, shape-shifting figures 
who can walk through walls, and “temporarily occupy the same space and time,” 
explain: we are “[w]ithout fixed form” (455).  
Bodies in twenty-first century are less glamorous. Ex-marine Burton suffers 
from malfunctioning former military cybernetic implants, “haptics” which used to 
pilot him remotely. The initial sentences of The Peripheral introduce the topics of 
mental disorder, military technology, phantom sensations, and disability not in a 
medical but in a political sense.  
 
They didn’t think Flynne’s brother has PTSD, but that sometimes the haptics 
glitched him. They said it was like phantom limb, ghosts of the tattoos he’d 
worn in the war, put there to tell him when to run, when to stand still, when to 
do the bad-ass dance, which direction and what range. So they allowed him 
some disability for that (1). 
 
As much as post-Jackpot bodies are clean and functional, bodies in pre-Jackpot times 
are damaged by war. Burton’s friend and former co-soldier Conner Penske115 is 
constantly pitied by Flynne for the state of his body:  
 
He’d come back in one of the ways that she’d been scared Burton would: 
minus a leg, the foot of the other one, the arm on the opposite side, and the 
thumb and two fingers of the remaining hand. Handsome face unscarred, 
which made it weirder … He made her sad” (36).  
 
Conner is equipped with 3D printed prosthetics, which, contrary to the characters of 
the twenty-second century, is upsetting for Conner’s friends. Flynne observes herself 
when talking to him as, “she was talking to a boy who was half machine, like a 
centaur made out of a motorcycle” (55). 
The Patchers, deformed cannibalistic life forms in far-future London, are 
depicted in a similarly pitiful and revulsive light. Patchers inhabit a future version of 
the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, which they “had assembled from recovered 
polymers” (18). Already in “The Winter Market,” Gibson ponders the significance of 
trash for culture. Casey wonders, “[w]here does the gomi stop and the world begin?” 
and explains that “[t]he Japanese, a century ago, had already run out of gomi space 
around Tokyo, so they came up with a plan for creating space out of gomi. By the 
year 1969 they had built themselves a little island in Tokyo Bay, out of gomi, and 
christened it Dream Island (142-3). Contrary to the Dream Island, the island of trash 
in The Peripheral emerged from human negligence of the environment rather than 
from planned waste disposal. Unlike the uncontaminated, clean, tight cyborg bodies 
of Netherton, to the protagonist Daedra, the Michikoids, and the patchers appear 
utterly repulsive in their fungating, bloated, leaky, and unruly nature. He observes, 
one patcher’s “skin was overgrown with a tweaked variant on actinic keratosis … 
gender indeterminate … its eyes, or possibly goggles, a single lateral smudge” (19). 																																																								
115 Featuring a character by the name of Conner in a novel entitled The Peripheral is hardly a coincidence 
for a technophile writer like Gibson who was surely aware of “Conner Peripherals,” a company that 
manufactured data storage solutions, such as hard drives or tape drives in the 1980s, and was commonly 
referred to as Conner (Walsh 429). 
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Other patchers have “two penises” or are “six-breasted” as “modification had run 
rampant”  (23, 25). Netherton is not only disgusted with the landscape of waste but 
the patchers themselves are, “[n]auseating” to him (23). As villain Hamed al-Habib 
explains, in their attempt to expel the patchers from the island for money, they have 
been infected with “endemic health issues … of which they aren’t yet aware” (468). 
Instead of reading this eradication of non-normative or non-human life forms through 
the lens of eugenics, I suggest that future projects might be interested in interrogating 
the relationship between these creatures’ deviant bodies and their synthetic and partly 
toxic environments. In light of recent dialogues between disability studies and 
environmental humanities scholar, Sarah Jaquette Ray argues in “Risking Bodies in 
the Wild: The ‘Corporeal Unconscious’ of American Adventure Culture” that 
mainstream U.S. environmentalism has a hidden attachment to the healthy, natural, 
and abled body (29). With reference to Stacy Alaimo and Linda Nash’s work, 
Kathryn Yalan Chang argues “that the history of the environment is intertwined with 
the notion of disease and with the issues of social class, gender, and race” (331). Thus 
far, disability studies and environmental humanities have mostly developed in 
separation. I argue that both fields would benefit from more extensive explorations of 
the connections between, for instance, the environmental value of biodiversity and 
human variation. In this regard, scholars have suggested a variety of terms, such as 
“eco-ability” (Anthony J. Nocella II), “prosthetic ecologies” (Cathy J. Schlund-Vials), 
“eco-crip” (Sarah Jaquette Ray and Jay Sibara) and “cripping sustainability” (Kim Q. 
Hall) that beg for further discussion. 
Gibson’s latest work, Archangel, is his first comic book. On the basis of its 
graphic medium, it opens new possibilities for the negotiation of disability. At the 
same time, this change in medium brings to light the fundamental difficulty of 
depictions of disability in literature. That is, in prose anything unstated with regard to 
characterization and description is unconsciously assumed to be within the domain of 
the invisible norm. Readers do not speculate whether Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie 
(1900) walks with a limp or F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Jay Gatsby (1925) relies upon 
medication, until they are in some way explicitly or implicitly told. For example, 
readers are told of Captain Ahab’s prosthetic leg in Moby Dick (Herman Melville, 
1851) and Boo Radley’s learning disability in To Kill A Mockingbird (Harper Lee, 
1960). What the reader is informed of is thus to some extent always already a 
noteworthy difference from the implied norm (of the society either “inside” or 
“outside” the text, or both) and in this way marks the character. What seems like a 
banal observation of the literary practice of characterization in order to facilitate or 
foreclose identification with a character becomes significant in the discussion of how 
language attaches meaning to gendered, racialized, classed, and disabled bodies. I 
have explained how Gibson’s use of language and his literary style have shifted over 
the course of four decades and would like to shortly highlight how Archangel renews 
this impetus to represent the disabled and non-disabled body by means of the 
imbrication of image and text.    
 With regard to the future of cyberpunk, Sterling confidently states in a letter to 
John Kessel in 1985 that as a literary movement it will surely pass: 
 
I don’t worry much about the future of razor’s edge techno-punk. It will be 
bowdlerized and parodized and reduced to a formula, just as all other SF 
innovations have been. It scarcely matters much, because as a ‘movement,’ 
‘Punk SF’ is a joke. Gibson’s a litterateur who happens to have an unrivalled 
grasp of modern pop aesthetic. Shiner writes mainstream and mysteries. 
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Rucker’s crazy. Shirley’s a surrealist; Pat Cadigan’s a technophobe. By ’95 
we’ll all have something else cooking (qtd. Kelly and Kessel vii). 
 
All of the cyberpunk-pack has continued writing after 1995, and yet Sterling’s 
prediction is accurate when bearing in mind the question of style. While The 
Peripheral has re-established Gibson’s role as a science fiction litterateur, his 
literature has evolved since the 1980, thus expanded his professional repertoire of 
stylistic and narrative means through his latest publication of a graphic novel in 2017. 
What is new about the representation of disability in Archangel is that it 
conceptually moves away from the medical deficiency of the individual, as well as the 
social exclusion of the individual from an ableist society, in order to examine the 
body’s processes of interrelation as being merely one character trait out of many. 
Archangel is an alternate history story that imagines a different outcome to World 
War II. The story ruminates on Cold War nuclear anxiety, and centers its plot on 
stopping the evil Vice President in the past via time travel, or as it is called in the 
book “quantum transfer.” Depicted as sitting at a control panel at the military 
quantum transfer facility, Major Guadalupe Torres is one of the main characters and 
is in charge of the transfer of people back and forth in time and space. As a member 
of an unnamed resistance organization, she tries to impede the Vice President’s plan 
to attain global domination.  
Only several frames into the story, Torres is unambiguously shown in a 
wheelchair. Important to the argument of this thesis, the character is not introduced as 
a wheelchair-user but as a military major. Contrary to the narrators’ clinical gaze in 
Gibson’s early work, for instance the ways Casey examines Lise’s passive body as it 
is maneuvered by the exoskeleton in “The Winter Market,” Torres’ condition is never 
commented on by any of the characters. This is not out of embarrassment or pity, I 
argue, but because her corporeality is entirely inconsequential for the events taking 
place. The depiction does not frame her body as suffering from a medical disability or 
represent it as socially marginalized. The wheelchair is discernable in some, but not 
all scenes. I trace this back to its status as being no more noteworthy than other 
features, such as her brown hair or green clothes and not due to attempts of 
concealment for the purpose of passing. In effect, using a wheelchair is just one trait 
out of many, and a rather insignificant one in that. The only mention in the story of 
Torres’s physique is by herself in a joke about military posture. In this scene, the 
military pushes their way through the bolted and barred facility and overpowers her. 
Thrown to the floor, she exclaims defiantly, “apologies for not standing at attention” 
(n.pag.)—a joke that is made not at her expense but to show her ability to mock 
authority.  
In the afterword, outside of the narrative, Gibson provides a short resume of 
all characters and states with regard to Torres that “she pilots a noisy electric 
wheelchair and wears a brace on one leg” (n.pag.). There are two final observations 
that I would like to make at this point. First, learning about Torres’s brace in the 
afterword (although it is not shown or even identifiable in any image) might challenge 
the implication of a “normal” body from the absence of notification. Gibson hints at 
the fact that her bodily variation may exist in narrative to varying degrees. The 
wheelchair is visible when Torres moves, though the brace is unnoticeable under her 
clothes. Instead of a narrative strategy or a metaphor for something else, her 
extraordinary physique becomes a rather insignificant character trait. Secondly, in 
contrast to early expressions of the use of prosthetics, for example Lise being 
“propped up” in her exoskeleton, Torres “pilots” her wheelchair. Once more I point to 
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the significance of language as the shift from a passive to an active verb form 
demonstrates the crucial difference in the perception of an identity (one’s own as well 
as somebody else’s) as having agency or not. Fought for by contemporary disability 
activist groups, Gibson’s shift in language can be read in correspondence to the 
cultural move away from the offensive expression of being “wheelchair-bound” to 
instead being named a “wheelchair-user.” As an expression, “to pilot a wheelchair” 
bespeaks activity and control, while acknowledging the enabling rather than disabling 
effect of the device. However, language alone does not make the body. As Segal 
underscores, “[t]here is no easy exchange of terms. Metaphors highlight some things 
and hide others and render some things obvious and some things unthinkable” (130). 
Yet, I argue that in consideration of Gibson’s entire oeuvre, he arrives at a 
new, flexible norm in his latest work. In the depiction of a female Mexican 
wheelchair-user, it is no longer useful to speak of disability, or even extraordinary 
embodiment. Torres does not express any limitation except for the inability to stand 
that becomes relevant only in the character’s mocking of authority. In Archangel, 
Gibson resolves disability not in the eugenic sense of the eradication of impaired 
bodies, but by means of a changed future social and ideological world order that 
attends to human variation.  
In closing, I would like to emphasize the potential of Gibson’s fiction for 
disability studies discourse. Not only does Gibson’s work challenge notions of the 
normal and the disabled body, but it provides new ways of portrayal to articulate 
readers’ sensitivity and re-configure public perception of the human body in general. 
A disability-informed criticism allows for consideration of Gibson’s extraordinary 
figurations’ defiance against an ableist social order. His vocabulary and imagery 
encourages readers to think and speak the human body anew. From Burning Chrome 
to Archangel, from technoromanticism to new realism, Gibson’s extraordinary bodies 
challenge the status quo.  
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